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Preface 
It has been my desire to carry out this study of my 
six year son and hie companions impersonally, and und~r 
the conditions laid down I think that this is possible. 
Th·e one effect of the relationship of mother and son in 
the observations as carried on, it seems to me, comes ·from 
the very naturalness of the attitude which the child has 
with me, the observer. Therefore, he feels no restraint 
whatever and because of that the panorama of his thoughts 
unfolds easily and in an entirely unhampered fashion. In 
the test periods I have tried to create a happy friendly 
relationship with each one of the group. I sat in their 
play and school groups part of every day for a month and 
became an accepted onlooker before attempting any indivi-
dual work. However, I realize fully that the happy years 
of companionship I have had with David can never be 
approached with any of them. 
This study of the members of this group of twelve is 
offered simply as an accompaniment to the fuller study of 
David, and not as an exhaustive scientific study in any 
sense. 
In a letter from M. Bovet, a director of the Institut 
J.J. Rousseau, Geneva, Switzerland, and a co-worker with 
M. Piaget, we have the information that experiments based 
on Piaget's findings have been carried on in Germany by 
several, among them Professor Katz and his wife, and in 
Cambridge, Engla.nd, by Mrs. Isaacs; also that M. Piaget 
is preparing a general review and discussion of some 
papers which have appeared in different countries in 
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It must be made clear in the very beginning that the 
basis for this thesis is the two volumes by Dr. Jean Piaget, 
· Institut J. J. Rousseau, Geneva, Switzerland, The Language 
and Thought of the Child and Judgment and Reasoning in the 
Child; hence the very small bibliography, the material used 
being observations and experimental tests based on these 
volumes,l 
Much has been written heretofore on the vocabulary and 
phonetics of child language, piling up statistics on the 
number of words various children have acquired at different 
ages and on the sentence structure (number of adjectives, 
adverbs, ·Conjunctions, etc.) used at different ages. 2 In 
the division of the year book referred to, on studies in 
language development, one hundred forty-three books are 
listed and various others referred to in the discussion of 
the problems. 
1 
Throughout this thesis these volumes will be referred to 
as L.T. and J,R. 
2 . s Of. The Twenty-eighth, Year-Book of the National ociety 
for Study of Education--Preschool and Parental 
Education: Studies in Language Development, 495-568. 
a 
Ohild thought back of its language has ~uzzled psy-
chologists since child study has been a matter of interest.l 
It remained for Dr. Piaget in his keen, logio~c.,manner to 
pull aside the curtain of mere vocabulary and analyze the 
thoughts of childhood; a for in.stance, the reasons why they 
use so few conjunctions and why they use certain ones more 
frequently than others, what they mean by the ones they 
use, etc., and what all this is evidence of in child thought. 
In true scientific spirit he gives the results of his 
careful and tireless research, opens up the field to fellow-
workers and invites others to further study, offering his 
own findings as guide-posts, not as final ends. As a result 
of his studies he puts child thought in just as distinct a 
class as •primitive• thought or the •autistic• thought of 
the pscyhoanalyst. To this class he gives the name •ego-
centric• (for reasons given later) and places it midway 
between autistic and social thought. 
The distinguishing feature of this world of child 
thought is ego-centrism (intellectual, not ethical, and by 
no means to be thought of as secretive), the child's self 
being bound up with his every concept and bij of reasoning. 
However, the child is entirely unconscious of this situation. 
1of. E. Olaparede: Preface, ix., to L.T. 
2of. E. Olaparede: Preface, ~i., to L.T. 
Only by socioalizing processes is a change wrought in the 
child's mind and he comes finally to develop·pure reasoning. 
For in so far as he is thinking only fo~ 
himself, the child has no need to be aware of the 
mechanism of hie reasoning. Hie attention is 
wholly turned toward the external world, towards 
action, in no way directed toward thought as a med-
ium interposed between the world and himself. In 
so far, on the other hand, as the child seeks to 
adapt himself to others, he creates between himself 
and them a new order of reality, a new place of 
thought, where speech and argument will henceforth 
hold their sway, and upon which operations and 
relations which till then have been the work of 
action alone will now be handled by imagination and 
words. The child will therefore have to become con-
scious to the same extent of these operations and 
relations which till then remained unconscious 
because they were sufficient for the purposes of 
action.l 
In other words, the process of learning an 
operation on the verbal plane will reproduce the 
same incidents as had arisen when this operation 
was being learned on t i1 e plane of action •••• This 
shifting from action to thought can be observed 
at every turn.2 
These two processes are condensed into the "law of 
conscious realization• and the "law of shifting." Of 
the first, Piaget says, 
1 
This law seems to us fundamental for esta~ 
lishing relations between the functional 
factors of childish thought,particularly be-
tween ego•centrism and the absence of social 






·'J.R!·· , 213. 
4 
Until the socializing process has had i ·ts way the child 
is incapable of reasoning as an adult reasons, on logical 
grouqds; ego-centrism of child thought being accompanied by 
(1) proneness to j~taposition (placing of concepts side 
by side on equal basis, without relationship), (2) syn-
cretism, or thinking in confused wholes, and intellectual 
realism---he sees only what he knows and connects everything 
1 
with his own mental schema, so he connects everything with 
everything else and justifies it at any price. This all 
,.. l~ad.s to ( 3) ';·recausal.i ty, an ignorance of the distinction 
between the physical and the psychical, therefore a ten-
dency to regard ·the world as endowed with both these qualities 
at the same time. (4) Transduction--he reasons from par-
;ticUlfl.l" to particul~ , .. not by synthesis. He builds no 
hierarchies of relationships, therefore he forgets what he 
has previously said when he has adopted a new particular. 
So he contradicts himself and he cannot retrace the steps 
of his own reasoning until, by contact of his own ideas 
with and adjustments to those of other people, his thought 
becomes socialized and he learns to see relationships in 
hierarchies and thus to build up synthetic wholes, to 
separate his reasoning processes from hie point of view, 
to ret~ace hie steps of reasoning, in short, to reaaon 
abstractly. 
Such, in a very condensed form, is the field for 
investigation into the realm of child thought built up on 
the basis of its ego-centrism. 
Piaget 1 s two vg_lumes, !he Language and Thought of 
the Ohild and Jud~ent and Reasoninf in the Child 
constitute a firs psychological ou line. of the 
Dogie of Childhood.~ 
Piaget concludes that there are four stages of modal-
ity of child thought: (1) From birth to 2-3 years--reality 
is simply and solely what is desired: (2) From 2-3 to 7-8 
years--heterogeneous but equal realities, world of play and 
world of observation; jumps quickly from one to the other; 
(3) From 7-8 to 11-12 years--beginning of hierarchical 
arrangement; (4) From 11-12 years on to complete hierar-
chical arrangement, that is, formal thought and logical 
assumption. 
5 
Now the age with which I wish to deal particularly is 
the six-year-old child. This should be of special interest 
because Piaget devotes much time in The Language and Thought 
of the Child to his findings with this age of Swiss-French 
children, taking two at the Institut J.J. Rousseau for long 
periods of observations. 
My observations include the study of my son, David, 
age 5:10-6:2, individually at home and together with his 
play-group and school-group (low first grade, Woodrow 
Wilson School, Stockton, California). In this school group 
1oomment in the ·Twenty-eiihth Yea,r;-Book of the NationBJ. . 
·society for Study of ducation~Preschool 8Jld Parental 
Education; Studies in Language Development, 565. 
" 
,, 0.. . I 
only those ·took part in the general conversa~ion or we1e . 
members of the smaller groups during the observation periods 
are considered. E~erimenta~ tests were carried on with a 
special group of twelve children from the larger group. 
These e;periments began three months before the mental tests 
were given, the genera.l observations extended over four months 
including vacation. The children at home are designated 
throughout by initial, those at school by number. 
Before setting forth theee observations, one criticism 
of Piaget•s method is offered. As far as can be discerned 
he bases his entire study according to the chronological age 
of the child. Because of the wide variation in the mental 
age of children of the same chronological age, it would 
seem a very important oversight. Surely all children do 
not reach the same stage of thought and language develop-
ment at the same chronological age of 2-3, .7-B, 11-12 years, 
or even at these mental ages, for the I.Q. ' of the child 
has a greater influence than the mental age in determining 
his rate of development. There seems to be an indication 
that those of a high I.Q. are developing more rapidly in 
these distinctions than children of the same menta~ age 
but lower I.Q. However, in group average, the group under 
our observ~tioa (as will be shown) corresponds to the aver-
age mental age rather than to the chronological. 
1urther .research is needed since Piaget has opened 
up the field and has himself neglected to emphasize anything 
but chronological age. Even if he is establ~shing norms 
they should be more closely allied to those by which men-
tal ages and I.Q.Ja are secured. These allow much more 
for individual differences in their establishment. 
In view of these facts we have obtained through a 
group test1 the mental age and I.Q. of the groups observed. 
It should be understood therefore that these are only 
indicative and not to be taken as being as reliable as 
individual tests, since they do not bring out so thoroughly 
fine points in individual development. 
The following table gives the chronological and 
mental ages of the school group observed, and arranges the 
children in the order of their I.Q.•s. The numbers starred 
are those in the smaller group of twelve described in the 
following chapter. 
M.A. O.A. M.A. O.A. l4.A. O.A. 
*No. 1 8:1 6:2 •No. 10 8 ·0 ..... 7:9 •No. 19 6:10 6:9 
*No. 2 8:3 6:5 No. 11 7:9:. 7:2 *No. 20 6:7 6:6 
*No. 3 8:3 6:7 No. 12 7:2 6:7 No. 21 6:8 6:7 
•No. 4 7:7 6:2 No. 13 7:3 6:9 No. 22 7:6 7:5 
*No. 5 8:0 6:8 No. 14 7:1 6:7 No. 23 7:0 7:1 
•No. 6 7:11 6:8 •No. 15 7:6 7:1 No. 24 6:11 7:5 
•No. 7 7:8 6:8 No. 16 7:11 7:6 No. 25 6:4 6:10 
*No. 8 7:11 7:0 No. 17 6:6 6:2 No. 26 7:7 8:5 
··wo. 9 6:11 6:1 No. 18 7:3 7:1 No. 27 7:7 8:8 
Average for group of 12• ••• 7:8 ••• 6:8 
1 Detroit Primary Tests. 
7 
Some explanation regarding this table is necessary. 
All children who ever made any remarks in the group are listed, 
but some of them, shy by nature, made so few that individually 
they make no perceptible difference in the group findings. 
The ~otive for including them is to show the relative pos-
ition in the larger group of those who did the most talking. 
This is to be said, however, that no one in the first twenty-
two out of the twenty-seven is below the I•Q. of the low-
est in the smaller group of twelve. The only one below that 
mark who made enough remarks to consider at all is No. 27, 
who · talked frequently. 
In the free conversation period at school the group 
of twelve made 71% of all spontaneous remarks and when the 
children in the play period at school broke up into smaller 
groups I always chose for observation the particular one 
~ontaining the largest number of the twelve children in the 
e;perimental group, hence 90% of the spon~aneous conversa-
tion is here carried on by these twelve. 
In home play it was impossible to obtain the mental 
ages of all the ten children who ever played in these periods. 
However, the one, s., who played most constantly with D., 
and who, with him, made 73% of all the remarks in home play, 
had M.A. 7:3; O.A. 5:4, by the same tests which were given to 
the other children at school. The four children who did 
90% of the talking in home play had average M.A. 7:9, C.A. 
6:4. The other 10% of remarks were divided between six 
children so did not affect the findings to any great extent 
in comparison to these four in 90% of remarks. This was as 




Methods and Purposes of Observations 
In this study the observations of the child or children 
have been divided into six groups. Each observation period 
has been one-half hour in length. The method in the first 
four groups has been to take down verbatim, under all the 
conditions .of the various groups, the spontaneous language 
of the child. No artificial conditions were produced, for 
these would have nullified the purpose of the observations. 
In all the groups a study has been made of remarks of an 
ego-centric character and of socialized remarks. 
(1) At ·the family meal the purpose was to determine 
the extent to which the child entered into the general con-
versation and adapted his own remarks to it, and to study 
and analyze his questions and his use of conjunctions. 
--
(a) During the half-hour of conversation with the 
writer the method was to let the conversation be directed 
by the child's inclinations entirely and develop naturally 
along these lines. It is also important to note that the 
child chose the activity to be engaged in, whether games, 
puzzles, story-telling, or just a quiet talk, usually at 
bed-time. His remarks were answered when he e;pected an 
answer but no attempt was made to direct the conversation. 
Here also his questions and use of conjunctions were studied 
ll 
and analyzed. 
(3) In the play-groups at home and at school, the 
purpose as before was to study their questions and· use of 
conjunctions and to determine the stages of conversation 
represented. 
(4) During the free conversation period at school the 
child%en were perfectly free to express themselves. They 
usually told of some experience or showed something they had 
made or possessed. ~ae rest of the group listened, asked 
questions, criticized or offered suggestions if they felt 
inclined. They simply drew their chairs into a circle; 
someone had something he was anxious to tell the group about, 
and once begun the conversation took its own natural course. 
Here again their questions, their use of conjunctions, their 
proneness to juxtap9sition, and their stages of conversation 
were studied. 
(5) In a special group of twelve (the ones starred in 
the list given in the previous chapter) experimental tests 
were given. Here the procedure in the other groups of 
following the natural drift of their spontaneous conver-
sation was laid aside, and they were set definite tests to 
determine (1) their use of the conjunctions 'because', 
'although', and 'therefore'; (2) their ability to pick 
out absurdities in sentences given and tell their reason 
for thinking them absurd; (3) their ability to handle 
'brother (or sister)' and 'right and left 1 situations 
12 
relatively; (4) their ability to cope with t~e syllogism; 
(5) their definitions of words designated by Piaget, in-
volving relative ideas, as 'half', 'part•, 'brother•, 
'family', etc.: (6) their idea of 'life', and of 'strength', 
taking P1aget 1 s lists and asking of each thing, "Is it alive," 
and "Why?" (or 1 Why nott•), •Is it strong?" and "Why? 1 
(or •Why ·nott"); (6 
(6) Experiments were tried with the same twelve 
children by twos to test in story-telling their ability to 
understand each other and to reproduce stories and e~lan­
ations. 
Such was the procedure followed to obtain the material 
for analysis, always based on the methods followed by Piaget 
in his study. The one point of difference, however, always 
to be kept in mind is that in our conclusions emphasis is 
laid on the mental age together with the chronological,{or 
according to I.Q.), whereas Piaget 1 s seem ·to take into con-
sideration only the chronological age. These observations 
e~tended over a period of four months (including school 
vacations). The material obtained from these observations 
consists of the following number of remarks: 
With . Without 
answers answers 
Of all children in groups: 
In school play •••••••••••••. 694 .••••••••••• 651 
In home play ••••••••• ~ ••.•.•• 743 •••••••••••• 691 
-
In free conversation (sc~ool) 744 ••....••• 636 
In all play g.roups •.•••••...• l437 ••••••••• l342 
In all groups •••••••.•••••••• 2181 ••.•••••• 1978 
Of D., the individual child studied: 
At bed-time ••••..•........••• l031 ••••••.•• 982 
At meal-time ••••••••.......•• 613 ••••••••• 540 
At home (with adults, next older brother being 
12:8-13) •••••.•...•••.•• 1644 •••••••• 1522 
In home play •••••••.•......•• 413 •••..••• 392 
In school play •••••.....•.••• 152 •••...•• 143 
In free conversation (school) 87........ 74 
In children's groups ••.•.•••• 652 ••....•• 609 
With family and with children 
2296 •••••••• 2131 
Total number of all children' s re-
marks in children • s groups and of 
the individual child in other groups. 
3825 •••••... 3500 
These figures have been given both with and with-
out answers since Piaget e~cludes all answers to adults 
or to each other from children's spontaneous language 




Functions of Language 
Perhaps it is to be regretted that these observations 
might not have been carried on under precisely the same 
conditions as Piaget's for the sake of an e~ct comparison, 
but he invites the extension of observations and the var-
iety of material brings out interesting point_s of differ-
ence in some respects and likenesses in others. 
In the first place we accept as proven his hypothesis 
of the large part played by ego-cen trio language in the 
child up to 7~8 years (but we mean mentally) when observed 
steadily throughout the day, because of the effects of ego-
centrism which we still find in these children, even though 
our observations show that it is on the wane in this par-
ticular group and child. 
The conditions which were chosen under which we were 
to observe were in every case social conditions, whereas 
Piaget•s observers followed his subjects about all day at 
school and studied them, both alone and in groups. For 
instance, he speaks of one boy who every now and then in-
dulges in fantasies which isolate him for several hours 
and during which he soliloquizes for several hours.1 Our 
findings should be considered with these facts in mind. 
15 
However, we shall set forth his types of language and 
our examples of each type. He divides language into two 
tY,pes, ego-centric and socialized. Ego-centric language is 
then divided into three categories and socialized into five. 
He describes these eight categories as follows (the abbre-
viations in parentheses after the names are those used 
· later in this study in giving examples): 
Ego-centric: 
(1) Repetition (Repit) •••• of words and 
syllables ••• for the pleasure of talking, with 
no thought of talking to anyone, nor even at 
times of saying words that will make sense ••• 
(2) Monologue (M): The child talks to · 
himself as though he were thinking aloud. He 
does not address anyone. 
(3) Collective Monologue (O.M.): The 
contradiction contained in the phrase recalls 
the paradox of those conversations between 
children •• ~where an outsider is always assoc-
iated with the action or thought of the moment, 
but is expected neither to attend nor to under-
stand. The point of view of the other person 
is never taken into account; his presence serves 
only as a stimulus. 
Socialized: 
(4) Adapted Information (A.I.): Here the 
child really exchanges his thoughts with others, 
either by telling his hearer something that will 
interest him and influence his actions, or by 
an actual interchange of ideas by argument or even 
by collaboration in ~ursuit of a common aim •••• 
(5) Criticism ~0): This group includes all 
remarks made about the work or behaviour of others 
but having the same character as adapted informa-
tion; in other words, remarks specified in rela-
tion to a given audience. Eut these are more 
affective than intellectual, !.e., they assert 
the superiority of the self and depreciate others. 
One might be tempted in view of this to plac.e this 
group among the ego-centric categories. But 
'ego-centric' is to be taken in an intellectual 
not in an ethical sense, and there can be no 
doubt that in the cases under consideration one 
child acts upon another in a way that may give rise 
to agruments, quarrels, and emulation, whereas 
the ·utterances of the collective monologue are 
without any effect upon the person addressed. 
The shades of distinction, moreover, between 
adapted information and criticism are often ex-
tremely subtle and can only be established by' the 
context. . 
{6) Commands, Requests, Threats (O.,R.,T.): 
In all of these there is definite interaction 
between one child and another. 
(7) Questions (Q.): Most questions asked 
by children among themselves call for an answer 
and can therefore be classed as socialized speech, 
with certain reservations •••• 
(8) Answers (Ana.): Bf these are meant 
answers to real questions lwith interrogation 
mark) and to commands. They are not to be com-
pared to those answers given in the course of con-
versation (categ.4) to remarks which are not 
questions but belong to 'information•. 
These, then are the eight fundamental cate-
gories of speech. It goes without saying that 
this classification, like any other, is open to 
the charge of artificiality. What is more im-
portant, however, is that it should stand the 
test of practical application, t.e.,that any 
reader who has made himself familiar with our 
criteria. should place the same phrases more or 
less in the same categories.l 
We have quoted in full Piaget 1 s criteria for the 
eight functions of language, since they are the neo.essary 
basis for the understanding of the classification of our 
observations. Of his methods, Olaparede says, 
His only aim in collecting,recording and 
cataloguing all these different types of be-
havior is to see the assembled materials in a 
clearer light, to facilitate the task of com• 
paring and affiliating them one to another. Our 
author has a special talent for letting the 
material speak for itself, or rather for hearing 
it speak for itself. What strikes me first in 
this book of his is the natural way in which the 
16' 
general ideas have been suggested by the facts; 
the latter have not been forced to fit Teady-
made hypotheses.l 
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Every remark taken down in our study has been classi-
fied according to the criteria of Piaget, with the one 
following exception. 
Because of the social nature of the conditions under 
which our observations were taken and the fact that Piaget 
says that either collaboration in action or association in 
thought-
•••• in the sense that everyone listen~ to and 
understands the speaker, but there is no col-
laboration because each child speaks only of 
himself, and of his own action, or his own 
thoughts.2 
--lifts remarks out of collective monologue into the second 
stage of conversation and marks the first step toward 
socialization of thought and language, we have therefore 
given to such remarks our own title of 'monologue type', 
indicating their _similarity to collective .monologue. 
Oolleot1ve monologue takes place wherever the 
child talks about himself, except in those 
oases where he does so during collaboration 
with his hearer ••• and except in cases of dia-
logue. Dialogue, in our view, occurs when 
the child who has been spoken to in a propo-
sition, answers by talking about something 
which was treated of in this propoett~on ••• 
and does not start off on some cock-and-bull 
etory as so often happens in collective mono-
logue.3 
1E. Clap~ede, Preface to t~:T·. · XV 
. 2t}:;:r~ 54 
·3 - · . 
1:/; 'l". 21 
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Our distinction will become clear as e~amples. are given. 
These remarks, to our mind after a thorough study of Piaget, 
are still of ego-centric type though listened to, for each 
child seems to listen only to pick up some idea or schema 
about which to weave his own remarks regarding himself, 
his action, or his e~erience. 
E~amples of Repetit1on: 1 
In home play there is just one e~ample of repetition. 
B. Here's the kind I want. 
D. Here 1 e the kind I want. 
J. Here's the kind I want. 
In school play there are seven instances, or 1% of 
their total conversation. 
l) No. 10. Now we can make the longest ones, if we can. 
No. 1. If we can. 
a) No. 10. Why don 1 t you paste your mouth togetherJ 
No. 6. Paste your mouth shut and you can • t talk., 
Why don't you past your mouth shut? 
No. 2. Paste your mouth shut. 







10. What's that? 
15. Got a cake. , 
a. (laughs) Got a cake. 
7. I'm going to wear my wrist watch the last 
day of school and a new shirt and a new tie. 
a. A wrist watch, a shirt, and a tie. 
D., at family meal, 1%. 
(Picks up a remark of his father's about a dog) Did 
you ever see a dog-dog-dog? 
D., at bed-time, 1%. 
1 In all remarks of children quoted in this study, paren-
theses are used to indica-te-· remarks of older persons or 
explanation of circumstances. 
I .. f 
l) (Pretending his stuffed animals are talking) 
Ma-ma. Da-da. 
2) Look at that (a strip of paste-board balanced; 
I look). Touch it, touch it, touch it (Repeats 
this as he touches it and 'see-saws' it.) 
.Repetition being a remnant of baby habits, it is 
natural that there should be only these rare instances. 
E~ampl~S ·~- df Monologue Type: 
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In these examples the fact is to be kept in mind that 
they are merely akin to those types as Piaget defines them. 
The fact that our subjects are always in pairs or in groups 
and playing with the same things differentiates their re-
marks from the real collective monologue by their association 
in a common activity, but otherwise they are the same sort 
of remarks, therefore ego-centric in origin. Since these 
children never separate themselves from any group in these 
observation periods, and since monologue and collective 
monologue are two varieties of the same category we have 
not separated them. 
In ho~e-play these examples simply consist of instances 
where these children announce to each other what they are 
doing. 
1) (They are coloring pictures in magazines) A. I'm 
going to get brown to color this hair. There's 
orange and black, but the black is broken. I'm 
going to take orange today. Are you using scarlet? . 
(Her remarks of monologue type turn into questions , 
which finally draw out a reply.) Why don't you 
take another color, What color have you now? 
D. Blue. These are blue-birds... , 
2) (The two tehildl:en are playing with an electric 
train.) · 
J. (Playing with the switch) I turn this and 
1· 
it turns this; and turn this and it turns this. They 
jump off the trains and get a hold of this and turn 
it back. This makes it go straight. (No reply from 
D.) 1 
3) (Building with Lincoln logs. ) B. My house· almost 
fell down, 
D. There now. 
B. Oh, boyJ Here's something I want. 
In school-play. 
1) (They are playing in the play-house, a corner of the 
. hall with low partitions and doll furniture in it.) 
No. 16. Here's another chair; isn't it cuteT 
No. 20. (Of a dish.) Oh, who broke that? (lieither 
answers the other.) . 
A few instances in this group occur when each child is 
working individually, as painting a picture, although others 
are doing theirs .at the sanle wide easel J and illustrate more 
nearly eollective monologue but they do not talk just about 
themselves. 
2) No. 15. My mother's sick in bed. (No one answers.) 
No. 1 This (his picture) is a car on a hill. 
No. 15. He's making a car on a hill. (To no. 1) 
you're going to get your shirt painted pretty soon. 
You put long sky down there. (No attention paid 
to any of these remarks.) : · 
No. lS. Now what did I put that up there for.? 
No. 15. When you get through you can wash th~ 
(the brushes) in there. (No answer.) 
No. 18. Stir it up. Stir it up. There isn't 
much black in here. 
No. 15. Two big eyes. 
No. 18. (About no. 1's painting) He's making a car 
up on a hill. (About his own) Here's. another weed 
growing up beside this one. Heyl Look at the nose. 
Let's see what I need. 
Here each.one is interested merely in the e~ression of 





his own thoughts and pays no attention to wha.t the others 
say. 
The following is of a different circumstance. · The little 
girls have been playing with clay and carrying on a conver-
sation together, but No. 5, having finished her clay doll, 
begins to talk to herself, though at the table with the others. 
3) No. 5. Why don't you stay on, Mr. Leg? See, ·here's 
his tail. How's he going to sit down1 ,Oh, gosh 
sakes! I can't make anything. It makes me mad, 
too. I ~ess I won't make no legs. (This tends to-
ward monologue. The others hear but go on with 
their play.) · 
Some of the clearest types of collective monologue have 
been given, but included in the percentages later under mono-
logue tYPe will be those remarks also where the child simply 
announces to the group with which he is playing just what 
he is about to do. Where an adult would think this out by 
himself and offer the socialized result, the child in these 
instances takes everyone into his confidence and thinks aloud.1 
Half of the monologue type remarks in this group, school-play, 
are of this nature and half are of the clearer e~amples, such 
as have been given. The following is of the announcing 
variety, but with the whole conversation to consider one can 
readily see their cooperation in the whole enterprise. 
4) (Playing in the sand.) No. 8. Now we need a lot 
. of wet dirt. I'm going to get some water and 
make a lot of wet dirt and build a palace. This is 
both wet and dry sand. 
No. a. I'm going to wet the sand all around here. 
No. a. I'm going to build a house. 
No. 2. We 1 ~e going to put some dry sand on. · 
No. 1. That's my place, cause that's where I put 
the water in. 
No. a. (To No. a.) That's my pail, but you can have it. 
Letts side it up here so the water won't run out. 
This conversation continues in this vein but soon develops 
into more socialized conversation as they become thoroughly 
interested in a cooperative idea. 
I
R.) No. a. No more dirt. It's enough. 
Ans.l No. 2. We need some more. 
A.I. No. a. No, we don 1t. I'll make a door here. 
A.I. No. 2. I'll make a window here. 
A.I. No. 1. I'll make a cliff here by the side of 
the house. 
!A.I.l No. B. This is a king's palace. A.I. No. 1. This is the king's garage. A.I. No. 8. No, let's have it a house near the king's 
i
alaoe. This is the king. 
Q.) No. 1. What? The acorn? 
Ans.) No. s. Tn~ acorn is ~he people. This is me. 
I'm the king. · · . 
~
A.I.l No. 1. I'm the queen. 
A.I. No. 2. Here comes me. 
!;I. No. a. Here's the thing that walks around the 
house. (The guard.) Here comes the road. They're 
makin~ it. · 
(A.I.) No. 2. Here comes the man up on top of the 
house. There's the bell. Let 1s wash our hands. 
This example (4) monologue type and socialized, shows 
how easily announcement runs into adapted information in group 
activity and so is a . ~lgher . s.:tep in·· socialization than true 
collective monologue, hence, our classification, monologue 
type. 
In free conversation there are practically no e~amples 
of collective monologue, since for the most part they are 
interested in what each one is saying to the e ~tent of listen-
ing a.nd at least adap.:t.ing ... th.eir own remarks to some word or 
general idea in what .another has said. Their individual 
tales group about a general topic or outgrowth· from some other 
child 1 s remarks. Often they show keen interest and question, 
criticize, or make suggestions to the one who has told of 
some e;perience or shown something he has made. Hence, the 
e~amples of monologue type are only those rema%ks in which 
the child breaks away from any connection with what has been 
said to tell something about himself or his experience. 
(They have been showing things they have made in school 
or have been talking about their play.) No. 9. One night 
I had a story and my mother read in a book about a man 
and he preached a sermon in a bad country and they put 
him in a river and a~· .. black man came and pulled him out 
again. 
No. 20. One day my little brother wanted to go right 
out and they wouldn't let him and I put on his rain-
coat and he went right out. 
No commen~ is made on either remark and the children go on 
talking about their play. 
With the child .at the family meal the examples occur 
when he separates himself in thought from the rest of the . . 
group and talks about his food or thinks aloud without look-
ing for a reply. All such remarks number 27 out of 613 
total remarks at the table, or 4%. 
1) If I haven't the biggest (dish of custard), I 1ve 
got next to the biggest. If I haven't got ne~t to 
the biggest, I've got the next to the ne~t to the · 
biggest. (And so on.) 
2) I took three bites of this and three of that ••• and 
then I'll take four bites of this and four of that •• 
(,and so on. ) 
or when he makes such remarks as 
3
4
) My glasses are stretched, mother. 
) All I've been eating is olives. 
5) I'd like to know who had to speak to me to make _me 
eat to-night, I'd like to know. 
At bed-time remarks of this type occur when he talks to 
an imaginary playmate or to his stuffed animala. 
l) (Making a string-doll nod) How do you do, today? 
(Winding it again) I do think this is going to oe a 
better 11 How do you do, today." 
2) (Playing with stuffed animals) You guys are guys 
_ with shoe-button eyes. Do you know itl 
or he announces what he is doing, 
3) I 1m going to take the whole shoe-string out and make 
it perfectly straight. Now I am going to take these 
little pajamas and scramble in. I'm going to show 
you folks, show you folks. 
or he thinks aloud (the following conversation leads up to 
the ne?Ct e_~ample), . 
Have you got a pin I could stick in my apple? (What 
for?) Like you said about the world; it was a .round 
ball and you go and go and go and come back to the 
same place. (He is given a pin.) · 
4) (Sticks the pin in and eats around the apple to it.) 
I came right back to it. Now I am going around again. 
I coasted half-way. You know what coasted is with a 
~ar. I turned my engine off, that 1 s the noise I make 
with my eating. I'm not half through with my apple 
yet. This makes two apples I've had today. 
Even this is adapted in a way to the remarks which preceded. 
There are 34 remarks of the announcing variety, 40 of the 
thinking aloud variety, and 7 when talking to his stuffed 
animals. 
These examples illustrate what Piaget means by ego-
centric language where the urge is to e;prees the child's own 
thoughts but not for any interchange of thought with the one 
who hears the remarks. Piaget finds the proportion in his two 
si~-year-old subjects of ego-centric speech to other forms 
of spontaneous language to be 47% for one and 43% for the 
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other, or 39% and 37% respectively of their total remarks.1 
Our findings exhibit a much lower percentage; 12% of ego• 
centric to other forms of spontaneous remarks, or 11% of 
the total remarks of these children's groups~· and for the 
individual child in the same three groups 11% to the other 
forms of spontaneous speech or 10% of total remarks. These 
findings, as has been said, are undoubtedly influenced by 
the conditions of our observations, but because of the other 
findings which will be set forth in later chapters, we know 
that ego-centrism is decidedly on the wane with the individ-
ual child and special group studied. Then too no restraint 
. 
was laid on these children.to .prevent their separating them-
selves to a greater extent in thought and indulging in more 
ego-centric speech. They did it enough to evidence their 
familiarity with it and ind'-ll.ged in it the least in their 
I 'I\ 
conversation period, which it would have been least appro-
" priate. A sense of fitness is evidently growing in their 
minds. 
Piaget, to ascertain the decline in ego-centrism in 
one of hie subjects, ha~ him observed similarly a few months 
after he was seven years old and found the coefficient of 
2 ego-centrism to have been reduced from 0.47 to 0.27. 
We have offered no coefficient of ego-centrism for 
this child or group because the conditione under which Piaget 
1 
Cf. L·. T ~ ;a.· 35 f. 
2Cf. L!.T:;., 42. 
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observed could not be exactly reproduced and it would not be 
a true comparison unless they were. 
Examples of socialized type of language, with categories 
named but not considered separately: 
In home play these examples are taken from the conver-
sation of two children who constantly play together and are 
on the same level of mentality (the little girl though just 
five ranks over seven mentally, and the little boy a year 
older in each case). 73% of home play conversation is by 
these t wo. 
l) (This is a continuation of a conversation while they 
are building with Lincoln logs.) 
(A.I.) D. Then you won't have any garage. (R.) I'll 
tell you. Take this down and put them all in here. 
Wait. Now fix it. 
(R.) s. Take everything out. (A.I.) I can fix it. 
I'm going to make the garage. · 
(A.I.} D. I'm making it eo your car will go right under 
the wall. 
(A.I.) s. No, I don't want it to. I'm going to make 
a house or something. ( R.) Pla.y like I left my car 
over there. I've got a good idea.; play like we build 
it and one goes right up. 
(A.I.) D. I know; you mean put two boards up like 
this and the oar oan go up. That would be keen. 
(Q.) s. I figured it out, didn't I, D.? 
(Ans.) D. I helped. , . 
Notice how each remark grows out of what has been said 
by the other child or leads up to another remark. by the other 
one. This is typical of their conversation at play. 
2) (This takes place as they are preparing to play. They 
have been talking about snow on the mountains.} 
· (A.Io) B. I can eat snow. It's cold and smooth. I 
like it. 
l
A.I.) D. It is cold. 
A •. I. B. I eat it anyhow. So does an old lady I know. 
A.I.) D. I eat pink cotton. (Candy). 
A. I~) B. Oh, I know. They' :re· in cones. If you ask 
for a double one they put a layer of snow on top. 
Once I got a whole bunch of it, a whole kettle-full 
of it and ate it. I know how to make it. If it's 
snowing take a cone and put snow in it. 
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This is of special interest as an example of the talk 
of these five-and si~-year-old children on a subject . other 
than the activity of the moment. There is no wandering off 
into soliloquy with these two children when playing together. 
They collaborate both in action and in thought. And remarks 
which· we have classed as ego-centric in their play-talk have 
'been when they announce to each other what they are doing 
or about to do, but always in collaboration of action. Any 
such remarks are extremely rare in their play and are to be 
found in the play in which other children participate, as a 
rule. 
One example of socialized language from school-play has 
already been given in outgrowth frorn and contrast to mono-
logue type. The ex&aples so far given include adapted in-
formation, requests, questions, and answers. The following 
includes criticism. 
(R.) (In the play-house.) No. 20. Father, will you sweep 
. the floor.T (c.) You make me ·mad. 
(Q.) No. 7. (Obeys her request by sweeping.) Do you want 
me to sweep those, too? 
(Ana.) No. 3. Those are pla4es. (She picks them up; they 
. are paper bon-bon cases.) 
(0.) No. 7. I hope it's clean. There are three ladies 
around this joint and they can't sweep a floor. 
Adapted information, together with most of 
the questions and answers •••• constitute the only 
categories of child language whose function, in 
contrast to the divers functions of the ego-centric 
categories, is to communicate intellectual 
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processes.1 
Questions will be treated in a separate chapter and con-
trast will be made of those questions asked by children of 
each other and those asked of adults. But attention is called 
here to the fact that 
intellectual intercourse between childr.en is still 
factual or descriptive, i.e., little concerned with 
causality which remains the subject of conversation 
between children and adults or of the child's own 
solitary reflection.2 
Their conversation centers most about their activities or 
description of e~eriences or of possessions. 
Answers, while counted in the total number of remarks, 
are not considered by Piaget as part of the child's spontan-
eous language, since the child's social lan&~age could be 
raised considerably by another talkative child or by an 
adult. 3 Thus in the tables which we will give the percen-
tages will be given both with and without answers (either 
to each other or to adults). Answers include those made to 
direct requests and to direct questions; when made to other 
statements they are adapted information.~ 
In free conversation (school) these examples will show 
how the children become interested in each other's drawings 
or toys to the extent of suggestions or criticisms. 
1 ...... : .. 
L '~·T. , 25. 
a ·-···-t·.r., 31. 
3 
Of. Y.t., 35. 
4of. L/ti;; 35. 
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l) (A.I.) No. 20. (Showing her drawing) ~ere's the moon 
the sky 1 and here's the grass, and here's the 
house, and here's a door. I'm going to put some 
flowers here and put in the sky. 
(C.) No. 1. A house can't be up in the air~ 
2) (A.I.) No. 24. (Showing her drawing) A house and two 
tr.ees and a sky. · 
(A.l.) No. 27. I told her to put on a door and it 
would look better. 
(0.) No. 10. She should put the chimney straight. 
Since we have mentioned the factual nature of children's 
conversation it is of interest here to contrast the descrip-
tions just quoted, from a child of average mentality and from 
one near the low level of I.Q. (92) in the larger group with 
that of another at the top 1 who describes his as follows: 
(A.I.) No.1. (Showing a series of brownie pictures he 
has drawn) This brownie's got his shovel down. He's 
been digging, but he's tired. This one is going to 
put dirt ~ in the truck. (Next picture) They're going. 
This is the dust from their wheels • . These are the 
wheels but the spokes are going around so fast they 
look as if they were plain. 
Piaget says of his two six-year-old subjects 
All the observed cases of information which 
might be thought to resemble explanation are 
statements of fact or descriptions and are 
free from any desire to explain the causes of 
phenomena.l · 
Is not this child desiring spontaneously to give the reason 
for particular effect in his drawing? There are other in-
' 
stances among the children of high I.Q. in the group where 
an attempt is made to explain perspective in a drawing or 
where several of these superior children by drawing on the 
blackboard try to demonstrate a problem under discussion 
-
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(whether a horse can run faster than a freig~t-train). 1 
The children who always stay on the mere factual plane 
are those mentally neer six years of age. These who are 
interested in the 'why! of things are in the upper third of 
the group, or occasionally an older one who is mentally 
between seven and eight will follow the lead of these others 
and offer a suggestion. 
No comparison of the percentage of remarks will be made 
in the tables which will be given at the close of this dis-
cussion except in the case of the child who is being studied 
individually as he appears in the three children's groups 
and the groups themselves. Merely as a matter of interest, 
however, examples will be cited of this child's socialized 
conversation when with older people. 
At the family meal his eg~centrio remarks numbered only 
32 out of the 540 spontaneous remarks, but in his socialized 
remar ks he entered the general conversation 89 times and 
adapted 144 remarks to remarks _growing out of this entrance. 
The remainder of his 540 spontaneous remarks were either when 
a subject was introduced by himself or when adapted to the 
conversation which followed. Of these 508 spontaneous 
socialized remarks, 205 were in question form, and 68 were 
requests. Of course no account was kept of the adult 
1 
This conversation will be given in Chapter IV. 
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language in which he did not have a part. 
It will be seen in the following chapters that as a mem-
ber of a social group made up of those older than himself 
(adults and older brothers) he evidences the greatest signs 
of socialized thought, interest in logical justification 
and synthesis of language, etc. 
E~amples of socialized language at the meal: 
1) (A.I.) (Hie brother has been speaking about twins) 
Twins are two brothereor two sisters born into the 
same family at the same time. (Brother: can't they 
be a brother and a sister? What about E. and W •1?) 
Ane. ) I didn 1 t know they .could. ' , 
2) R.) Guess what we saw down-town, daddy. Guess. 
He guesses.) 
Q.) You give up? (Yes.) 
A.I.) An Indian •. (Mother: Part Indian.) 
Q.) What else was he besides Indianl (Mexican or 
Spanish.) . 
{
Q.) What are we besides Stocktonians? (Americans.) 
3) .Dadd¥ tells a story about an absent-minded man.) 
A.I.) ~Sympathetically) The clock might have struck 
again while he was away. 
4) (A.I.) Bread and milk go together. I don't mean 
they sound alike, but they go together; bread and 
milk• (Aunt: Like land and water.) 
(Q.) What others go together, daddy? (Brothers and 
sisters.) · . 
(A.I.) And big and little, and wife and husband. 
5) (A.I.) You know, last night Aunt M • . was studying 
brownie talk. (Mother: I guess she was studying 
French.) 
(A.I.) You know that other night when she was study- -
ing and you came out and said 1boo-doo' she was 
studying brownie talk. (No, it was French.) 
(Q.) Do brownies talk French? 
~~plea from bed-time talk: 
1) (R.) Make me_ a 4, mother. (I make a written one.) 
(C.) That isn't the way a boy in my class made it 
at school. (I m~e a printed one.) 
(A.I.) Yes, that's the kind he made. One is open 
at the top; the other isn't. 
2)(Q.) Do you want me to sing the Teddy-bear song? 
(Yes.) 
(Sings) Teddy-bear has his lair 
Under Johnnie's rocking-chair, 
Don 1 t go there; 
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You will get an awful scare. Boo! 
(A.I.) You want to do that 11 Boo 11 good and hard. 
(Laughs) All the kids laugh at school when the teacher 
does it good and hard. (Sings it again.) · 
!
R.l You sing it now. (I do). 
C. Sing it right. (Sings it over, laughing.) 
c. You are supposed to laugh, too, mother. 
3) Mother says she can't see an¥thing to a little 
movie book he is showing her.) (A.I.) I'll show 
you. (Turns the pages rapidly.) Now watch this space 
right here and pretty soon you'll see a car turning. 
Here she comesJ . 
(R.) Watch! Watch the man fall out. · 
(A. I.) He backs up. (His explanation as to why he 
does.) When you hit, it bounces you back sometimes. 
!Q.) When a ball hits it bounces back, doesn 
1 t it.? 
Yes.) , 
A.I.) He's down; he's lying down. He doesn't put on 
his brakes at the end of the racing track. 
4)lQ.) See this thimble on my finger1 (I nod.) 
A.I.) It looks like a snail-shell. 
Q.) Do you know what a snail does 'when it sees a 
bear or anything like that? (I expect it crawls in-
to its house. It carries its house right along on 
ite back, doesn't it?) 
(Ans.) Yes. . 
(A.I.) And when it w:1nts to go camping it takes .:.its 
house right with it. 
(Q.) That's a good idea, isn't it? (Yes.) 
5)This example is interesting from the standpoint of his 
explanation of his drawing of a gyrotop.) 
(A.I.) This is the wheel. That's the thing the wheel 
spins in. Here it is going: the thick part is the · 
wheel going. You see when it isn't going the wheel 
looks thin; when it 1 s . goin~ it looks thick. (By 11 thick 11 
he means blurred; by 11 thin 11 he means distinct lines.) 
6) Q.) Did you ever see gold in the sky? (Yes.) 
A.I.) I have. I've dreamed about it •. 
Q.) Have you ever seen gold in the sky all sparkles? 
Yes.) · 
A.I.) It isn't sparkles, though. (No, it's there-
flection from the sun. Sometimes there are gold 
edges on the clouds.) 
A.I.) That's to show they are clouds. 
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?t (A.I.) You're going to feel so proudly when you see 
R.) Guess what it is. (I don't want to.) · r
our Christmas present that I'm going to get for you. 
A.I.) I 1m not going to tell, because it•s .a secret. 
I don't know, it's going to be hard to keep it. 
(Q.) You don't want to know~ do you? •oause you like 
surprises, don't you? (Yes.) , 
(A.I.) We're going tQ get millions of surprises. 
(And so on.) 
Examples could be multiplied many times but these have 
been given to show not only the different types of socialized 
conversation but to show the varied interests of the si~-ye~ 
old. This will be shown further through the study of his 
questions. His interest turns from toys, games, puzzles, 
e;planations, questions about animals, to life, our persom-
alities, death, and the universe; in fact, every variety of 
topic. Although they cannot all be studied here technically 
from the standpoint of logic, they are filled with a wealth 
of psychological interest to a student of children's minds. 
Also they evidence the difference in subject matter about 
which a child talks when with an adult and .when with his 
playmates. Perhaps it should be mentioned here that this 
child always insists on answers to his questions. 
Before giving the tables of remarks let us emphasize 
again the difference in our circumstances of observation for 
studying ego-centrism in any mathematical way. We have 
found, however, that Piaget's classific~tion covers every 
remark~"made by any child; it is workable and opens an in-
teresting field of investigation. But it is evidenced here 
as in the following chapters that our subjects, at least 
those most studied, are emerging definitely f~om the ego-
centric period while Piaget still finds his two subjects 
equally divided between ego-centrism and socialization. In-
vestigation should be carried out with younger American 
children and great care chosen to study subjects where men-
tal and chronological ages correspond. These subjects 
were chosen first and the findings brought out the differ-
ence between our subjects and Piaget 1 s of the same age. 
Because Piaget enters so thoroughly into every detail and 
because such a procedure is impossible in a study of the 
present scope, we refer the reader to his book for further 
points of comparison.1 
~.T. Chapter I. 
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Smmnary of Functions of Language 
I. Children's groups, with answers. 
Home Play School Play Free Total 
Repetition 1 0% 7 1% 
Conversation 
3 <>% 11 0% 
Monologue Type 85 11% 109 16% 39 5% 233 11% 
Adapted Information 369 50% 336 48% 512 70% 1217 56% 
Criticism 30 4% 13 2% 26 ~ 69 3~ I 
Request 84 11% 92 13% 9 1% 185 9% 
Questions 122 1'1% 94 14% 47 elfo 263 12'% 
Answers 52 7dfo· · 43 6%· 108 ~5% 203~ ~ --Ego-centric Totals 86 11% 116 17% 42 6% 244 11% 
Socialized Totals 657 89% 578 83% 702 94% 193,7 89% 
Total Remarks 743 694 744 2181 
II. Children's groups, without answers (i.e.,spontaneous). 
~ Home Play School Play rree Total .. 
Repetition 1 O% 7 1% 
Conversation 
3 !% 11 1~ 
Yoril)logue TYPe 85 12% 109 17% 39 6% 233 11% 
Adapted Information 369 54% 336 5z1, 512 81~ 1217 62% 
· Criticism 30 4% 13 ! % 26 4% 69 3# 
Request 84 12% 92 14~ I 9 1% 185 9i% 
Questions 122 18% 94. 14% 47 7% 263 13%~ - - -Ego-centric Totals 86 12% 116 18% 42 7% ··a44 12% 
Socialized Totals -· 605 88% .. 535 .,82% 594 ... 9:3% 1:73:4 . 88% -. 





III. D1s Own Remarks, in Children's Groups (With answers). 
Home Play School Play Free Total 
# 
Conversation 
Repetition 2 5 3% 0 0% 7. 1% 
Kon.Ologue Type 42 10% 19 12~ 0 0% 61 9~ 
Adapted Information 207 50% 70 46% 60 6~ 33'7 Sa% 
Or1t1c1sm 19 5% 3 2% 4 5% 26 4% 
Request 48 11~ 19 1~ 1 1% sa 10% 
Questions 74 18% 27 18% 9 10% 110 1'7% 
Answers 21 6% 9 . ' 6% .13 15% 43 ... ?d/a_ - - .,_ __Ego-centric Totals 44 10% 24 16% 0 0% 68 l~ 
Socialized Totals 369, 90% 1_28, 84% ,.87 100% 584 90% - --~- -Total Remarks 413 152 87 652 
IV~ D's Own Remarks, in Children's Groups (~ithout answers). 
Home Play School Play Free Total 
Conversation 
Repetition 2 ~ 5 4% 0 0% 7 1% 
Monologue TYPe 42 loi7: 19 13% 0 0% 61 10% 
Adapted Information 207 53% 70 49% 60 ~1% 337 56% 
' 
Criticism 19 5% 3 2% 4 5¢% 26 4% 
Request 48 121~ 19 13% 1 3/4, 68 11% 
Questions 74 19% 27. _ 1~ 9_ 12% 110 18% ---- -- -
Ego-centric Totals 44 11% 24 17% 0 0% 68 11% 
Socialized Totals _· 348 89% 119. .. 83% 8.7, 100%. ·_:,541, . 89%. 
- -- --Total Remarks 
(Spontaneous) 
392 143 87 609 
· ' 
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v. D's Remarks, with Adults (with answers). 
At Meal At Bed-Time 
Repetition 5 9 1% 
Mono1 ogue Type 27 84 8% 
Adapted Information 217 412 40% 
Criticism 18 20 2% 
Request 68 11~ 125 12% 
Questions 215 34~ 332 3~ 
Answers - 73 1~ 49 5%_-
Ego-centric Totals 32 5% 93 9% 
Socialized Totals 581 95% -938 91% --
Total Remarks 613 1031 
VI. D's Remarks, with Adults (without answers). 
At Meal At Bed-time 
Repetition 5 1% 9 1% 
:Monologue Type 27 5% 84 8% 
Adapted Information 217 40% 412 42% 
Cr1t1c1sm l8 3% 20 2'% 
Request 68 13% 125 13% 
Questions 215 38% 332 34% 
- -
Ego:...oentric Totals 32 6% 93 9% 
Socialized Totals 508 94% .- 889 . 91%. 
- -Total Remarks 540 982 
(Spontaneous) 
Ohapter IV 
Types and Stages in Conversation 
Where in the preceding chapter single remarks, with 
the accompanying circumstances formed the unit of this 
study we now turn to conversations of three remarks or more 
as the unit in question, This study considers only conver-
sations between children and is therefore based on the obser-
vation of play at home and at school, and in the free con-
versation period at school. Let us first establish what we 
designate here as a conversation. 
Whenever---to fix an arbitrary minimum--three con-
secutive remarks about the same subject are made by 
at least two interlocutors. Here are two of the 
simpler possible schemes of conversation:! 
I Remark by A. II (1) Remark by A. 
Remark by B adapted 
to ( 1). 
(2) Remark b¥ B adapted 
to (1}. 
(3) Remark by C adapted 
to (l} or (2}. 
Remark by A adapted 
to ( 2). 
Piaget proceeds to establish three sta.ges of conver-
sation showing the process of evolution by which a child 
passes from ego-centric language proper to the higher types 
of conversation. Stage I represents the ego-centric lan-
guage in monologue and collective monologue, Therefore I 
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In the first type of Stage IIA 
there is association in the sense that everyone ) 
listens to and understands the speaker, but there 
is no collaboration because each child speaks only 
of himself, of hie own actions, or of his own 
thoughts. 
In the second type there is collaboration in 
action or in thought connected with action (non-
abstract thought) in the sense that the conversa-
tion bears upon an activity which is shared by the 
talkers. The subject of the conversation is thus 
some definite action, and not the explanation of a 
past or future action... , 
By abstract we wish (in Stage IIIA) to desig-
nate those mental processes in a child which are 
no longer connected with the activity of the mo-
ment, but are concerned with finding an explanation, 
reconstructing a story or a memory, discussing the 
order of events or the truth of a tale,l 
Not to quote e~actly further but to sum up Piaget's remar.ts, 
there is a gradual socialization of thought as the child 
passes from one stage to another, though he still retains 
remnants of past stages. It will be noted that the point of 
difference between A and ·B of each stage is that A is based 
on agreement and B on disagreement. It is only when stage 
IIIB is reached that any attempt at proof is made; before 
that there is simply a clash of aseert16n•~ 
l .. -·-
L';·T', , 54 f. 
2ror detailed discussion, see L.Ti, Chapter II. 
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Undoubtedly the best way to detect the difference between 
the stages as well as to study each stage is to cite e~les. 
$tage IIA (first type) is only found in the free con-
. versation group at school, and is to my mind at one with a 
column of 1 That Reminds Me.• 
1) No. ~0. Once my daddy went fishing. My mother did't 
catch anything but my daddy did. 
No. 16. My daddy oatch~d ·one. 
No. ~4. I caught a great big fish once. 
No. 2. My daddy went fishing. My dog fell in but he 
got out and my daddy caught four fishes. 
No. 10. My dog could. My dog swims. It's a fox 
terrier. Every time we go swimming he jumps in the 
water. Once my father went in swimming and my dog 
jumped on his back. 
No. 15. I got a dog too. Another girl has a dog and 
he's that high (motions). He's a hunting dog and he 
can find things. They keep him in the cellar. 
No. 7. I got a dog and every time I'd throw a ball 
he'd catch it. 
No. 19. Once my sister had a dog and it used to jump 
over me. A machine ran over it. 
No. 4. My grandmother has two dogs and every time at 
night a machine goes by they bark, and my grandma 
can't sleep, but they never get runned over. 
~) (The teacher has read a story about children at the 
beach.) .. 
No. 1. I've dug holes in the sand and the waves wash 
up in the hole and p~l the sand back with 1t. 
No. 2. I went down to the beach. 
No. 1. Once my aunt and I were down at a pretty place 
on the beach and my aunt and I picked up lots of 
pretty stones and shells. 
No. 9. Once I went to the beach and I had my shoes 
and stockings off and I got my feet wet and I had 
my bathing-suit on. 
No. 20. I went down to the beach last Sunday and we 
saw the sea-gulls. I had my swimming-suit and my 
swimming-shoes and my swimming-hat and when I todt 
my swim!"!ling-shoee off they were washed away. (And 
so it continues for some time.) 
These two e~amples illustrate fully the conversation desig-
nated by Stage IIA (first type) and follow exactly the 
description g~ ven by Piaget.· 
It is quite plain that this stage is an outgrowth of 
ego-cent~ic language and likewise only a step in the direc-
tion of socialized language. For while each child is in-
terested in what the others say and indicates by his own 
remarks that he is listening, yet he makes no comment on 
the remarks of the other child but merely uses them as an 
excuse to tell of something along the same line from his own 
e?CI>erienoe. 
In Stage IIA (second type) there is a definite progress 
for they are interested in a common activity and their in-
terest becomes more objective and less subjective. 
In free conversation period: 
1) No. 2. I'm making a cave and we are making some 
ditches all around so people can't get in. 
No. 27. We're making a great big one. 
No. a. I hope you don't bump into the wall. 
No. 2. We might bump right into Mr. J's basement. 
2) No. 3. (E~lains her picture.) We're playing hide 
and seek. - (She points it all out.) A boy found a 
board and made a bridge across. And this little 
boy can't find this one and this little girl is 
hiding from that little boy. 
No. a. I think you'd just have her head sticking up. 
No. 1. (Goes up and points.) Is she hiding from this 
little boY,? I should think you'd have him here. I 
should thi~k the board would be straight. fHer 
bridge is curved. The teacher e~lains that bridges 
may be either straight or curved~) 
3) No. 27. (Showing a toy tractor.) You can't wind it; 
it winds back. (The group watch interestedly.) 
No. s. My brother has a train that does that, .and he 
holds it till it starts. · 
No. 7. Hold the wheel and it won't go back. I've got 
an airplane that does that. 
No. 2. Put the brakes on and then start it and then 
take the brakes off. 
No. 27. It won't do it; its broken~ 
From school play: 
1) No. 10. (Making paste-board reindeer'which he has 
promised one of the girls he would make for her.) 
Here's one of your reindeer. (To No. 15, who has 
been an interested onlooker.) 
No. 1. Where 1s his horns? 
No. 10. He can't have any,. They'd bend back. 
No. 1. He must be a baby reindeer. He must be a 
fawn. 
42 
No. 15. (To teacher) Here's one of my reindeer, but 
he hasn't any horns. They'd bend back. He's a baby 
reindeer. 
2) No. 3. The teacher told me how to make this; you ask 
her.-
No. 5. I know how. 
No. 3. There fs just a certain way to do it. There, 
my book is done. I'm going to make a fancy cover. 
(To No. 5) She gold me how to do it. That's not the 
way. There's just a certain way. 
No. 5. You do it, then. 
No. 3. Get your cover. (She does.) You do it like 
this and like this. (Punches the holes for her.) 
From home play: 
1) A. How do you steer this thing? 
D. ! 1 11 show you. You turn the, wheel till it's like 
this. As long as it's that way it goes straight. 
A. I 1 ve got it now. 
2) (Building and playing with Lincoln logs.) 
B. Let's make the house big like this and put these 
things in it. This is a desk, isn 1t it? 
D. No, it's a t able. 
B. Wha t's this? 
D. That 1 s a da-v;enport. This goes like this and there's 
a davenport for you. We 111 have to put a davenport 
right here. Move that over. 
B. Here, D. 
D. Move back the table. (Conversation continues.) 
From these ex~nples the sharing of a common activity or 
interest or thought stands out clearly as a step further 
towards socialization. 
Of IIIA Piaget says, 
Conversations at this stage are the only ones 
in which there is any real exchange of thought •••• 
The conversations which we shall class 
under the present type are those which bear 
(1) - on the explanation of things and the mo-
tives of actions, (2) on the reality of events 
("Is it true that ••• ?• Why? •••• etc.) ••••• 
From the twenty .ohil~en under observation 
we obtained only one conversation of this type, 
and not a very clear one at that. This shows 
once more how ego-centric are the intellectual 
processes of the child. It also enables us to 
place the beginnings of the socialization of 
thought somewhere between 7 and B. It is at 
about this age, in our opinion, that co~versations 
of this type first make their appearance.l 
From home play: 
D. I love doggies. 
A. You love them. Why don't you kiss them_? 
D. I love 1 ern but I don't kiss them. I ki~s oats, but 
I don't kiss dogs. 
s. I kiss my cat. 
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This case is concerned with the "Why" of a oonjectural action. 
From school conversation: 
1) (This conversation ·continues from one previously 
oit~d as an example of Stage IIA (second type) on 
the subject of cave-digging.) 
No. 1. If you got in it and somebody walked over 
it and tramped it, it would fall in and you'd be 
buried~ · 
No. 2. If it caved 1n we could go over into Mr. 
J's basement and it wouldn't cave in 1 cause there 
is a house over it. 
No. 1. Are you digging it in the basement? 
No. 2. We're going to go deep and make it .go flat, 
and then go into the basement. (Conversation con-
tinues.) 
This e?tample,·also involves a possible procedure. 
1 . 
2) (·this is the most interesting of all but is too 
lengthy to quote in full. It 0¢9urred on the very 
last day of observation and lookd toward demon-
stration and proof.) 
L;T., 63 f. 
. ~ "; ; ~No~;·: S• :- ( -.O~t1.~u1ng a conversation· o~ peny-riding.) . 
When my mother was a little girl, there was a horse 
·' -·,>lj<, 1one., 1;1me :and .sh_e . got o~_- the horse .and .had. a. r_aoe with · ' ., ·a .. ~rain. · 
. ; .. :, ri· t~ <?·~· S. •. : Wh~.~~ J~ind ; of. ~ i .t r~.in , a frei gh ~ . ~:r_ain .or. a " -.. 
passenger train! A. passenger train could go ·taster 
, -'.t:> .. t~an a .. hors~. (JI~ goes to the 'bl~okboard and draws.) 
'Tb:i:'S' would be ' the' hor·sa- ahd th1s would ·be the freight 
train (behind.) The t;rain would be so. slow. If it was 
a l':passeriger 'trai'h here would be the horae and here the 
. . h.~ ... ~~a~ '(r\tr~ ~~ain way ahead.) (Nos. 1 and a go. to the. 
•.h'--''boai'd and··point to No. a•s drawirig as ·they talk.) 
lo. 2. Without .the cars on the engine and coal oar 
. ::,. t'6ou!d' ·go as fa.s·t• · · 
.· lo. a. I'm _not talking about that. I'm talking about a 
rH ; ~u!rr-efgh'e train~ · · 
No. 1. An electric train could go as fast. 
·. l'U.: . ·•o~;·t ·21·;· '!.ike ·:~M&- •freiglit train was ali el·ephant; the 
horse would run faster than the elephant. 
•f'., «t :::. :xo -..~~· 2'.; . But· you · see the -train is longtl!r than the ·horse 
. but the horse could run faster than the train. 
'·'!;r;, t Se.v.ei"al,: · O~uld a horse run as fastt · 
.' · No. 2. I used to live in a big plaqe and th-e :freight 
thi$] 'C:rains·. used to .go by all the tim·e. · .Sometimes the -J.rain 
. would be a long line and the engine couldn't go very . 
r. r.: r.f ... t. ·, (Yore remarks.) . . 
·· No.1. If it wanted to, (Notice the attributing of a 
:\~}· · :5:p.ey.cholog1oal intention to the train, an evidence of 
animism) the train could go faster than the horse • 
. ~:lt·1:, I~-.should.-, think the train would beat the horse. (Draws.) 
The · horse might slow down. It might get tired. 
~~~,m}:Ba~· &.t. I -t J might. ·-get soared of the train. 
. ·. No .. 27. Interesting ideas! 
'~"?1 --r-n. .B~ .. ~2:~· ~~~, .,th~i horse stopped the train could bea t him. 
No. a. I'll tell you a good thing to do. If you're 
r:r.;::~- ~·~:- by.~~· fr~1ght train get a horse and see wh o beats • 
. No. 27. If I go to San Francisco I'll try it and tell 
-
.-.u :~-·· ~ ' ' "r" ... ·~~ ••• ... • 
Oontrae, :iritli ,,this~.th~ conversations quoted at the beginning 
... · ......... ·. ,,. : ,, . - . 
of thi~~-o~'t(~- .~~:_e~ies ·from the same group under the 
lo ... ',' .i,- • ~·- • ..... • ' 
I 1'f If. ;,.~ "f.. ~{ ¥ ~ ~ .' •1, • t • C. 
same condftioria· ot Stage tiA (first type). Such conversations · 
~t:r·-::1~ ~ c!·'J·,f.\ tr-~ ., j lP-~ v· ~ 
still are common but the process of socialization among them-
\.} (; ~: l ~;~""~.+--;t ~.}~a,,:- · ~i.! • r . .. •> 
eel ves, of· !adapting: :their thoughts to each other's and 
. . •t ~" \ ........ 
1,. fr .... J ~ ..- .. , .. 
demonst~rattng. ftde_as .,~ i'Srrworlting out beyond .the field. of 
their own immediate activities. There is, ot course1 a 
development within each stage and there are examples of 
conve~sation starting out in one stage and developing into 
the ne~t, but space does not permit the giving of more. 
So far we have considered e~amples of the types of 
conversation based on the agreement of ~pinion. Therefore 
the following examples will show their parallels based on 
disagreement. There happens not to be a single example in 
all these observations of Stage IIB (first type). In 
common usage we would designate it as fight, a quarrel 
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that reaches blows, or at least threats of blows. Probably 
this is due to the circumstances under which they were taken, 
in school or in a home. Such conversations would be most 
likely to occur when children were entirely by themselves 
with no evidence of supervision. Therefore, let us turn to 
e~amples of Stage IIB (second type), clash of assertions 
with no attempt at proof. 
From free conversation at school: 
No. 1. (Describing a drawing of hie own.) Here's the 
rain. Here's the clouds. This is a rainbow. This 
is supposed to be red, scarlet, and pink. 
No. 10. Isn't that snow? 
No. ~ It's rain. 
No. ]Q, Rain is white. 
rrom school play: 
1) (In the play-house.) No. 16. Here's the pillow. 
No. 5. That's its bed. 
No. 16. 1Tie not. It's the pillow. 
2) No. 10. (Showing c~lortd paper to No. 2.) This 
is pretty. 
No. 2. No, it isn't. 
No. 10. 'Tis too. 
rrom home play: 
1) (They have just asked for an apple.) s. That's a big 
red one. 
D. That·• s a pink one. 
s. Nice red apple, makes you hungry. Let . your mother 
out it. 
D. No, I'll out it. Which side do'1you want? 
S. This one; it's the biggest one. You kno~, company 
the biggest. 
D. There isn't going to be any biggest. Let's go 
outside to eat them. 
2) A. Here comes s. 
D. Look who's here,s. Don't you know who she is? 
Who is it? A.? 
s. No. . 
D. 'Tis too. 
These e~amples are self-evident. 
Primitive argument is thus, on the mental 
plane, the equivalent of quarreling on the plane 
of action--a simple clash of contrary opinions 
and desires.l 
Piaget finds again, as in the case of Stage IIIA, only 
one example of IIIB. 
This result shows very Clearly that genuine 
argument and collaboration in abstract thought 
const1tu•e a stage of development which only 
intervenes after the age of seven.2 
This fact is of the greatest importance, he claims. 
For it is between the ages of seven: .and eight 
that we can date the appearance of a logical 
stage in which the phenomenon of reflection be-
comes general; if we agree with P. Janet in 
calling reflection the tendency to unify ones 
l . .. 
~. 70. 
2 -. ·. 
L·· • .lfe ·, 73. 
.. 
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beliefs and opinions, to systematize them with the 
object of avoiding contradiction.l · \ 
Reflection is defined as "the outcome of an internal debate 
in which a conclusion is reached."2 Piaget designated as an 
element of clear e~amples of this stage of argumen~the 
e;pl1c1t use of the conjunction 1because 1 • I have no· ex-
ample of arguments in which 'because' is used, although its 
use in other types of conversation will be considered in the 
chapter on conjunctions. There are, however, e~amples of . . 
arguments where attempts are made to justify or prove state-
ments and these mark the beginnings of Stage IIIB. 
From school play: 
l) No. 1. The workers is the fastest group of aJ.l. 
No. 2. No,,It's not. 
No. 1. Yes, it is; I guess I know. Teacher told me. 
This would be purely primitive·argument e~cept that in the 
end the child seeks to justify his own statement, first by 
his own authority and then by the authori~y of an elder. 
Another similar example takes place between the same two 
children: 
2) No. 2. Look at J.I. 1 s design. 
No. 1. That's not J.I. . 
No. 2. Yes, it is. 
No. 1. ! 111 ask him. {He doe~.) I guess you're right. 
In this case the child appeals directly to another person 
for proof and finding himself in the wrong admits his error. 
Here is another direct appeal for proof: 
1.--- -t ·. ·T·., 74. 
2L~ · T7-~ 75 '• ·• ., .. 
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3) No. 3. (Talking about the pictures t~ey are pasting 
in their scrap-books.) Here's another front room. · 
Oan I have one? 
No. 6. No, it's a dining-room. 
No. 3. No, it's a front room. · 
No. 6. I'll ask. (She comes and asks me and finds 
she is wrong.) All right; you can have this one. 
Though Piaget does not class this as genuine argument, they 
are a... step~· in: advance of the cases where no attempt is made 
to justify one's statements, and this is evidently the way 
in which primitive argument developes into genuine argument, 
by recognizing the need for proof. 
The summary of the findings in this study is as follows 
(taking from all children's conversations): 
Stage IIA (first type) ••••• 21 l 21 
Stage IIB (first type). •..• 0 ) 
Stage IIA (second type) •••• l24 
~ 130 Stage IIB (second type) •••• 6 
Stage IIIA • .•............•• 4 
~ 4 Sta.ge I I IB • ..•..........••• 0 
In addition there are ••... 12 
other conversations which 
merge from one stage or 
type to another. 
Total number of conversations 167 
It is very evident from this that these children, at 
least among themselves, are more interested in activity than 
in causal or logical e;planation. This will be brought out 
again in the study of their questions and in their use of 
conjunctions. However, these further studies will bring 
out the difference 1n individual development, in the same 
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individual when in contact with a more socialized group. 
It is evident from examples given that a beginning is being 
made in collaboration in abstract thought, which beginning 
Piaget places somewhere between seven and eight. It is also 
evident that a feelin g of a need of justification or proof 
in argument is awakening, though naturally lagging somewhat 
behind the other, since it demands a more explicit use of 
words. 
Hence our findings bear out Piaget's thesis of develop-
ing stages of conversation marking their progress in social-
ization. It is likewise true that the examples of more 
socialized conversation come from the third of the group 
having the hi ghest I.Q., which confirms our own statement in 
that regard, concerning their corresponding development of 
thought. 
Chapter v 
Understanding and Verbal E;planation Between 
Children 
In the matter of dealing with the understanding between 
children we feel most at a loss since the material is so 
elusive. Therefore we have made no attempt to put our re-
results into mathematical form and merely offer general con-
clusions borne out by the examples we give. To quote from 
Piaget, 
When, moreover, the language becomes socialized, 
the process at first only touches the factual 
products of thought, i.e., in talking to each 
other children avoid the use of causal and log-
ical relations (because, etc.), such as are used 
in all •genuine argument• or in "collaboration 
in abstract thought." Before the age of 7 or 
8 these \two kinds of relations are therefore 
still un~xpressed, or rather, still strictly 
individua~. Observation shows that up till the 
age of ab?~t 7 or 8, the child, even when he can 
thi nk o£ th~m himself, does not spontaneously 
give explanB;tions or demonstrations to his equals 
becaua·e his l ,anguage is still saturated with 
ego-centrism.a. 
Piaget allude many times to this fact that children 
do not exert theme lves with their equals to use causal 
relationships or 1 gical synthesis, to be interested in 
causal e~lanation or to go beyond factual or descriptive 
1tf~ T'~' , 100 f. 
conversation and hints that this may not be true of the 
I 
child when with adults. He emphasizes the conditions be-
tween children but does not balance these with similar 
situations of the child among adults, except in his study 
of questions .and in the present e.xperiment to be studied. 
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In the former study (of questions) the child is not the 
same in both situations and the situations are not parallel. 
Our parallel studies of the same child among his equals and 
among adults offer a splendid opportunity to bring out the 
points of difference. The contrast will be emphasized 
throughout the thesis. We will observe in later chapters 
the rarity of 'because', for instance, when children talk 
among themselves, about their play or experiences. We will 
also point out how the same child increases his spontaneous 
use of 'because' and other conjunctions when in an ad~t 
group, showing that children still retain more ego-centric 
habits of speech among themselves and therefore use fewer 
socialized forms then than they are capa.ble of and use 
under other circumstances. 
If children fail to understand one another, it is 
1 because they think they do understand one another. 
To study the evidences of this characteristic in our 
subjects we performed two experiments, one considering 
1acted 1 conversation and one story-telling. The Children 
were taken in pairs to alternate with each other in the 
hearing and the retelling of the explanation or the story 
to each other. One child witnessed the explanation of 
paper-folding or cutting with the information beforehand 
that he was to show the other child each step of the pro-
cess he had gone through and repeat as exactly as he could 
the e~lanation which had been given him. Then the second 
child was called in to listen to and to repeat the demon-
stration and explanation as correctly as he knew how, to 
the child who had told him. 
,, 
Experimenter: (Folding a paper) This is cut to 
.look like a cross. (Cutting off corners.) Now 
watch. I'm going to make it into a box. I fold 
this clear back to the line. I · fold the point 
back -even with the line. (Repeats for other 
three sides.) Then I put it up to make the sides 
stand up. Now see if you can do exactly what I 
did and be sure to tell exactly what you do. 
No. 3. (explainer): We 1re going to make a bo~. 
Fold that- right even with that. Fold the point back 
even with that. We take this and fold it even with 
that line. Then we fold this point back. Then we 
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take this and fold it back even like that. Fold this 
point back here. (Repeats for the fourth. side.) 
Straighten up the sides. 
No. 7. (Reproducer): Fold it back like that. Fold it 
back like that. Fold it back like that. Fold this back. 
It's wrong; I didn't fold it clear ba.ck. (Sees hie 
own mistake and corrects it; repeats his first formula 
for other sidest however.) 
No. 3 (suggests~; He hasn't folded the points clear 
back. · 
No. 7. I 1m going to get that yet. I fold this down 
farther. (Gets it right.) 
This experiment is much simpler than the one used by 
Piaget (the explanation of the mechanical device by diagram)1 ; 
yet simple as it is, the child who listened to the adult 
repeated more essential points to the other child than that 
reproducer gave back to her. The first child is very pains-
taking by nature and has given an excellent e~lanation but 
the second child fails to tell what he is going to make and 
leaves out essential points in the explanation. Only his 
quick wit and the visible results of the gaps in his e~lan­
ation help him in this case to check his own explanation. 
Instead of reproducing an explanation in the essential 
points, he uses the sketchiest terms. This pair has been 
used to show that it is not only understanding of adults 
by children that is more exact than understanding between 
children but to show the individual difference in children. 
The children exchange their roles of explainer and repro-
ducer. Notice the sketchy way in which No. 7 explains 
1t~T., Chapter III. (Piaget's experiments are explained in 
----full.) 
what the adult has told him. 
0 
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Experimenter: I am going to make a circle with a 
s~uare in each quarter. I fold it over once e~enly; 
· then I fold it once again evenly. I am very careful 
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to take hold of the point where the folded sides come 
together. I out the open sides rounding from this 
point to this. I fold it double again and cut a three-
cornered hole in the middle of this fold. Now I un-
fold it and see, what have I? · 
No. 7: Get a piece of paper &nd fold it like that. 
You fe~d it again and try to cut a round circle. Now 
I'm stuck; I think it goes like this. I cut a hole. 
He does it right but says nothing about what he is going to 
make, about folding it evenly each time, or about how he is 
to hold it. No. 3, who watches closely, follows his actions 
as well as his sketchy explanation and gets it right, but 
notice the difference in the type of explanation she gives 
now and the one given by her after an adult e~lanation. 
She is reproducing his. 
No. 3. Fold that like that. Then fold it like this. 
Make a round circle. Fold it like that and cut out 
this little hole. 
There are varieties of explanation and degrees of 
accuracy in these six pairs of children. One child, No. 19 
takes the same adult e~lanation for folding .a paper bo~ 
that No. 3 had and gives her partner this explanation: 
No. 19. Go like that and go like that (repeats three 
times.). 
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Of course she fails in her finished product and her little 
partner, who has only her pattern and explanation to go by, 
has the same results. 
It would be tiresome to multiply these examples. The 
children with the strongest bent for accuracy and e~actness 
give the best explanations and also give back most accurately 
what their partners tell them. The value of this simple 
experiment lies in the fact that it shows how much some o~ 
these children rely on action and reality to fill out the 
gaps in their explanations. 
This is the only experiment in which we deviated from 
Piaget 1 s e~act pattern, as he uses the mechanical e~lan­
ation, a much more difficult one to handle .. However, the 
story-telling is carried out as a parallel to his suggest-
ion. The same plan is followed with the two children as 
with the explainer and reproducer. in the other experiment 
given. Here again we found all varieties of and degrees 
in accuracy of explanation • 
. Experimenter: Once upon a time, there was a lady who 
was called Niobe (name not essential) who had 12 sons 
and 12 daughters (any number provided it is larger than 
the number the fairy had). She met a fairy who had 
only one son and no daughter (or any inferior m.nnber). 
Then the lady laughed ·.at :,the fairy because the fairy 
only had one boy. Then the fairy was very angry and 
fastened the lady to a rock (or tree, etc.). The lady 
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or1ed for 10 yearso In the end, she turned into a rock 
and her tears made a stream which still runs today.1 
No. 1 (explainer): Once there was a lady. She had 11 
sons and 11 daughters. She met a fairy with only one. 
She laughed at the fairy 'cause she had one. The fairy 
tied her to a rock. She cried and cried for 10 years. 
She turned into a rock. The tears ran till it made a 
stream. The stream still runs. 
No. B. (reproducer): Once a lady had 11 sons and 11 
daughters. She laughed at the fairy 'cause she had 
only 1 son. The fairy tied her to a tree. She cried 
for 10 years. 
The first is ap almost accurate reproduction, the only point 
left out being that the fairy was angry at the lady. The 
reproducer .fails ·. to mention the meeting of the fairy and 
the lady or to finish up the story. It is to be remembered 
that the adult or explainer tells or retells the story un-
til the child told says he is ready to reproduce it. These 
two children do not reverse the order of events or neglect 
the causal relation. Here is the same story reproduced by 
two other children: 
No. 2. (explainer): There was a lady had 12 sons and 
12 daughters. Another lady only had one son and. one 
daughter. She laughed at this other lady. The other 
lady tied her to a rock. She cried for 10 years and 
made a stream and it .1 s there now. 
He tells it very well but neglects the causal relation. 
No. 5. (reproducer): There was a wife had 12 daughters 
and 12 sons. There was a lady had 1 daughter and 1 
son. The other lady laughed at her. She tied her to 
a rock. She cried for 10 years. 
Notice the mi~ture of pronouns and the neglect to finish 
the story as told her. 
1 
Of. ~~ 82 and 87. 
Pronouns, personal and demonstrative adjuectives, 
etc., 1he, she,• or 'that, the, him,' etc., are 
used right and left, without any indication of 
what they refer to ••• The pronouns distributed at 
random are therefore a characteristic of the style, 
and not a proof of lack of understanding,l 
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This is just as true of No. 5 as of the case referred to by 
Piaget, 
The first two children change parts and the following 
story is told to one of them (They are told not to bother 
about the names): 
Experimenter: A child went up to a lark and said, •Good 
lark, have you any young ones?" "Yes, child, I have," 
said the lark, 1 and they are v.ery pretty ones, indeed." 
Then she pointed to them and said, "This is Fair Wing, 
that is Tiny Bill, and that other is Bright Eyes." The 
child said, "Yes, at home we are three, myself and my 
two sisters, Janet and Alice. And mother says we are 
pretty little children and she cares. a great deal for 
us.• To this the little lark answered, "Oh yes, mother 
cares a great deal for us, too.• Then ~the child said, 
"Good lark, will you send one of your little ones to 
play with me?" Before the mother bird could answer , 
little Bright Eyes said, "Yes, if you will send your 
sister to play with us in our nest." The child said , 
1 0h Alice will be so sorry to leave home and come away 
from mother.• The little bird said, "Tiny Bill (or our 
little brother) will be so sorry to leave our nest and 
go away from mother.• The little child didn't know 
what to think and went home saying, 8 Ah, everyone lLkes 
his home.• 
No. 8 {explainer): A little boy went to see a bird. The 
child said, "Have you any young ones?" The lark said, 
•Yes, I have." The child said, "Can .Tiny Bill come over 
to my house?" Before the lark had a chance to answer, 
the other baby bird said, "The other bird would be sorry 
to leave his nest." The child said "My sister would be 
sorry to leave the bouse.• 
He bas left out details but carries the thread of the story 
1·---·· t ·, T',, 102. 
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thfough without a mixture of order of events ·or of pronouns. 
No. l repeats .almost exactly the story as told him. 
No. l (reproducer): Once a boy went to a lark. fhe 
child said, "Have you any baby birds?" The lark said, 
"Yes, I have.• The boy said, "Can Tiny Bill come over 
to play with me?" Before the bird .could say, the 
little bird said, "The other bird wouldn't want to 
leave the nest.• "The sister wouldn't want to leave 
the house, either," the child said. 
These e~amples are given from the first pair of children 
because No. l gave the fullest explanations and most accur-
ate reproductions. Two other stories were given them but 
in every instance they reproduced the causal relationship 
mentioned in the original, whether as explainers or as 
reproducers. In the story of Eparninondas, No. 8, in tell-
ing it as e~lainer, said, 11When he got home it (the butter) 
was all melted because the sun was shining hard." The 
original had said, "The sun was shining hard and when he 
got home ·~; the butter had aJ.l mel ted. n He understood the 
causal relationship, though it was not exp~essed in the 
original and put it in his own. 
The next two children are quoted because in the first 
reproduction a causal relationship inferred in the original 
is caught by this child and put into her story when retold. 
These instances are unusual, for causal explanations are 
apt to be left out, according to Piaget. 
Other factors are at work which help to render 
the explainer's exposition rather unintelligible 
to the reproducer~ These are an absence of order 
in the account given, and the fact that causal 
relations are rarely expressed, but are generally 
indicated by simple juXtaposition of the related 
terms. The explainer, therefore, seems not to 
concern himself with the 1how 1 of the events 
which he presents: at any rate, he gives only 
insufficient reasons for those events. In a · 
word, the child lays stress on the events them-
selves rather than on the relations of time 
(order) or cause which unite them. These factors, 
moreover, are probably all connected in various 
degrees with the central fact of ego-centrism.l 
No. 15. (explainer): Once upon a time there was 
a lady and she had 12 daughters and 12 sons~ And 
a fairy come (No. 10 interrupts her: •Not 'come', 
'oam$•.•). She had 1 son. The fairy tied her to 
a rock because she said to the fairy, "Ha ha.• 
She had tears in her eyes. She turned into a 
rook. 
No. 10 (reproducer): Once Upon a time there was 
an old lady. She had 12 sons and 12 girls. A 
fairy came. She had 1 son. The fairy tied her 
to a rock. She had tears in her eyes. She turned 
into a rock. 
Exchange of parts. 
No. 10 (explainer): A little girl went up to a 
bird. The little girl said, •Have you any birdsf" 
The bird said, "Here's one and here's one and he~e's 
one." The little girl ·. said, "Will you send one to 
my home?" The little bird said, 1 Yes, if you send 
your li'14tle brother up in our nest we will let you 
have one." The little girl didn't knQw what to do. 
She went home thinking. · · 
No. 15. (reproducer): A little girl sai'd, "I want 
a little bird." The bird said, "Come over to my nest 
if you want to have a Qird. Send your little brother 
over to our nest to get it.• She said, "All right." 
She went home. She was mad. 
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This reproduction is an example of what Piaget means by the 
habits of child thought which result in lack of understanding. 
No. 15 did very well with the story which an adult had told 
her, but though No. 10 told her the story of the bifd and 
the child quite clearly, except for the point of e~change 
1 L.T., 107. 
of child for bird she changes the latter part of .the story 
to fit her own schema and puts a new interpretation on it. 
The ne~t examples show how much some of the children 
condense the story and put various interpretations on it. 
No. 20 (explainer): There was a lark and 2 children. 
They said, "Nice lark, will you send Billy over to 
play with us? 11 They said, "Send Mary to play with us." 
So Barbara said, "Mary would be so sorry to come from 
60 
home." It was up in a nest. · 
No. 6 (reproducer): Once there was a lark. There were 
2 children. The lark said, "Will you send some children 
to play with us," Barbara said, "She was so sorry to 
come from home." (Who is 'she'?) 
Such a brief study of these experiments is very inade-
quate. One wishes for time to pair the children off diff-
erently and study different results obtained. This pairing 
was done without any consideration of equal abili tie's, the 
experiment of story-telling being done early in the course 
of the observations, so the same pairing was continued in 
the demonstrations to make a fair comparison. 
The results of our story-telling experiment are above 
.. 
those quoted by Piaget in the story-telling by six-year-olds. 
We would emphasize the general placing of the ideas in order 
by the children (exceptions here and there) and the repeat-
ing of causal relationships where they occur in the story 
and as they are understood and put in, in the two instances 
quoted. These are in contrast to lack of understanding and 
seeing of relationships which Piaget e~phasizes in his si~­
year-olds. ·our stories compare favorably with those quoted 
by Piaget from the seven-and-a-half-year-olds and stand out 
above those quoted from the six-year-olds. This bears out 
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our conclusion about this group approaching more nearly the 
criteria for the seven to eight-year-old or t~e age of im-
plicit reasoning. This sense of relationship already dev-
eloping in them will be brought out in another chapter. There 
is, on the whole, a very little romancing or filling in of 
gaps not remembered. The children try to reproduce the stories 
they hear and do not twist and turn them to any . extreme, though 
such tendencies in some of them are still evident as shown, 
There is no equivalent to "She cried for 50 months" as Piaget 
1 
alludes to in one example, and "For 20 rnonths,,.and then 
2 20 months." Our points for criticism are very mild beside 
this romancing and lack of order Piaget refers to. He goes 




••• that the objectivity of thought is closely 
bound uo with its communicability, It is in 
ego-centric thought that we give rein to our 
imagination. When we think socially, we ar3 
more obedient to the "imperative of truth". 
On the one hand, it is only from the age of 
7 or 8 that there can be any taLk of genuine 
understandins between children. Till · then the 
ego-centric factors of verbal expression (ellip-
tical style, indeterminate pronouns, etc,) and 
of understanding itself, as well as the deri-
vative factors {such as lack of order, in the 
accounts given, juxtaposition, etc.) are all 
too important to allow of any genuine under-
standing between children. Between the ages of 
7 and 8 these factors become less active and 
some of them (lack of order) even disappear. 
On the other hand, there exists between children 




difference as regards their efforts to be 
objective. This convergence of two inde-· 
pendent phenomena is certainly not fortui~ 
taus, and it has enabled us to place the 
beginnings of verbal understanding between 
childre~ approximately between the ages of 
7 and a.I · 
After the age of ? :to .. 8, these consequences 
of ego-centrism do not disappear immediately 
but remain crystallized in the most abstract 
and inaccessible part of the mind, we mean the 
realm of purely verbal thought,2 
To prove this point, Piaget carries out experiments wit~ 
older children who are able to read, for these experiments 
are on written material and therefore beyond· our group. Here 
he brings out the syncretism of understanding or perception 
•by means of general schemas" which supplant the perception 
of detail.3 He goes on to distinguish between the syncretism 
of ·understanding and the syncretism of reason~ng and shows 
how they are dependent on one another. 4 
1~, 125 
2t:; Tl J 128. 
3 · . of. t.T,, 132. 
4 . . c Of. L, T,, hapter IV. 
Ohapter VI 
Ohildren's Questions 
The reason for studying this phase of a child's 
language is best given by P1aget. 
There is no better introduction to child logic 
than the study of spontaneous questions,l 
He treats it as a Wtransition subject between the functiamal 
study of verbal intelligence in the child and the analysts 
of the peculiarities of child logic.•1 
lfhat are the intellectual interests or, if one 
prefers, the logical fuhotionA to which the 
questions of a given child testify, and how are 
those interests to be classified?l 
I 
He then proceeds to classify them according to the :eort 
of answer which the child e~ects to receive, which classi-
fication will be given shortly. All the questions of which 
he has made a study2 are those asked by a single child of 
.. 
one adult. In another connection, however, he deals with 
a briefer study of the questions of two six-year-olds,3 
In our present study it is of interest to e~amine the 
questions asked by children in their own groups in compari-
son with those asked by one of these same children when 
with adults, 
There is also a difference in connection with the con-
ditions under which the subject matter was obtained. The 
lz;··, T·,, 162, 
2 L.T., Ohapter V. 
3~ 
~~ 28-34. 
questions asked by the child from whom Piaget took his 
findings were asked always during a lesson-hour and. this 
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he speaks of as having an inevitable influence on the ques-
tions, in ppite of the natural atmosphere under which they 
were asked. This would account, certainly, for the large 
number of questions of causal explanation involving pre-
causality from which he draws his conclusions in this con-
nection about preoausality in the child. However, our study 
only strengthens his judgment that children of their own 
initiative are not especially interested in the cause of 
things. If one were to guide a child's thoughts toward 
natural phenomena, the child would inevitably ask questions 
about them, but just as Piaget 1s e~erimenter refrained 
•as carefully from provoking questions as from picking and 
l choosing among those that were asked," so in this present 
study all effort to guide the conversation was conscientious-
ly avoided. At the family meal, for the sake of these 
observations, the child was allowed to enter the general 
conversation at will, as his interest directed, or to ask 
any questions or to introduce any subject he desired. Even 
in the groups at school no observ§tions were taken during 
lesson time, but when children chose their activity and 
their · own topic of conversation. In r .egard to their quest-
ions, as to all their language under consideration, every 
. 1L.-. T/ , 163, 
one has been included and counted, no differentiation 
whatever being made. 
The following are the tables for analysis which Piaget 
uses. Further explanation of his terms will be given in 
connection with the examples chosen from this study. For 
' .. 
more explicit details the reader is referred to his chapter 
on "A Child's Questions.•1 




Form of the question 
{
Cause •••••••.••••••• J Matter of the question Physical objects 
End ••••••••••••••••• 
Jlotivation Motive ...•.•........ 
Justification [Justification proper 
Logical reason ••.••• 
Psychological actions 
Customs and rules 
Classification ana 
connection of ideaa 
Piaget explains the difference between psychological 
motivation which has to do with the immediate motive and 
psychological e~lanation which has to do more with the 
reason or cause underlying the motive and which closely 
connects with or grows into logical or causal explanation, 
but he classes them all under motivation. 
l 
II. Questions Not Expressed Under 
the Form of "Why" 3 
Of causal explanation 
Natural phenomena 
~~ Chapter V. 
2
L; T., 171. 






Of reality and history 












Classification and evaluationl 
Of calculation 
With this material before us, let us cite examples 
from the children's groups, first considering the 'Whys.• 
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In the free conversation period at school 47 questions 
are asked by the children, ?% of their spo~~aneous remarks. 
Of these 47 questions, 7 are 1Whys. 1 6 of these 'Whys' are 
whys of motivation (5 of simple motive and l of psychological 
explanation). 
1) (No. 15 has shown her paper dolls.) No. 27. Why 
can't you play with them? 
2) No. 10. Why didn't you u~e sticks (for candles in 
the clay cake)? . 
' The difference in degree between these and the next question 





3) No. 27. Why would you hunt tin-foil? No. 20. 
(has been ta~king about it) I would ,get money 
for it. 
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The one why of causal explanation in the group is a question 
about the pasteboard reindeer one of them was showing to 
the group. 
No. 11 Why don't they have horns? No. 7. They're mother-
reindeer; they don't have horns • . 
In the school play period questions form 14% of the 
children's total spontaneous conversation and out of 94 
questions asked 10 are 'Whys,f all of motivation. They are 
all of the same tYPe, having to do with the activity in which 
children are engaged. 
1) No. 10. Wby don't you work faster? No. a. I am 
working as fast as I can. 
2) (Playing house) No. 20. Why don't you put some water 
in it (the pitcher)? No. 3. It spills. 
In the home play group, 18% of their spontaneous conver-
sation consists of questions, 122 in number; of which 7 are 
'Whys' (6 of motivation and 1 of logical reason, this latter 
being the only such question among all the 'Whys' of children 
in their own groups). According to Piaget, the words or 
meaning •Why is it called? etc." classes a question as one 
of logical reasoning, •relating to judgments and not to things.nl 
1 
In logical justification, thought becomes con-
scious of its own independence, of its possible 
mistakes, and of its conventions, it no longer 
w_ •• 194 f. 
seeks to justify the things in themselves,1 but its own personal judgments about them, 
.... ,.t 
D. Thfs boy's name is •sock' (a stocking-doll.). Do 
you know why? I want you to tell why, 
8, Because it was made from a stocking, · 
The questions of motivation again all ha.ve to do with their 
activity, This is a typical one: 
A, Why don't you take another colorl What color have 
you got now? . 
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D. Blue, These ,are blue-birds. I know they are, by their 
wings, 
Summing up the 'Whys' of children in their own groups, . 
there are 22 of motivation, of which 1 takes on the character 
of a more lasting cause of the action; 1 of causal e~lan-
ation; and 1 of logical justification. This bears out Piaget's 
conclusion that 
there is very little attempt on the part of children 
(i.e., among themselves) to socialize their search 
for the causal explanation of external phenomena, 
This does not mea.n that they do not feel the need 
for explanation (i.e., when with adults),2 
As to the other questions under these same conditions, 
they group themselves mostly about 'actions and intent,• 
'reality and history,' and 1classification, 1 In other words, 
they are concerned with matters of fact and not of abstract 
reasoning, which is what Piaget contends. 
Examples from free conversation, 
Action and intent. 
No. 15. (Showing a bell and a little sleigh she has 
1 
L. T., 194. 
2 -·· 
Of. ·L,·T, ,33f,; ~· 13. 
If 
Fact. 
made.) I wanted to put the bell on the sleigh but I 
don't know how to put it on. Maybe someone will help 
me. 
No. 8. Couldn't you hang it on? (He tries but doesn't 
succeed in making 1 t stay.) . . 
(No. 2 has told about an experience with a lizard.) 
No. a. Did he bite you? 
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No. 2. He didn't do anything. There was a pile of cans 
there and he dug down in there. 
Place. 
No. 18. I am going out in the hills to take my lunch. 
fio. 27. Where? Boston1 Cleveland? Twin Peaksl San Fran-
cisco? 
Classification. 
(No. 10 shows a drawing.) ·No. a. What's that blue on the 
side? 
No. 10. A curtain; I haven't finished it yet. 
E~amples from school play. 
Action and intent. 
1) No.1. (making designs with colored sticks.) Were you 
working with these with me last time? 
No. 2. No, it was M. , 
2) (Playing with clay.) No.3. He can't get a whole big 0 
piece like that soft, can het 
No. 5. No. . 
No.3. He ·has to take a little piece. 
3) (Making paper chains.) No. 1. You can take the blue 
out, can't you? 
0 
No. 10. Yes. . 
No. 1. Take it out. 
Place. 
Time. 
(In the play-house.) No. 5. You go to work. 
No. 2. Where shall I go? 
No. 5. Your work is doWQ there (pointing). 
(While they are painting.) No. 15. Some kids had a fight 
today, didn't they? 
No.1. What do you~ean, at recess this afternoon? 
No. 1~5.. Yes. 
Classification and evaluation. 
1) No. 10. Is it all right now? 





2) No. 15. (Pointing to a key on a ribbon) Isn 1 t that 
cute? What is it? 
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No. 3.. A key to my, bike. 
3) no. 20. (About No. 1 1 s drawing.) What are those spots? 
No. 1. The dirt on the hills. 
4) (Playing with clay.) No. 5. What is it, a chair or a 
stool r ' 
·No. 6 •. She changes it a~l the time. 
School rules. (There is only one.) 
(They are making 'phonics• books.) No. 6. How do you 
make an F? 
No. 3. I Qan show you on the board. 
Logical reason. (There are only two.) 
1) No. 1. How could anything be pigger than big? 
No. 2. Giants are bigger. , 
2) (Involves demonstration but does not have to do with 
set rules) No. 20. How do you make a house? 
(No. 1 shows her.) I made mine square. 
This last example is not as clear as the other, and is closely 
allied to action and to rules, but the child who is shown 
criticizes her own and sees her error, hers being more like a 
box than a house. 
E~a.n1ples from home play. 
Action and intent. 
Fact. 
1) s. Did you color all these yoursel~? 
A. Yes. . 
2) D. How are you going to get into your house? 
B. (Has no door.) Climb up, I guess. 
D. Climb up here? 
B. Guess I 111 bu.j,ld up some steps. Guess I'll tear it 
down and build a door. 
3) (This illustrates the intent which corresponds to 
psychological motivation.) D. Do you want to color 
with my colored pencils? 
A. Yes. 
D. I'm going to get a magazine for you. 
1) s. I have my camping-suit on. You know where the 
oamp-fire girls got Well, there's the cutest puppy 
there. He'll spea~ and stand up like that (shows). 
D. Does he speak our language? 
2) s. I wish I was up at the cabin now. I'd slide 
down hill. I bet there's snow there now, don't you, 
7! 
D.? It said in the paper that the bus had a hard time 
ge~ting over the grade. 
D. Is it hot up there now? 
s. No, it's cold. 
Place. 
Time. 
(Playing with train.) D. Put the switch right here 011!1 the 
end of the bridge. 
J. Where is it? 
D. Right here. , 
D. Did you have to go home at a certain time? 
B. No, we'll just start home when it's kind of dark. 
Classification. 
1) B. What are these for? The roofs? 
D. Yes, but we're not .ready. I'm ,not and you're not 
either. 
2) B. What's this thing? 
D. It's going to be a, chair when I get it done. 
3) B. This is a desk. isn't it? 
D. No, It's a table. 
The one question about social rules is an appeal to an adult. 
D. (To S.) That isn't fair for you to have all the short 
sticks. Is it, mother? 
, 
There is one example of logical reason which, however, borders 
closely on intent. 
A. I told you you didn't have red. What did you say you 
did for? 
D. •cau~e I thought I did. 
It has the criterion, "Why do you assert that?• which we 
have referred to before. One of the examples of logical reason 
through demonstration was given in connection with types of 
conversation. 
A. How do you steer this thing? 
D. I'll show you. You turn the .wheel like this. As long 
as it is that way, it goes straight. 
This is allied to human action but the demonstration involves 
I 
. ~ 
reason, It shows how one forms a basis out pf which the 
other gradually emerges; the intellectual realist through 
transitional stages becomes able to separate intellectual 
processes from himself. In a similar manner Piaget shows 
how questions of logical reason grow out of questions about 
the actions of people through questions about· the rules 
which govern these actions. This very confusion in the 
child's mind of causal e~lanation and logical justification 
with psychological motivation is what Piaget designates as 
1 1precausali ty. • 
Now what we propose to show is that in the 
child before the age of 7 or 8, these types of 
explanation are, if not completely undifferen-
tiated, at any rate far mDre similar to each 
other than they are with us. Causal explanation 
and logical justification in particular are still 
identified with motivation; because causation in 
the child's mind takes on the character of fin-
alism and psychological motivation far rather than 
that of spatial contact, and because, moreover, 
logical justification hardly ever exists in an un-
adulterated form but always tends to reduce itself 
to psychological motivation, We shall designate by 
the name of precausality_ this primitive relation in 
which causation still bears the marks of a quasi-
psychological motivation. One of the forms taken by 
this precausality is the anthropomorphic explanation 
of nature. In this case, the causes of phenomena 
are always confused with the intention of the Creator 
or with those of men, who are the makers of mountains 
and rivers. · But even if no 1 intention 1 can be detected 
in this anthropomorphic form, the 'reason• which the 
child tries to give for phenomena is far more in the 
nature of a utilitarian reason or of a motive than of 
spatial contact.! · 
1u~ ·T~,, 196 
2!/~ '!''. :, 181 
r. 
If all the questions noted down were examined, one 
would see that the children among themselves ask only what 
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matter of the examples given has been tYPical of all. But 
when the child is in conversation with one or more adults, 
his questions, though falling under the same heads, are in 
many instances of a deeper natuxe. Piaget says that .the 
child regards the adult as omniscient, thinks all his own 
questions can be answered and this leads to his notion of 
,_ final ism, of leaving nothing to chance. And it is only with 
the realization of death and of necessity that his reasoning 
begins to assume a logical character, for the idea of necess-
1 ity underlies all logic. At any rate, children of this age 
seem never to ask each other questions far removed from 
simple activity, motive, and fact. 
We turn now to D.'s questions asked of adults. The first 
fact to notice is the proportion of questions asked. Where-
as the percentages of questions to totals of spontaneous 
language of all the children in their groups is 7% in free 
conversation, 14% in school play, and 18% in home play, and 
of D. in these same groups respectively is 12%, 19%,and 19%, 
the percentage of his questions when with one adult is 34% 
and at the family meal is 38%. 
1This is a general summary of this phase of Piaget's hyPo-
thesis as it appears throughout his books. 
'. 
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In the tables of summaries the 'Whys' will be separated 
from the other questions, but in considering examples they 
will not be treated entirely apart from the others. Since 
the catagories of questions are now clearly in mind, they 
will, though named in each instance, not be listed as 
separately as heretofore. 
Unless so designated, the examples will not be kept 
separate as to time of ·occurrence since they are all asked 
of adults (or of older brothers, ~2 and 16.) 
In the family group ' talk has centered around plays and 
this group of questions from D. involves several of classi-
fication and one of fact, as well as a why of logical reason, 
due to the fact that it implies a "Why do you say ••• ?" 
Classification 
Were the thxee men in the play I was in the Three Muske-
teers? 
, 
Why of logical reasoning. 
Why not? (i.e., why do you say they were not?) 
Classification. 
Weren't the three musketeers soldiers? (Yes.) 
Classification. 
Then what makes musketeers? (Soldiers who carry muskets. 
They didn't have muskets in Trojan days.) 
Classification. 
What are muskets? (Explanation.) 
Fact. 
They have muskets now, don't they? 
Other classification questions. 
ll When a girl loves a boy it's her 
2 What are sheaves? 
3 What are jokes? , 
4 What's an adul~? 
(Explanation.) 
beau, isn't it? 
5 What 1 s a lamp? 
6 What's a crescent? 
7 Are nails steel? , 
8 Is a young cow ~ calf? 
9 What does parched me~? 
10 What does quenched mean? 
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Where among themselves the 'children's classification 
questions only sought to designate an object, these seek 
for a definition of a term, and through definition and rule 
the child begins abst.ract reasoning. Still other classi-
fication questions are of the following order: 
(~he family at table are talking about the death of a 
n~ighbor.) 
l) .. What kind of dreams do you have when you are dead? 
(Nobody knows.) I mean, if you wake up? (Nobody ever, 
does.) · . 
2) Is a funeral where they take you when you~re dead? 
(E?CPlanation.) 
Action and intent. 
ll Are you going over to pray, mother? 
2 What do. they do when they fire a ma.n? 
3 Do they bury you when you get older? . 
, 
This leads to a why of logical justification on social rules. 
Why do they bury dead people? (Explanation of danger 
to the health of those living, so . they either bury or 
burn the dead body.) I'd rather be burned, so I wouldn't 
get dirt in my eyes. 
Two points of interest in this example are (1) that the ques-
tion comes very near to the why of causal explanation show-
ing how closely allied these two types are to one another 
and (2) that the child thinks he will still care after death 
whether or not he has dirt in his eyes. 
Other very different examples of social rules are: 
1) (The child at the table is asked not to repeat 
something.) I won't tell till I get married and tell 
my wife. That'll be all right, won't it? 
2) Do ladies that own stores have to pay,for their 
little boys' clothes? (!xplanation of wholesale and 
retail.) 
The ne~t example, while it deals with social rules, shows 
how rules and definitions are hard to separate from classi-
fic a tion arid how they grow out of human action, also why 
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Piaget puts question of logical reason under classification. 
Did you hear Mrs. X. say she forgot to tell me when :it 
was time to oome ho~e? That was an excuse, wasn't it? 
The following conversation at bed-time is filled with 
questions of different types. 
Place. 
Where is Jesus? (Answer.) 
Is He down-town, too? (Answer.) 
Is He all over town? (lnswer.) 
Causal explanation. 
How can He beT (Because He is a Spirit.) 
Psychological motivation. 
Why doesn't He come again, like He did? (He came once 
to show man what God is like.) . 
Why did they call Him Jesus? (Just as we·~ called you D.) 
Psychological explanation. 
Why did they hang Him? (Because the¥ were so selfish 
they didn't recognize .Him to be God.) 
Fact. 
Are the crosses they hung Him on chopped down? (Yes, 
a long time ago.) Was it two pieces of wood nailed to-
gether? (putting hie hands together cross-fashion.) 
(Yes.), · 
This conversation shows the great difference between the 
subject-matter of questions asked by a child of an adult or 
of another child. They fall into the same categories of 
f act, etc., but deal with far different subject-matter, as 
for e?tample: 
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We know God, don't we, mother? 
A question of psychological explanation which involves 
causal e~lanation of sound waves, etc., is 
Why do deaf men put their hands behind their ears? 
, 
Ex~~ples of Causal explanation. 
· 1) ('Why' of physics.) (As shadow falls across the 
table.) Why do we always have to have a shadow? 
2) (Body.) Do all black-haired people get white ,hair 
over their ears like you do, daddy? {No, because ••• ) 
3) When you die, you forget how to read, don't you? 
Everything is just the opposite to what it is in life, 
isn't it? (Yes, because ••• ) 
4) (Animals.) Ants can crawl up trees easier. than any-
thing else, can't they? 
5 Do eggs grow? . 
6 What are his .(elephant's) tusks for? 
7 {Physical phenomena.) How was eartn made? 
8 Wi~l lead go to steel? 
9 Is the moon on fire? . 
10 (Manufacture.) How,do they make olive oil? 
Two other questions of causal explanation have been classed 
under 1body 1 but they are of deeper significance. They are 
asked on separate occasions, so indicate that .the child is 
puzzling about them. 
1) Mother, am I always the same person? (Yes, there can 
never be another D.F.) But there has qeen another D.F. 
(An uncle.) (I try to explain about individuality and 
that no two persons are ever exactly the same.) 
2) Mother, is it always the same 1 I 1 when I wake up in 
the morning? (What do you think?) I didn't know. - It 
must be, though, 'cause it has the same feelings and 
the same life. 
The following example of logical reasoning is too inter-
esting to be left out. 
(At table. The remark has been made that his brother 
had three rides across the Bay in an aeroplane when he • 
was .in San Francisco.) How could he have three rides? 
How 1d he get back to the place he started f1•om? 
(Explanation: Because he crossed the Bay pnce in the 
ferry-boat.) 
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It is hoped that this more natural way of handling the 
individual child's questions of adults has not ·been confusing. 
The summaries following will place all the material by classes. 
Before giving those tables a few examples gathering up those 
types not indicated thus far are offered. 
First are examples of invention, which strangely have 
occurred nowhere in the children's conversation. 
1) If I were a mechanic, do you know what I'd do_t 
2) But if I did see a ghost in the closet, what ~ould 
you do? (But you couldn't, there aren't any such things.) 
But if,I did, what would you do? (I'd look at it and 
see what it was like, etc.) What are they? (People have 
used their imagination, etc.) 
3) What would happen if you broke a leg? 
. 
Piaget speaks of such physical assumptions as •mental exper-
iments. n 
Childish assumptions point to a confusion be-
tween the logical and the real order of things, 
just as precausality confuses logical implication 
-and causal explanation. In other words, the child, 
thanks to the notion of preoausality, conceives the 
world as more logical than it really is. This makes 
it possible for him to connect everything and to 
foresee everything, and the assumptions which he 
makes are endowed in his eyes with a richness in 
possible deductions which our adult logic could never 
allow them to possess. 
Examples of historical fact. · 
· (Naming books of the Old Testament.) 
1) The Chronicles that are put around at peoples' 
houses? (He means newspapers, such as the San Francisco 
Chronfqle, so explanation of meaning of chronicles.) 
a) Did they (the Jews) have Chronicles1 (I'll read you 
some of them, so rou can see what they ,are like. I read 
about King David.) 
1t.T{, 211 f. 
3) He's dead, isn't he? (Yes, a long ti~e ago.) I 
wonder if I'll be a king when I get big. (The names 
being the same.) 
Examples of school rules. 
- 1) (Pronounces 'pretty' as though it were 1purty'. (I 
say, "No, it's 'pretty'") Who said so? 
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2~ It begins with aT, doesn't it?,(Ye&.) 
3 'Because' is better than # 1 0ause~, isn't it, mother? 
Yes.) 
4) It 1s wrong to stole. You shouldn't stole. (Explain 
'steal, stole, stolen.•) Wouldn't it be this way, "I 
have not stolen"? (Yes.) "I have stoled," that wouldn't 
be right1 What do. I hitch on to that 'stolen'? He has, 
or they ~ave? (It makes no difference.) Is 'tqey have' 
two words? (Yest) 'They' is one word? And 'stolen' is 
one word? .(Yes. J 
It is not inJcended at all to convey the idea that when 
with an adult the child asks only such questions as have been 
given as examples, but it is true that neither this particular 
child nor any other in the children's groups ever ask questions 
of this nature of each other during the observation periods. 
Probably these questions are typical of any child of similar 
age and I.Q. when with adults whom he feels free to question. 
Side by side with these questions are many in the home obser-
vations of the same character as the examples given from the 
chidren's groups, dealing with the games, stories, or i mmed-
iate activity or interest. But most of the questions are 
seeking for adult information by which to check his own 
opinions and these questions certainly form a more intensive 
mode of the socialization of the intellectual processes with 
its consequent gains in logical reason, if the adults asked 
are interested in giving the child a thoughtful answer, based 
on their best knowledge. 
(D.'s 
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Summary of Children's Questions in Their Own Groups 
included.) 
Home Play School School 
Play·- Conver- Totals 
sat ion 
Not in the form of 'W'.ayt. 
Action and Intent 59 42 10 111 
Reality and History 
J'act 20 8 8 
Place 14 9 7 
Time 0 1 0 
34 18 15 67 
Classification 
Nomenclature 2 1 0 
Classification 15 17 15 
Evaluation 1 3 0 
Reason • 3 2 0 
21 23 15 59 
Rules 
Social 1 0 0 
School 0 • 1 o · 
1 1 0 2 
115 84 ~ 239 
In the form of 'Why'. 
Psych. Motivation 6 10 6 22 
Causal E~lanation 0 0 1 1 
Logical Reason 1 0 0 1 
7 10 -7 24 
1~ "'"94 47 283 
Percentages of questions 
to total spontaneous re-
18% 14% 7% marks 
Same for both play groups 16% 
Same for three groups 13% 
Summary of D.'s Questions 
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in Children's Groups. 





Not in the form of 'Whyl. 
Action and Intent 37 11 5 53 
Reality and History 
Fact 12 4 0 
Place 12 3 2 
Time 0 1 0 
24 8 2 34 
~assification 
Nomenclature 1 1 0 
Classification 6 3 2 
Evaluation 2 1 0 
· Logical Reason 0 · 1 o· ,. 
9 6 2 17 
' Rules 
Social 1 0 0 1 
71 25 -9 105 
In the form of 'Why'. . 
Motivation 1 2 0 
Causal Explanation 0 0 0 
Logical Justification 2 0 0 
or 
Logical Reason 
3 2 0 5 
--rr4 ~7 ---s -no 
Percentages of questions to 
19% 19% 12% total spontaneous remarks 
Same for all children's groups 1'7% 
-
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Summary of D. ' s Questions with Adults 
Meal Bedti1ne Totals 
Not in the form of 'Why'. 
Action and Intent 33 123 156 
Reality and History 
Fact 79 45 
Place 7 23 
Time 4 · 3 
Invention 4 9 
94 - 80 
Causal Explanation 
174 
General 1 0 
Human Body 2 12 
Animals 3 2 
Plants 2 0 
Physics 1 9 
Natural Phenomena 9 --23 
Spiritual Phenomena 0 3 
Manufacture 3 6 
~2 32 44 
Classification 
Nomenclature 5 3 
Classification 31 40 
Evaluation 7 13 
Logical Reason 2 4 
45 60 105 
Rules 
School 5 16 
Social 3 3 
8 19 27 
192 314 506 
Whys 
Motivation 14 11 
Causal Explanation 1 1 
Justification 
Justification 0 2 
Reason 2 0 
2 . ··a'· , ... , ) - -.J -- ... _ 17 14 3!1. 
---zos ~28 537 
Percentages of questions to 
Total Spontaneous Remarks 38% 33% 3~ 
Total, number of questions asked by D.of children and adults 647 
General Summary of All Children's Questions in Groups 
Not in the Form of Why 
Action and Intent ••••••••••••.•••••..••••••...••••• 111 
Reality and History (Fact 36) (Place 30)(Time 1) ••• 67 
Causal E~lana tion • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . • • «D 
Classification (Nomenclature 3)(Classification 47) 
(Evaluation 4)(Logical Reason 5).... 59 
Rules (Social 1) (School 1)........................ 2 
· Whys (Psychological Motivation 22] (Causal Explana-
tion 1 )(Logical Explanation~ . l~ ••••.••. : .•.••••• , 24 
83 
Total ntimber of questions asked by children in groups 263 
General Summary of D.'s Questions 
with Adul te and Other .Children 
Not in the Form of Why 
Action and Intent ••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Reality and History (Fact 140)(Place 47)(Time 8) 
(Invention 13) ••••••..••.•.••• 
Causal Explanation (General l~(Body 14)(Animale 5) 
· (Plante 2) Physics lO)(Manu-
facture 9 (Spiritual Pheno-
mena 3) ••..•.. .•.••• :· ••.....•• 
Classification (Name 10) Classification 82) 
(Evaluation 23)(Logical Reason 7) •• 
Rules (School 21) (Social 7) ••..•.•.••.•••.••••••• 
Whys (Motivation 28) (Causal Explanation 2) 
(Logical · Justification 6) •••............•...•••• 








Total of above figures •••••••.•••.••..... . •............ 910 
From which should be subtracted D. 1 s questions in groups 110 
Total number of questions asked by children.......... 800 
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From these summaries and our examples it is evident 
that child thought centers about action, psychological moti-
vation, and matters of fact. It is also evident from our 
typical examples that questions asked by children between 
themselves are simple in character and have to do with the 
activity of the moment, but that a great change takes place 
in the character of the que~cn~ when the child (whom we 
have observed) is with friendly adults. 
Another outstanding fact is the small proportion of 
'whys'. This harmonizes with our assertion that the major-
ity of these children and the one most thoroughly studied, 
are in their mental age passing out of the ego-centric per-
iod and beginning the period that extends from 7-8 to 11-12, 
Our findings in the case of the child with adults bear 
out the truth of the following statement (with the exception 
that he does not frame his questions of causal explanation 
in the form of 'why'.) 
Thus, on the one hand, the relative fre-
q*ency of 1whys 1 diminishes; on the other hand, 
there is an increase of questions of reality and 
history in comparison to those of explanation; 
finally, the sense of the 'whys' becomes increas-
ingly causal. These movements seem to us to be 
closely connected with one another. It is true 
that statistics can be made to prove anything, but 
in this case statistical induction corresponds 
with the results of qualitative analysis and 
clinical examination. 
For one thing, if the f .requency of the 'whys 1 
diminishes in proportion to the bulk of the ques-
tions, this 18 because between the ages of 3 and 
7 'Why' is - rea.lly.a question which is used for every 
purpose, which demands a reason for everything in-
discriminately, even when there is no reason for 
present except through a confusion of the 
psychological and the physical order of things. 
It is therefore quite natural that when these 
two orders come to be differentiated, and when 
the idea of chance or of 1 the given' first makes 
its appearance, a large number of questions 
should break away from the why form. They will 
then take the form of 1 how 1 or of simple ques-
tions without any interrogative words in them, 
and will concern themselves as much with the con-
sequences and inner mechanism of phenomena as with · 
their 'reason.• The decrease of 'whys' would thus 
be an index of a weakening of precausality. This 
weakening, it seems to us, can also be seen in 
the increase of simole quest i.ons insofar as these 
show signs, as compared to •why~', of a desire for 
supplementary information.l 
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Thus we find in the case of D. his questions of causai 
explanation with but one exception are stated in other forms 
than 1 why 1 • In other words, he is more interested in infor-
mation about than in the 'why' of things in general. This 
searching for correct information is tYPical of his questions 
of adults, although at times strong evidences of the remains 
of precausality make their appearance, but very infrequently, 
however. This infrequency of the 1why 1 form in his ques-
tions as well as the less precausal character of his causal 
questions stand out in startling contrast to the questions 
of the six-to-seven-year-old quoted by Piaget. 
1 
If questions about facts and circumstances are 
multiplied, it is because the child gives up the 
attempt to account for phenomena which are simply 
given, and tries to gain a more detailed knowledge 
of t he historical circumstances in which they 2 appear, of their condition and of their consequences. 
From this point of view we are also enabled 
to understand why questions of reality and history 
increase in comparison to questions of explanation, 




always assuming that this increase is no~ due 
to the arbitrary character of the classification~ 
Only 31 out of D.'s 537 questions to adults are 'why' ques-
tions, while 185 of 750 questions cited of Piaget'a si~-to­
seven-year-old subjects are in the form of 'why'. When D. 
does ask 1why 1 questions they are chiefly, as with the other 
children, 'whys df motivation.• 
Though there are very few questions explicitly logical 
in form, many of his questions of action, or reality and 
history, and of classification and rules are implicitly 
logical. If this is evidence of remaining precausality it 
is also evidence of the germs of reas·oning growing in his 
mind. 
There is indeed subject-matter for a whole book in the 
study of children's questions and one is baffled very often 
by the delicacy of the task of separating them into arbi-
trary classes. But Piaget's analysis certainly is appli-
cable as well as interesting and if proof of his tireless 
effort in his study of the "Psychology of the logic of 
childhood." He spared no pains to verify every assertion 
and back up his conclusions. He carried this particular 
e_~eriment over a period of ten months with a child between 
six and seven and then seven months later put fifty of the 
same questions to the same child and found a decided decline 
of precausality. Through socialization of his thought, then, 
the child adapts the information given him and gradually 







drops his precausal ideas. A similar though ~premeditated 
experience indicates that the same thing is true in D.'s 
case. 
His question, "Is the moon on fire?" was the most 
strongly precausal question he asked during the observations. 
Its precausality is indicated by his own remarks following. 
That's what I think. I think Jesus has a soft thing 
up in the sky, that He l .ights every night and morning 
(the sun) and puts it up in the sky, but He 1 s carefuii. 
not to turn i t upside down because the fire might fall 
on folks and burn them up. There might be sticks 
flying around in the air and they might catch fire. 
He always has daylight though, because He always has 
the sun. 
This is perfect evidence that he still retains strong pre-
causal J'lotions. But contrast to that these remarks. He 
himself brings up the subject, three months later, after the 
observations are closed; and a~ter he has made his own the 
explanation given him at the previous time. 
A boy said the light from the moon was stronger than 
the light from the sun because it gave .light in the 
night. But that isn't so, is it? Because the moon 
gets the light that it gives us from the sun, and any-
way it's dark at night because the sun isn't shining 
on our side of the earth. 
Let us keep in mind Piaget 1 s conclusion that 11 precau-
sality tends to disappear at the same age as ego-centrism, 





We have seen from our studies so far that ego-centrism 
is bound up with these various aspects of child thought and 
that they are affected by it either directly or indirectly. 
As we go on to study more particularly child reasoning we 
shall see how ego-centrism, in whatever degree it remains, 
affects the processes of reasoning. It should be kept in 
mind always that Piaget emphasizes formal reasoning and 
draws very nice distinctions in view of that. We have found 
that to be true in his analysis of chiJ.d's questions and it 
will be evident throughout, since in the ability to separate 
oneself from one's own viewpoint and reason from hY-potheses 
is the greatest evidence of divorce from ego-centric thought. 
It is also evident and will be increasingly so, that 
a child in passing into another stage of thought and reason-
ing does not drop entirely the habits of the former stage. 
With others of h.is own age he is far more ego-centric than 
with adults and in tests and experiments evidences far greater 
advance than in conversation with other children. 
CHAPTER VII 
Use of Conjunctions of Causal, Logical and Dis-
cordant Relations 
in taking up the effect of ego-centrism on the reason-
ing processes in a child, Piaget shows that since the child 
is unconscious of the need of proof he does not synthesize 
hie thoughts, does not consider relations, and therefore 
omits logical relations and juxtaposes propositions instead 
of connecting them. Because the child fails to analyze he 
brings thoughts together in confused wholes connecting every-
thing with everything else, and so ind.Ullges in an excess of 
relating to which Piaget gives the term 'syncretism' which 
is the opposite of juxtaposition, that being a lack of e~-
1 plicit logical relation. He compares it (as he says M. 
Luquet has done) to children's drawings: "The thing is not 
there a 's a whole, the details only are given,· and then, for 
2 lack of synthetic relation, they are simply j~taposed." 
The method followed by Piaget in studying this angl e 
of child reasoning is to study the spontaneous use of the 
child's conjunctibns, especially 'because,' 'although,' 
and 'therefore', and to give experimental tests which in-
volve the completion of sentences by the children from the 
1 
Of. J ,R:,; 4 
2 -
J,R, -, 3, 
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point where the conjunction is used. Of the results of these 
tests, he says: 
The data show that up to the age of 7-8 the 
word 'because' is occasionally an equivocal 
term which is used for all purposes, and covers 
a number of heterogeneous types of relation--
causal, consecutive, and even finalistic, the 
child being apparently undisturbed by this heter-
ogeneity,l 
Bumming up his findings rather than going into every 
detail, they are as follows: (1) The child confuses different 
possible relations, such as causality, consequence, etc.: 
(2) He is unable to handle the explicit relations of dis-
cordance, and 1although, 1 1 even if,' etc. unambiguously be-
fore 11-12, using the conjunction 1but 1 , which fails to in-
dicate exact relations; (3) He does not use the 1but 1 of 
implicit discordance till 7-8 (that in which the word 1but 1 
II 
~ Qccurs, not at the beginning, but in the middle of a sen-
tence, and of a sentence containing a causal relation whether 
2 ' 
lo gical or psychological." ): (4) The word 'therefore' does 
not e~ist in childish language until formal logical thought 
makes it first appearance after 11-12; (5) The d1fferent 
meanings that a child gives to the word 'ther efore' turn out 
to correspond exactly to the different meanings of 1because 1 
as 'and', and 'and then', 'because', etc.: (6) A child's 
talk is full of 'thens', but only a few of them are logical 
'thens' corresponding to 1 therefores 1 ; (7) There is a rarity 
1-... 
lJL.., 16. 
2i·,a~ , 52. 
of the 'because• of logical explanation. corresponding to the 
rarity of the 1whys 1 of logical justification: (8) The child 
does not understand logical necessity, so reasons from par-
ticular to particular, or by transduction, and easily for-
gets what he has just said, and so contradicts himself. 
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Piaget distinguishes three types of 1because 1---'causal 1 , 
'psychological', and 'logical'---calling to mind the three 
classes of 'whys' studied in Chapter VI. The distinguishing 
marks of them will be brought out 1n the study of the examples. 
In the present study his method of experiment1 has 
been closely followed but the findings will necessarily have 
to be condensed as much as possible. The most interesting 
aspect of the experiments has been the study of the indiv.i-
duality of the child in his approach to the experiment and 
of his characteristic answers, arid the detailed material 
gathered with each one, but as heretofore only sufficient 
~~amples can be mentioned which will bring out the general 
results. 
After talking with each child in a friendly fashion and 
creating the atmosphere of playing a game together, we ast 
if he can give us a sentence all his own containing the word 
~ecause'. All but one of the twelve do so 9 This one, No. 
5, although she afterward finishes the sentences we give, 
declares she cannot think of any of her own. It is of 
1 
For fuller details, see J.R., Chapter I. 
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interest to note that in her 82 remarks in school observation 
periods she never once uses the word 'because•. She uses 
'because' in a causal sense, however, in every completion 
sentence except the one about teasing the dog. In that sen-
tence she uses -because' in the sense of 1and then•. We 
find in the other experimental tests that she ·uses 'because' 
correctly twelve times, of her own accord. These are the 
sentences (Used by Piaget) given to each child but as com-
pleted by No. 5 (the child's words being all those following 
the conjunction): 
1) I shan't go to school tomorrow because I it's rain-
ing. (This has the criterion of a causal 'because', 
i ~e., "The mark of a relation of cause and effect 
between two phenomena or two events."l) 
2) That man fell off his bicycle because I a car bumoed 
into him to make him fall. (Causal). · 
3) I lost my pen because I it was hanging. (Causal). 
4) I teased that dog because I he's bad. (She means 
he 1s bad as a consequence of her teasing. Her 'because' 
equals 'and then' or 'therefore•). 
5) A man fell down in the street because / he was play-
ing ball in the street. (Causal). ,. 
These sentences are so worded that a child could very 
easily finished a causal 'because' involving a psychological 
relation, which Piaget calls "the relation of motive for 
action", 2 which children of this age are prone to use, he 
states, especially in place of logical relations. She, 
however, does not do so. 





Her attempt to finish the sentences involving a logi-
cal relation (i.e., denoting "a relation, not of cause and 
effect, but of 'implication,' of reason and consequent; what 
the 'because' connects here is no longer two observed facts, 
but two ideas or judgments. 111 ) is a good illustration of 
'justification at any price' and lack of reasoning. 
1) Paul says he saw a little cat eating a big dog. His 
friend says that is impossible because f the qog was 
mean. 
2) 2 is not half of 5 because I 5 is .a little bit 
straight and 2 is a little bit straight. 
In her case the sense of necessity of logical relations is 
still entirely dormant. 
Neither does she understand the use of 'although.' The 
sentences given each one were as follows, up to and includ-
ing the conjunction of explicit discordance. These are as 
she finished them: 
1 . 
1) Ernest is playing in the street even though I he 
would get run over. · (This is the only , correct use 
she makes of such a conjunction.) · 
2) I have some big friends even though I they come down 
to see me. (Confuses with 1 and 1 .) 
3) He slapped my face even though : I I slapped him. 
(Confuses 'though' with 1because. 1 ) 
4) I have given John my bicycle though I I . might get 
hurt on it. ( ! Though' equals 'because•.) 
5) I ate another roll although I I want to die. (Rather 
an exaggerated idea of the immediate effect of over-
eating, but the 'although' is equivalent to 'because'). 
6) It is hot today although I I gu~ ss I'll take a 
shower. (Here 'although' equals either 'and' or 
'therefore•.) 
7) He bathed yesterday although I he was hot. (Equals 
JtR', , 6. 
'because'.) 
8) He didn't get wet yesterday, although j 
no water i n the tank. (Equals 'because'.) 
9) That man fell off his horse, although I 
was running fast. (Equals 'because•.) 
there was 
the horse 
This brings before the reader the sentences used and 
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illustrates the same results as Piaget found, especially 
in the use of conjunctions other than 'because'; namely, a 
confusion of discordance, causality, consecutive relations, 
and consequence. 
Her utter lack of understanding of 'therefore' empha-
sizes Piaget 1 s conclusion that 'therefore' is not a part of 
a child's vocabulary before 11-12. For her it does not 
exist in the sentence, for she adds a 'because' to each 
'therefore' before completing the sentence. 
1) John has lost his pen, therefore I because it was 
barely hanging. 
2) I can't ride my bicycle, therefore I because the 
bicycle was broken. 
3) Tomorrow I shall have a holiday, therefore I because 
it is Sunday. 
4) It will be fine tomorrow, therefore . ./ because he can 
:Qlay. 
5) The sun is shinin ~ , therefore /because it was a 
pretty day. 
Not understanding 'therefore' at all, she naively for ge s 
its existence, adds the 'because' with which she is fami-
liar and finishes the sentence, although in the last two 
cases she confuses her ideas with the correct use of 
'therefore'. 
This same disregard of what is.not within their 
understanding i s tr.ue in the case of several others. No.2 
adds •because' to every 'therefore' given. No. 7 adds it 
t o three of them, but uses 'therefore' correctly in the 
fifth sentence: The sun is shining, therefore I it is a 
nice day. In the fourth sentence, however, he repeats the 
same idea which preceded the 'therefore'; it will be fine 
tomorrow, therefore I it will be a nice cool day. No. 6 
adds 'because' to the 'therefore' in ever·y sentence except 
one, and repeats the original idea in other words after 
the 'therefore' in that sentence. No. 8 uses 'therefore' 
in the first sentence as meaning 'because', and thereafter 
adds 'because' to the 'therefore'. No.1 uses it as 'be-
cause' in three sentences. Enough have been mentioned to 
show how readily they attribute the meandng of 'because' 
to ·•therefore', or disregard it entirely in the sentence, 
adding 'because' to it. 
Other instances show it to be confused with 'and 1 • 
No. 15. Tomorrow I shall have a holiday, therefore I 
I .like holidays. 
No. 15. The sun is shining, therefore / I like the 
sun. 
No. 19 finishes two of her ~entences in this fashion: 
John has lost his pen, therefore I what shall we do 
about it? 
I can't ~ide my bicycle, therefore I why can't I? 
I 
We can thoroughly agree with Piaget 1 s statement that 
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children of this age show no unambiguous use of 'therefore', 
the conjunction of logical consequence. It is only fair to 
t hem, however, to mention a few instances in their 
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spontaneous conversation where they make correct use of 
'so' as equivalent to 'therefore' although they never once 
use 'therefore' of their own accord. 'So' is, however, much 
more common with adults in social communication, 'therefore' 
being reserved more for demonstration or scholastic dis-
cuss ion. 
1) No. 1. It isn't big enough, so they come down to get 
into a bigger one. 
2) No. 1. There wasn't any brown, so I used red. 
3) No. 7. We thought it was too little, so we busted it 
u~ and we're making another. 
4) No. 7. His brother has a steam-roller, and it won't 
go, so he pushes it. 
5) No. 19. I made abook and I never made no pictures, so 
I put numbers on it. 
These examples, though few, show the beginning of the use 
of a conjunction of consequence, equivalent to 'therefore' 
though less formal. 
As to the use of 'although' four of them add the word 
'because' before they finish their sentence~ the explanation 
of this, as with the 'therefore', being that since it stands 
out as a 'because' in their minds they unconsciously add the 
word, thereby ·~·ustifying it at any price". It is confused 
with 'because' in some instance by each one of them, and 
continuaillly by a few of them. Sometimes· 1 although' is used 
for 'but•, sometimes for 'therefore', sometimes for 'and'. 
Thus again we find the confused heterogeneity of which 
Piaget speaks. 
1) No. 3. He slapped my face, although/ I told my 
mother. (Equals 'and 1 or 1 therefor~'.) 
·. • 
2) no. 4. That man fell off his horse, al.though I he 
gets up again, (Equals 1and 1 or 1but 1 .) 
3) No. 20. It's hot today, although I I drink water. 
(Equals 1 and 1 or 'therefore•.) 
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Undoubtedly the reason why 'although' and 'therefore' 
are most frequently confused with 'because' is that it is 
the one of the three con~unctions of which they make use, 
and this they use e~ceedingly well. Every one makes correct 
use of 1because 1 in every instance in the completion of the 
five sentences, with the exception of No. 15, who in one 
sentence uses it as equivalent to 'and then' (I teased that 
dog because I he bit me), and No. 4, who confuses it four 
out of the five "times with 'and' or 'but•. She, however, 
uses 'because• correctly in all her explanations in the 
other experiments. 
No. 8 adds to his example, 11 I shan't go to school to-
morrow because I I'm sick," this remark, "I 1m sick in the 
hospital;' is another reason': Of course, h~ means a fur-
ther or stronger reason, but he understands of his own 
initiative that in using 'because' he is giving reasons. 
His e~lanation of the following sentence is a fine illus-
tration of the beginnings of logical reason. He has given 
the sentence, "I teased that dog because I ~e · cried." 
Thinking this is a case of reversing cause and effect, or 
meaning 'and then' instead of 'because', I ask, "How's 
that? Don't you mean that he cried because you teased him?" 
. 
"No," he replies, "it's this way. If you laugh when they 
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tease you, they go away; if you cry, the more. they tease 
you. I teased the dog because he cried." 
A point to notice about many of their completion causal 
sentences is that they are stated impersonally. This, it 
would seem, is a step away from the personal element in 
reasoning. The sentences of No. 10 bring out the impersonal 
stating of the cause. 
1) I shan't go to school today because I it's rainy 
day. 
2) That man fell off his bicycle because I his bicycle 
wouldn 1 t go. 
3) I lost my pen because I it fell off. 
4) A man fell down in the street because I a car ran 
over him. It knocked him down and made him fall. 
Also No. 15. 
1) I shan't go to school tomorrow because I there is 
no school. 
5) A man fell down in the street because / it was 
slippery. 
In the 11 original sentences containing 'because' 5 are 
of psychological explanation and 6 are causal. 
No. 6. I go down to Oakland because I want to see the 
fishery my cousin has. (Psychological) 
No. 1. I asked my father if I could play in the sand 
because I wanted him to :know where I was. (Psychological) 
This same child in his first sentence containing 'although' 
uses an original logical 'because' ('should' and 1might 1 
r " show that because connects two judgments). 
Ernest is playing in the street, even though I he 
should go out of it because he might get run over. 
E~amples using a causal 1because 1 : 
No. 10. Because the man bumped into somebody, he fell 
down. (Causal) 
No. 2. I play with my own self because there's no kids 
to play with. (Causal). 
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There are many points of interest in a detailed dis-
cussion of their examples, but the completion of the sentences 
calling for a logical 'because' rema~ for study. 
1) Paul says he saw a little cat swallow a bi~ dog. 
His friend says that is impossible, because 1 ••• 
Here are a few examples of the completions of this sentence: 
No. 1 I it couldn't. The cat it too little. (This is 
is correct, but he might have explained more fully. 
Three others give t i1is sa.rne reason, or that the cat' s 
mouth or throat is too little.). 
No. 2. (goes into full detail and is most painstaking 
in giving reason) I the cat has too small a mouth and 
he couldn't swallow it anyway unless the dog was all 
chopped up and he took little pieces. 
No. s. (Also goes into complete deta.il) I a little cat 
couldn't swallow a big dog. It's mouth isn't big 
enough and the little cat couldn't hold a big dog; 
it's stomach isn't big enough. 
No. 19. I His friend· fooled him. The dog is too big 
for his throat. 
Nine out of the twelve, or 751; give the correct logical 
reason. One w.1biguously states her logical reason, one 
gives a psycholOgical reason ( 11 I he didn't '1mow how a 
little cat could eat a big dog"), and one, a meaningless 
statement. Not all, however, have a general proposition 
in mind, such as, "Little cats do not swallow big dogs," 
but are reasoning from a particular case. This is not 
true of No. 8, nevertheless, and all these examples are 
better stated than the ones Piaget gives from children 7:11 
and 8. This failure to state the general proposition is 
due to the child's inability to be conscious of his own 




for granted and so reasons from particular cases.1 
Piaget's test sentences, "Half 6 is 3 because I " and 
"Half 5 is not 2 because/," do not seem fair to ask of 
children who have had no number work whatever in school, 
' but they were given out of curiosity to know how these 
lOO 
childxen would handle it. Two of them handle both sentences 
correctly. · 
No. 1. I 3 and 3 are 6. I there is 1 in the middle. 
(He might have said, "It is 1 more than 2 plus 2, 
but he has given a logical reason.") 
No• 8. I 3 a.nd 3 make 6. / it is more than 2. (It could 
have been stated more clearly by an adult but this 
is a logical reason). 
Five others finished one sentence correctly; four of them, 
the easier problem. 
No. 2. / they are both half; 3 is half. 
No. 3. I if you cut 6 right in two in the middle, you 
would have two 3 1 s. 
No. 4. I if you take away 3 from 6 . thetl!t_ll be 3 left. 
No. 7. I if you took an apple and cut it in half and 
each half in 3 pieces, there'd be 6 pieces. (A round-
about way, but correct.) 
No. 10. I you 1d have to take 1 out to make 2 half~ 
These children give a correct logical explanation in har-
mony with the arithmetical rules. It will be recalled that 
the first one quoted, No. 5, gave a meaningless e~lanation. 
'' No. 3 probably has the correct idea, since she finishes one 
correctly, but she takes it for granted that one understands 
her meaming and so is not explicit, 'I because it doesn't 
I·'- , 
come that near to 5." The other children of the 12, Nos. 
6, 15, 19, and 20, simply shake their heads and refuse to 
I~;: , 
~Of. J. R. , 29 • 




f !dish the sentence. They do not, however, f1nish the 
sentence as Piaget gives an instance of a nine-year-old 
d H I 1 oing, " alf 9 is not 4 because he can't count." 
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Another 1because 1 of logical justification is completed 
correctly by seven of the twelve children. The following 
are typical. 
Paul s~ys that the road from his house goes down all 
the way to the school and goes down all the way back 
from school. Jean says that's impossible because I 
No. 1. I it has to go up to go down. (Idea of necessity 
in relationships.) 
No. 4. I he goes down-hill to school and up the hill 
to the house. (Correct, but does not justify her 
statement.) 
No. 6. I you couldn't go down all the way there and 
all the way back. He'd have to turn around and go 
up the hill. (Mixture of pronouns but correct logic.) 
No. a. I it would be uphill back. He'd have to go up 
too. 
Such phrases as 11 it has to," "he'd have to," 11 it would be," 
indicate the presence of the idea of necessity and an attempt 
at justification. Contrast Piaget's statement, "Even when 
the child has reasoned correctly ••• he cannot justify his 
reasoning, because he is accustomed to take the essential 
2 points for granted." 
None of these children exhibit a heterogeneous use of 
the word 'because' itself, but handle it intelligently, 
in the majority of cases, to meet the need. In only 5 sen-
tences out of the 108 separate 'because' sentences given to 
the whole group to complete, is the word 'because' confused 
with any other conjunction. Neither is it tn any of their 
1 . 
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original sentences. Piaget 1 s e~amples, taken ~rom children 
6-7:6 j : in these same tests, show confusion of 1because' with 
1and' and 'in f:such a manner that. 11 Enough e~amples from 
this group have been given to show that they tally closely 
to the criteria given by Piaget (which have been alluded to) 
which mark the beginnings of the third stage of socialization 
of language and thought. It is true, nevertheless, that 
among themselves they take the easy way and do not exert 
themselves to use the more explicit speech, but continue 
the ego-centric habits. 
··They evidence a healthy development toward abstract 
reasoning, as for instance in the correct though . simple 
completions of the logical 'because• sentences by eleven ~f 
them in at least one instance, by several of them in two 
or three instances, and by two of them in all (one of these 
two being one of the two youngest members of the group). 
75% correctly complete the first sentence, requiring a log-
ical 1because•, 65% correctly finish one of the arithmetical 
sentences, and 65% the sentence about the road. The average 
percentage for the correct completion of the three logical 
'because' sentences is 72%. These are higher than Piaget 1 s 
results with eight-year-old children, but he worked with a 
group of 180 children, probably a more heterogeneous group. 
It is to be expected that this group of twelve with an 



















average chronological age of 6:6 at the time of this experi-
ment, and an average mental age of 7:8 would show evidences 
of advancement beyo~d children of just average intelligence. 
It is to be remembered, also, that the chronological age 
of these children then ranged from 5:11 to 7:6, and two 
of the youngest ones did as well as, and, in some instances, 
better than the oldest member. This indicates that not 
only mental age, but I.Q. is a determining factor. Since 
explicit understanding and use of abstract reasoning do not 
appear before the age of 11-12, we are not looking for it, 
but there seems to be evidence through their use of 'because• 
in these experiments that they are already entering upon the 
age of implicit logical reasoning. 
If this phenomenon (juxtaposition) really lasts 
up till the age of 7-8 ·, we must expect to find, 
even at this age, that when the childr en are 
asked to complete a sentence which implies a 
definite relation, there is a certain runount of 
confusion between the various possible,. relations. 
Only this element of confusion will prove that the 
relation was not implicit in the child's mind, 
and that the child was really incapable of es-
tablishing the correct relation.l 
Since our genercd conversation in school play group 
study is only from the standpoint of the group, there is 
not enough individual material to warrant any individual 
study in the spontaneous use of 1because 1 • However, some 
points of general comparison may be made. Later, the study 
1 
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of our single child in other groups will point. out how very 
general this is. 
In the play period the children talk in short, simPle 
sentences, illustrating juxtaposition by lack of conjunctions, 
while in the free conversation period they indulge in the 
habit of stringing statements toge ther with 'and' and 'and 
then,' offering many illustrations of juxtaposition and 
syncretism. 
That there is no pains taken to synthesize their state-
ments when interested in activity, is plain, since there are 
only two instances of 'because' and one of a logical 'so' 
in their 694 remarks in school play. These are all made by 
No. 1 and in both uses of 'because' it is causal, the first 
being a rare, pure causal (dealing with external phenomena). 
1) I can make myself some blue because there is green 
and yel low there. 
2) That's my place 'cause that's where I put the water 
in. 
3) There wasn't any brown, so I used red. 
There are many instances where a 'because' is implied but 
the meaning is as clear as in adult ellipsis'. Instances 
from story-telling show how No. 8 and No. 15 put in a 'because' 
correctly which was certainly inferred in the original but 
not stated; these children catch the causal relationship, 
however, and put in a 'because' in the retelling of the story. 
Nevertheless, this does not keep them from stringing many 
statements together in their own conversation. 
No. 20. (practically average) likes to e~ress herseaf 
in this way: 
A man came past one night and he said, "Hello," and 
I said, 11Hello, 11 and he said, "Do you want a ride?" 
and I said, "No." 
The following illustrates a common style of language in 
play: 
No. 2. I almost got my chair made. I just got two 
more legs to make. I put sticks inside to make the 
legs. 
Notice the short, terse sentences. However, in school play 
there are 10 ins t ances of 'if', 3 of 'then', 4 of the •so' 
of purpose, and 5 of 'but 1 of vague discordance, although 
these indicate nothing of interest particularly in logical 
arrangement. 
It is in the free conversation period that we find 
everything strung together in long sentences. While all 
t he children fall into this form occasionally, it is of 
interest to notice that the one boy most prone to its use 
is the one with the lowest I.Q. in the larger group under 
consideration, No. 27. He is the child of 8:8 C.A., but 
only 7:7 M.A. He shows very little evidence of an eight-
year-old in his conversation, for the most part he talks 
as a child very much younger. Here are typical e~amples: 
1) First time I went I saw someone and I said "Hello" 
and I went on the scenic railway and I lost my breath 
and it kept on and it goes in the dark and you don't 
see where you're going and you keep going and you 
· land in the water and the water splashes on the win-
dow. 
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2) One time I went up-town and I saw two fire-engines 
and one fire-engine bumped into a street-car and they 











tow-car for the street-car and the fire-engine began 
to tip off the tow-car. It tipped up on bne end. It 
went 'boom' and the street-car went 'boom' and the 
glass went to pieces and we all got dizzy and the 
tractor bumped into the street-car and the street-car 
carried the building right away. 
These are "dyed-in-the-wool" examples of syncretism, or 
thinking in confused wholes, and of juxtaposition, or the 
lack of synthesis. 
Even the ones who handle 'because' so well in experi-
mental tests, when with other children frequently ju~ta­
pose their ideas. 
Here are extreme examples: 
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No. 2. Last Sunday I went down-town and we went around 
town and we saw a great big water-wagon and we saw a 
great big hose under the water-wagon and they were 
putting the hose down in a great big hole in the middle 
of the street to wash it out. They took the great big 
hose from the water-wagon and put it on a faucet of 
the fire-hydrant and filled it up. 
No. a. Once a little boy ate lunch and went out in the 
garage and got into the oil and the little boy had to 
go to bed and I had to sit in a "chair. Let me think, 
there was something else. We had a gun and we pointed 
the gun at the dog and he'd run and then we ate waffles 
and then I went home. We had lots of fun. 
No. 1. (Just after the long tale of the wreck told by 
No. 27, cited above) Somebody ought to take up a house 
and put it on wheels and take an engine off the track 
and have a little thing to hook the house to the car 
and have the front .of the house in back and that would 
be the observation car. 
While these examples are typical of most of No. 27's remarks, 
the other three children many times talk very differently, 
as our various illustrations show in other chapters. Examples 
were taken from them to illustrate how in the same child 
at t his stage the beginnings of implicit logic and the signs 








It is when the child is relating an expe~ience that 
he falls most noticeably into this habito They respond 
readily with 1because 1 to the teacher's questions, but 
since it is the rule to leave them to their own devices and 
merely listen, _.she seldom asks questions during these periods. 
(In the use of conjunctions, all remarks, answers included, 
are considered.) 
Examples of 1because 1 from free conversation: 
1) (No. 20 has shown and described autumn leaves she 
brought to the teacher. The teacher asks of the 
group, ~Where could she find autumn leaves like that?") 
No. 8. Out-doors. ( What makes rou think so?) No. 1 • . . 
Because we hear them. (Logical) . 
2) (The teacher has finished reading them a story and 
asks ., "How old was Beth?") No. 19. Five. (Why?) 
Because there were five .candles on the cake. (.Logical) 
3) (A child is showing something she has made from 
the school clay and the children discuss whether each 
one can take home what he has made. The teacher asks, 
"Who can tell us why we don't take it horne?") No. 19 
We don't take it home because there is not .enough for 
all of us. (This would be causal were it not tha t 
she is giving the reason for her opinion.) 
The following a re from their own descriptions or experience: 
4) No. 1. (describing a picture) They're digging the 
hill down 'cause the country doesn't want it here. 
{Psycholoo-ical) 
5) No. 2. fTelling about his baby-brother) Hy mother 
turns the water off. My brother likes it, 'cause he 1s 
scared of the water. (Psychological) 
6) (They are talking about making dolls.) No. 1. I can 
make one out of a stocking 'cause the teacher showed 
us how in kindergarten. (Causal, relationship of two 
facts) 
7) No. 16. (talking about riding horse-back) We just 
rode the big one, 'cause the little one gets scared. 
(Psychological) 
8) No.4. (They have been talking about the deep-water 
way. No. 27 has said they are making an ocean. This 
child calls it, digging a well.) We went out to Dad's 
Point but we couldn't get there because they are 
digging a well. (Causal) 
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Notice how she contradicts herself. 11 V/e went ••• but we could-
n't get there." She knows so well herself that they started 
for that place that she thinks everyone will understand. 
This, besides the example of 1because 1 contained, illustrates 
how little pains children take to make their meaning clear to 
each other. 
Conversation between children is therefore not 
sufficient at first to take the speakers out of 
their ego-centrism, because each child, whether 
he is trying to explain his own thought or to 
understand those of others, is shut up in his 
own point of view. This phenomenon occurs, it 
is true, ~ong adults. But these have had at 
least some practice in arg~1ent or conversation, 
and they know their faults ••• because experience 
has shown them the appalling density of the human 
mind. Children have no suspicion of all this. 
They think that they both understand and are 
understood,l 
We must not forget, however, the illustrations we have given 
from this group which show effort to explain points to each 
other and to compare opinions. 
E~amples of logical 1if 1 : 
1) No. 1. (to a ·~ remitrk of No. 20 that her baby brother 
is 9 years old) He wouldn't be a baby if he was 9 
:years old. 
2) (Talking about phonic rhymes) No. 1. It would go 
up there {Pointing) if it was. 
3) No. 10. (talking about the paper chain on the 
Christmas tree) If it was long enough it mi ght come 
down again. 
There are frequent uses of 1but 1 which fulfil their 
vague sense of discordance and ·some might be considered 
implicit. There is also the use of 'only' as 'but•. 








No. 15. ·We've got something else, only we didn't write 
it down. 
No. 8. (endeavoring on his own initiative to explain per-
speotive in his drawing) This (pointing to a tree) · 
really is as big as this (pointing), only this is far 
away • 
There is another instance of a •so 1 equivalent to •there-
fore' which should be mentioned in addition to the five used 
by the three children of the experimental group. 
No. 12. (about his picture) I started the house and 1 
made it crooked, so I started it over again. 
Examples of juxtaposition and syncretism might be 
multiplied but it is enough to say that vague and implicit 
relationships are more common throughout the -general group. 
The child, unconscious in most instances of the need of 
proof, does not naturally use expl i cit relationships at this 
age to his equals~ Again, nearly all exruapl es of any a ttempt 
at logical relationships come from the half and usually the 
third having the highest I.Q. One point stands out cl early: 
When these children do make use of 'because' they do not 
use it in a heterogeneous manner which Piaget states is 
1: natural up to 7 and 8. Also the few who use 1so' as equi-
11 
valent to 'therefore' do it correctly, but there is no t a 
single instance in their spontaneous conversation in these 
groups of 'although' or 'even if'. A few e~amples will be 
brought out in the case of the one child studied with adults. 
One would think from these examples of their spontan-
eous conversation that most of them had never>heard of 
'because•. However, the experiments and their answers to 
" 
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the teacher disprove this. They have become ~amiliar 
with its use. Observations carried out all day, under all 
conditions, would undoubtedly tell when. Merely as a matter 
of interest, the word 'because' was .used spontaneously 215 
times by the group of twelve in their answers or conversa-
tion during the experimental period, outside of the experi-
ments on the use of conjunctions and outside of story-telling 
and explanation. These were distributed throughout the group 
and were almost entirely causal or logical. 
Summing up the material from home play we give these 
few examples, the first two of which are most interesting 
because they come from a little girl of just 5 who is over 
7 mentally. 
1) S. Maybe you can't use it. 
D. Maybe I can't use it? 
s. Yes, because it 1s my' ,car. (Causal) 
2) D. This dol~'s name is Sock. Do you know whyl I 
want you to tell why. . 
s. Because it was made from a stocking. (logical; 
gives reason for a name.) ·· 
3) D. Let's play p ar tner tag. No, we can 1 t, because 
you have to have two partners to chase and two to 
run. There aren't enough of us. (Logical justi-
fication ~Y rule.) 
All the instances of 'because' in this group, though few, 
were used by these two children, so there is no need to 
give further examples. Compare with these examples the 
statement: 
Note the correct use made of 'because' at the 
age of st. In the three lists of complete voca-
bularies given by Mlle Descoeudres 'because' is 
used by the 7-year-old but not by the 5-year-·old 




We have also the correct spontaneous use of 'because' by D. 
many times in experimental tests and in 67 examples in 
spontaneous language in these short periods of observation 
between 5:10 and 6:2. 
Let us turn now to examples of the child among adults. 
Before giving these it is imp~rtant to point out that Piaget 
considers the 1because 1 of psychological relation as inter-
mediate between the 'because' of causal e~lanation and the 
'because' of logical explanation or justification. 
The relation_here is empirical in a sense, since 
it is & question of two facts and of a causal 
explanation. In another sense, however, it is 
logical, since it introduces a reason, an intelli-
gent motive as cause. We have here as much a justi-
fication as an exnlanation. 
We have distinguished this third type because 
children have a tendency to replace logical by 
psychological relations. We gave an example of 
this just now. "Half 9 is not 4, because he can't 
count.•2 
At no time can this be said to be true of t 'his child. His 
·' use of 'because' is as clear and correct as an adult's. 
The examples themselves prove this. Therefore, all of his 
psychological explanations are as much logical as psych-
ological and in his case, at least, no differentiation need 
have been made for the reason Piaget has given, namely, 
proneness to 
or not. The 
of all. 
1 L.T., 25. 
2 .. : 
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use his psychologioal reason whether it fits 
examples given are without · exception typical 
1~--~~.~--------------------------------------------~~--~~--------------------~--J 
E_?Camples of the 'because 1 of psychologic,al relation-
ship (motive for a desire, command, or act): 
From bed-time conversation. 
1) We want a big circle -because we're going to play 
games. 
2) I ~eel as if I wanted to give them all my clothes, 
because you wouldn't want to be poor like that, would 
:you? 
3) You don't want to know, do you? ' Cause you like 
surprises, don't you? , 
4) You do that, because I can't do it~ 
5) I say that every day, because I love you more and 
more. 
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6) (Has been telling how to play Charley-Over-the-Water) 
Does Charley hurt the birds? I hope not, because they 
are pretty. (Involves an evaluating judgment) (The 
rest of his comment is so interesting, it is included) 
They just fly around and look pretty. Just like some 
people. I've heard people say, "I've nothing to do," 
and someone s~y, "Just stand around and look pretty." 
At the family meal. 
1) Put this where I can't reach it, because I want some 
of it saved. 
2) I didn't mean to tease, mother. When I do things 
with the tops of things, don't be scared, because I 
really woUldn't do what you didn't want me to. 
3) You remind him not to forget, mother, 'cause I don't 
want him to forget • 
. 4) I want you to sit and keep me company tonight because 
i t .1 s kind of hard to have a mustard plaster. 
Examples of causal explanation (relationships between 
two facts or events or phenomena): 
From bed-time conversation. 
1) The teacher had to help me first, because I didn't 
fit the right-colored balloon into the right hole. A 
funny little dotted man holds them up in his hand. It 
tells by the place for the balloons what color to put 
in and you put the right colored paper balloon in 
the place, red, green or yellow, or whatever it says. 
2) Remember that last night of Christmas vacation when 
I lay in bed learning those things (books of the Old 
Testament). I didn't get sleepy because I was talking. 
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3) (In a bed-time story, the stare have been called 
'sparkling lights.•) But they aren't sparkling lights; 
they are other worlds. Maybe our world is a star to 
another world under it. 'Cause that's the way they are, 
one world above another. 
4) (Why did the pebbles put in the water raise the level 
o! the water?) Because they took up eo much space. (This 
was nothing that had been rehearsed; an entirely spon-
taneous answer.) · 
5) (He has asked, "Is it always the same I that wakes 
up in the morning" and to find out wh¥ he asked the 
question, I ask, "What do you think?") I didn't know. 
It must be, though, 'cause it always looks the same and 
has the same feelings and the same life. 
This last examples belongs equally, if not more, to those of 
logical 'because' but since it involves his explanation of 
the phenomenon of individuality, it is placed in this group. 
The same is equally true of the next example. 
6) Oh, mother, are nails steel, (What do you think?) 
Yes, because they stick to this magnet. 
These examples show that this child is interested in using 
the genuinely causal 'because' (causal explanation of ex-
ternal phenomena), rare with children of this age, according 
1 to Piaget. 
At the family meal. 
1) Mother, he can't have his pie, because he hasn't 
finished his lettuce yet. 
2) K. can't go to orchestra, because he's got a broken 
strap. (On his saxophone?) Yes. 
3) Well, they could just .walk in there 'cause there 
wouldn't be any door. They wouldn't have to open any 
door. 
4) I don't know why you feel it when your foot goes ~o 
sleep, because the house doesn't feel it when you go to 
sleep on the bed. (Why is it that the house doesn't 
feel it?) 
1 . -




5) Because it's made of wood, it isn't al:ive. 
E.?a.mples of 'because 1 of logical justification or e~lan­
ation (involves proof or beginnings of proof, or connects two 
ideas, or gives a reason for a judgment or opinion): 
Bed-time conversation. 
1) That's easy, because I know where Michigan is. 
(Reason for~ judgment.) 
2) (Proving location of elephant's mouth.) Yes, 'cause 
I've seen him curl up his trunk like this (motions). 
3) I wonder if s. knows how to work B.'s (movie-book) 
yet. I think she does, because they're awfully easy 
to work. (Reason for opinion.) 
Family meal. 
~) I heard them talking about giving you those pencils, 
· but · I couldn 1 t tell you, because if you tell anyone, 
then you can't give it to them. (Justification by 
social rules.) 
2) I think ~eople with black or brown eyes are safest 
at ni ght. {His brother asks, 11 Why 11 ?) Because they 
don't show. (He criticizes his own reasoning.) 
3) I forgot, because their eyes are shut ••• If their 
eyes are shut, robbers don't know who they are. 
(Whose eyes?) Anybody 1 s. (Why?) A eat's eyes show 
in the dark ,when they'l:'e open, .so (logical 1 so' equals 
'therefore') I don't see why anyone's wouldn't. 
4) (He has given his idea of attitude as the tone of 
voice one uses. His brother asks him why.) Because 
when X. talks too loud sometimes, mother says she 
doesn't like hie attitude. (He is justifying a de-
finition.) 
5) (He has bewailed the fact that a brother is using 
something of his that he considers valuable. The 
brother asks, "Vfhat do you mean, valuable? 11 ) Because 
it cost a lot of money. (Justifying a de~inition.) 
6) (He and· his father are talking about letters of the 
alphabet which can't ever look as if they were up-
side-down or side-ways. His father suggested the 
letter 0 as one of them.) It could be sideways, 
because it has to have the long part on the side. 
7) It could be turned sideways, because it's taller 
than it is wide. · 
8) Maybe Daddy can (something others have tried to do 
and failed), 'cause he's a man. He's the oldest one 
in the family. If he can't do it, nobody can. 
-
' . >T. n· 
' '( 
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From these examples it is evident that this particular 
· child, when with adults at least, is strongly interested in 
studying out the logical reason for things. Piaget finds 
it otherwise with children of this age, but as he himself 
maintains about the questions of the subject he observed, 
the only way to test these hypotheses is to carry the study 
out with as many individual subjects as possible, since,as 
in the case of the boy who asked so many causal questions, 
it may have been due to the special interests of the child.1 
At least these examples under consideration seem to the 
observer to tally with Piaget 1s requirements {referred to 
before) and examples of the use of the logical 1because 1 • 
It would be interesting to study other examples as 
those illustrating the use of the logical 'then' or 'so' 
which are equivalent to 'therefore'. There are many in-
stances of both. But at least we will note one of the use 
of a 'but' of implicit discordance. Piaget says of this 
use of ·'cut': 
In short, the only cases in .which the term 'but' 
really denotes an implicit discordance, are those 
1cf L T 34 • . • --!....-!.1 
in which the word occurs not at the beginning · 
but in the middle of a sentence, and of a sen-
tence containing a causal relation whether logi-
cal or psychological. Now such sentences were 
not to be found before the a.ge of 6 1 and the 
two examples we have between thf ages of 6 and 
7 are anything but unequivocal. 
He then gives e~amples (age st): "Suns are round, but they 
have no eyes and mouth." "It is more than that, but that's 
right." Compare with these, 11 I heard them talking about 
those pencils with your name on, but I couldn't tell you, 
because if youmll anyone then you can't give it to them." 
There are many others as clear as Piaget 1 s examples, but 
this shows the use of it in our subject at 5:11 in a very 
clear form. It seems strange that this child should not 
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use 'although! 1 though 1 , or 1 even 1f 1 correctly in more than 
1
, 2 of the 9 sentences for completion, and the word 'therefore' 
in only 2 of the 5, since he uses their equivalent correctly 
at home ( 1 then 1 and 'so' equal to 'therefore') and at school. 
I ~ 
Examples of 'though'. 
1) ! 'didn't lmow. It must .be, though, 'cause it always 
looks the same. • • 
2) I think Jesus has a soft thing up in the sky t hat He 
lights every night and morning and puts up high in 
the sky. He always has daylight, though, because He 
always has the sun. 
Examples of 'even if 1 • 
1) (Talking about peanuts at the meal) Even if it took 
a long time, you'd .roast them till they were done, 
wouldn't you, daddy? 
2) (Playing school at bed-time) Sometimes she (his real 














It is of interest to note an increasingly frequ~nt use of 
this conjunction outside of observation time, as "I will, 
even though I don 1 t want to," etc. 
ll7 
The e~amples given of his use of conjunctions, especially 
at the family table, show a definite progress into the realm 
of synthesis. Here he uses the greatest nmnber of conjunctions 
(and correctly) and gives definite proof, therefore, that 
for him the feeling that he is a member on equal terms of 
this adult group arouses in him a growing need for direction 
of thought and checking of statements by reasons and beginnings 
of proof. These findings seem of special interest since Pia-
get makes the statement, 
There is still a great deal of work to be done 
ori the intercourse between children of different 
ages, between brothers and sisters, and above all 
between parents and children.l 
It is because of such findings, also, that we have ~aid 
stress on mental rather than chronological age as the cri-
terion for various stages of socialization of thought and 
language. It is interesting to note that the only instances 
of ~u~taposition at meal-time are when he falls into the 
monologue type of conversation or thinking aloud and not 
being interested for the moment except in his own activity 
or thought. 
E~amples: 




a little bite of something else, then a ~ittle bite 
of something else; a lit t le bite of olive, then some-
thing else; and bread, then something else; and milk, 
and that will be all; potatoes, then peas ••• 
2) (He has been talking to the rest of us about a play-
house and children's clubs, but launches now into an 
ego-centric type of speech, thinking aloud with an 
audience.) I am going to be a carpenter when I am big 
and I'm going to work alone and I 111 get up early in 
the morning and go to work on a room and I'll have 
another man working on a room way off there and then 
we'll work on a room together in between and that way 
we'll get t he house done. 
These instances show the distinct difference between the 
effort at synthesis in his socialized language and in the 
remarks he makes simply thinking aloud, with no idea of adap-
tation · to another's thoughts, thereby indicating the close 
connection which, as Piaget has pointed out, exists between 
socialization and synthesis of language and thought. There 
are examples of much interesting material which show a quick 
selecting of an essential point in another's conversation, 
a checking notanly his own thought by another's, but another's 
by his own, as when his brothers talk of a ·ball-game score 
~ being 7 to 7, immediately the child e?.Cclaims, "The.n it was 
a tie,• Or when it was mentioned that George Washington 
i • 
married a widow, he quickly says, "Then she wasn't a widow 
any more." Again, his father has made a general remark re-
lating to the conversation, "What if we couldn't think?" 
' D's immediate remark is "We wouldn't know anything unless 
we saw it, then if we couldn't see anything we wouldn't 
know anything." 
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using 'if ••• then ••• • but enough have been giv~n in connection 
with other e~a.mples to show that their use is frequent. 
A wealth of material in four almost equal sets of re-
marks shows the extreme difference between· this child's type 
of conversation when with a group of adults and when with 
children of his own age, although he is noticeable in his 
school group for more socialized expression. 
Taking the one child studied at home as well as at 
school, we find the following percentages of 'because' to 
his total remarks: 
In school play~ • • • • • • • • • • .1.3~ 
In school conversation • • • • • • .3.5* 
In home play • .1.0% • • • • • • • • • • Average for s.chool groups .2.0% • • • • • 
Average for 3 children's groups • • .1.9% 
In conversation with 1 adult. • • • .2.5% At the family table • • • • • • • • .5.3% 
Average with adults • • • • • • • • .3.9% 
The variations between the groups is evident. Thus, 
as in the case of the proportion of the child's ego-centric 
to socialized language, it is not feasible, bec~use of the 
~ circumstances under which the observations were taken, to 
. 
ro.: 
make strict comparisons with Piaget's figures. His sub-
jects were studied for hours at a time a.t school, while 
our observations were necessarily limited to daily half-
hour periods with each group. 
., 
CHAPTER VIII 
.The Ohild's Ability to Handle Relationships . 
In studying the development of childish reasoning, 
Piaget lays emphasis on the child's inability to handle 
relational situations. Syncretism, or failure to analyze, 
and juxtaposition, or failure to synthesize, show lack of 
necessity in child logic, and in his inability to handle 
i relational situations and ideas of relativity the child 
I ' 
reveals his failure to grasp "reciprocity existing between 
different points of view ••• Necessity and reciprocity con-
stitute an essential character of logical thought---its 
reversibility.ul 
In testing these relational judgments, he uses the f~ve 
absurd sentences of the Binet-Simon test for ten-year-olds. 
1• A poor cyclist had his head smashed and died 
on the spot; he was taken to the hospital and it 
is feared he will not recover. ·· 
2. I have three brothers: Paul, Ernest, and myself 
(I changed this to 'sisters' and to girls' names, 
since I am a woman). 
3. The body of a poor young girl was found yesterday, 
cut into eighteen pieces. It is thought she must 
have killed herself. 
4. There was a railway accident yesterday, but it 
was not very serious. The number of deaths was only 
forty-eight. 
5. Someone said: "If I ever kill myself from despair, 
I won't choose a Friday, because Friday is a bad 
day and would bring me ill luck."~ 
In his results, the order of difficulty was as follows: 
1 ... , -•··w--
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The questions of the three brothers and of 
Friday were the most difficult. The ques-
·tions of accident by far the easiest •••• It 
is because they (the latter) appeal directly 
to the sense of reality without any presupposi-
tions about the data ••• In order to discover 
this absurdity (that of Friday and the brothers) 
the child has therefore to place himself at the 
point of view of the person who lays down the 
premises. The reasoning takes place relatively 
to a given point of view, which is a psycholo-
gical operation of far greater difficulty.l 
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He goes on to show how the children do not accept the pre-
mises as such but stick to their own point of view,so do not 
reason from these premises in a purely deductive style. 
Thus the difficulty of reasoning formally 
(i.e., of admitting a datum as such and de-
ducing what follows from it) is the real 
difficulty of the test. That is why this 
test is, in our opinion, better suited to 
the age of 11 or 12 than to that of 10. In-
deed, there was an interval of at least a year 
between the success of this test and that of 
the accident tests. 
We are now in a position to understand 
what formal reasoning really consists in, and 
how its structure may be influenced by soci~l 
factors such as ego-centrism and the sociali-
zation of thought.2 ·-
He goes on to show how at the age of 7-8 the child begins 
to •distinguish hypothesis from reality11 and that this stage 
corresponds with the "development of the logical 1because 1 
and the beginnings of correct deductive reasoning.n 3 
Our results from the tests go to prove conclusively 
1 ' ' 
J.R., 64. 
2 --· '. 
J , R-,, 66. 





why some of our children do not correspond to his s:tage 
chronologically. 
No. 1 is the only one to pick out the absurdity in 
all 5 sentences. 
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1) The doctor couldn't help his head because he died. 
2) No, ~ou haven't, because your self isn't one of your 
sisters. (How many sisters have I, then?) Two. 
3) She couldn't cut herself up in 18 pi~ces. She would 
be dead. 
~4) It was serious, because they were killed. 
5) Because he couldn't work on Saturday and there wcUld-
n!t be anyone to work on the lawn and pull weeds. 
(Corrects himself without any suggestion) Oh, it would-
n't make any difference after he killed himself, if 
it brought him bad luck, because he'd be dead already. 
It wouldn't make any difference what day he killed him-
self; it would be just the same. 
No. 2 passes the first three successfully: No. 3 answers 
correctly concerning one: No. 4, two: No. 5, none: No. 6, 
three: Mo. 7, two: No. 8, three: No. 10, one, and decides the 
accident in test four was serious but doesn't say why: Nos. 
15, 19, and 20 do nothing with any of the sentences, but No. 
20 exclaims over test 4, "Whew, tha.t 1 e a lot. They shouldn't 
have been killed; they should have been careful." It is 
striking that every one who sees the absurdity in any one 
sentence sees it in the one about the sisters. None other 
than No. 1 get the Friday test, and even he was on the 
wrong track until he caught himself. The rest make all 
. sorts of answers from "I don't know", "Friday is a good day; 
I don't lmow," to such as "'Cause it was on Friday and she 
didn't want to kill herself; she wants to forget about it." 
But the point we wish to emphasize is that eight of the 
twelve children do the sister test correctly, as follows: 
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No. 2. It wouldn't be right, because you counted your-
self. I 1d just count my brothers. (He explains 
thoroughly about his own 2 brothers.) · 
No. 3. You counted yourself; you had 2 sisters. 
No. 4. no, it wouldnJt be right; you could skip your-
self out. You're not yourself's sister. 
No. 6. You said you had 3 sisters. This way you'd only 
have 2. 
No. 7. No, it's not right, because there's only 2. 
There's only 3 sisters in the family. You've only got 
G. and M. 
No. 8. You don't count. You're not a sister to your-
self. 
No. io. You only have 2, ·because you're not your sister • . 
The tests passed were all clearly stated. All of the children's 
remarks on sentence 2 have been given to show how clear they 
were in their ideas about it. There is no confusion in the 
minds of these children about myself as a sister to the others 
but not to myself, or between the phrases, "I have sisters" 
and "We are sisters." These are common errors of Piaget's 
subjects. Our further experiments on the reciprocal relation-
ship of brother and sister carry out and prove these findings. 
Such results prove adequately that these children are 
developing away from ego-centrism and that our low percen-
tage of ego-centric remarks is significant. Some of these 
children are able to handle these tests involving a develop-
ment in the . beginnings of formal logic. At least this test 
confirms our opinion that mental age is a truer guide than 
chronological, but that I.Q. is the most determining factor 
and that mental tests which allow a child to answer if 
possible some tests noticeably beyond his years are more 







·~ that no one was available to give each of these twelve child-
,. . 
· .. " 
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ren an individual (Stanford-Binet) test. The group test 
given, while a general guide, does not differentiate far 
enough the individual ability, and possibly the individual 
tests would change the relative position of certain ones 
in ~his group. The one child in this group who had been 
tested i ndividually ·ranked noticeably higher than in this 
group test. 
To test further the ability to handle relationships, 
we asked the following questions, which Piaget used in his 
tests. 1 
1. The brother and sister test. 
1. How many brothers have yout And how many sisters, 
How many brothers has each one of .them (in turn)? And 
sisters? . 
2. How many brothers are there in the family? How 
many sisters? How many brothers and sisters altQgether? 
3. There ,are three sisters in a family. How many 
sisters has A? ••• B? ••• C? 
4. Are yo~ a b~othe~ (or a sister)? What is a 
brother (or a sister, according to the ,sex of the child)? 
5. Ernest has three brothers, Paul, Henry, and 
Charles. How many brothers has Paul,? ••• Henry? ••• 
Charles? , 
6. How many brothers are there in this family? · 
II. The right and left test. 
7. Show me your tight hand~. Your left. Show me 
your right leg. Now your left. 
a. Show me my right hand. Now my left. Show me 
my right leg. Now my left. (During the questions the 
,experimenter must sit opposite the child.) 
-. 9. (A coin is placed on the table to the left of 
a pencil in relation to the child.) Is the pencil to 
the right or to the left? And the penny.? 
10. (The child is oppQsite the experimenter, who 
has a coin in his right hand and a bracelet on his 
left arm.) You see this penny? Have I got it in my 
right hand or my left? And the br.acelet? 
11. (The child is Qpposite three objeqts in a row, 
L · ... 
. J ,R,-,98 f. 
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a pencil to the left, a key in the middle, and a coin 
to the right.) Is the pencil to the right or the 
left of the key? And of the penny? Is the key to the 
right or left of the penny? And of. the pencil? Is 
the penny to the right or left of the pencil? . ,And of 
the key? (Six answers altogether.) . 
12. (,The same questions as before, with three objects 
in a row opposite the child, a key to the left, a piece 
of paper in the middle, and a pencil to the right. But 
the objects are only shown for half a minute and are 
then covered over with a copy-book( and the answers 
are taken down. The child is told): Now listen, 
I 1m going to show you three things only for a tiny 
.moment. You must look very carefully and then after-
wards tell me by heart how the things are arranged. 
Look out ••• (the experiment) ••• Well now, is the key 
left or right of the piece of paper, And of the pen-
cil? etc. 
The results of our tests do not coincide with Piaget's, 
since he finds the degree of correctness to advance steadily 
with age. We can only offer our results with this comment: 
The children who think most clearly in all situations handle 
these correctly: the children who are most prone to juxta-
position, and most prone to thinking in confused wholes, fail 
in some respects, but even so they are considerably beyond 
<· 
what Piaget finds according to their age. , 
Age.Tests passed by Piaget's subjects.1 
' o. 5 Test 7. 
. 6 Tests 2 and 7. 
7 Tests 2, 7, and· 9. 
8 Tests 2, 3, 7,8~9 and 10. 
9 Tests 2 J 3, 4 I I 8 I 9 J and 10 • 
10 Tests 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 
11 Tests 1-10 and 11. 
12 Tests 1-12. 




the point of view of a person opposite the child, then we 
cannot count our tests 11 and 12 in that light. We took 
the difficulty of these tests to lie in the relative notion 
of right and left in handling several articles and had the 
child answer them in relationship to hie own right and left. 
Our findings should read with that in mind. up to that 
point, however, these children passed tests beyond their 
age as indicated by Piaget 1 s results. 
dual. 
















Missed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother). 
Missed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother). 
Missed none. 
Missed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother) 
and test - a • . 
Missed none. 
Missed none. 
Missed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother) 
and tests 6 and 8. 
Mi ssed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother). 
Missed one-half of test 4 (definition of brother) 
and tests 5,6, -a. 
It will be seen that 35% of the children fail to give 
an adequate definition of brother or sister while handling 
the ~elationship problems correctly. The other 25% who 
fail in the definition fail in from 1 to 3 of the other tests, 
test 8 included in each case. It is evident that for these 
children definition is more difficult than the handling of 
reciprocal relationships. They implicitly understand what 
a brother or sister is, and given a situation they handle 
the relations accurately on the whole. Test 4, therefore, 
is the only one not passed according to Piaget's standard 
(Any test in which only one or two points are passed must 
be considered unsuccessful and a test is considered passed 
if answered correctly by 75% of the children). 
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It should be kept in mind that these children's ages 
range from 6:2 to 7:8 at the time the mental tests were given, 
and that these experimental tests were given two or three 
months earlier. Only three children in the group were be-
low I.Q. 113 and none below 101, and that fact would neces-
sarily influence our findings. Piaget's experiment was tried 
on 200 children. He comparies this brother and sister test 
to the Binet-Simon test ("I have 3 brothers, Paul, Ernest, 
and myself") and nlaces the successful solution of such a 
test at the age of 11. Any one who has witnessed a mental 
test understands that the individual child may pass certain 
questions far beyond his chronological age ~ccording to his 
individual ability, and the net results of all his answers 
determine his level of mentality. Piaget everywhere fails 
to consider this question of individual capaeity, or else 
in dealing with larger groupe counts on his results being 
those which approximate average mentality. However, only 
half of our group give an idea of relativity in their de-
finitions of brother or sister and that would bear out 
the conclusion that the sense of relationship is not fully 
and clearly u.~derstood by a group of children whose average 
mental age is 7:8. 
In the first place, it should be noted 
that the first part of the question {Are you 
a brother?) hardly presents any difficulties 
after the .age of 4-5. The correct definition, . 
on the other hand, is not found till the age 
of 9, and by correct we mean that which implies 
in one way or another the idea that in order 
to be a brother one must have a brother or a 
sister,l 
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Examples of correct definitions: 
No. 1. A brother is a boy who is born into the same 
family with another boy or girl. A sister is 
a girl wbo is born into the same family with 
another boy or girl. 
No.2 • A brother is a boy. I'm a brother 'cause I'm 
my baby's brother. Or a brother could be a 
sister's brother. 
No. 3, A sister is a girl, if she has sisters or 
brothers. A brother is a boy if he has sisters 
or brothers. (She turns around brother and boy, 
but her meaning is clear.) 
No. 6, A girl is a sister if she is sister to a brother 
or another sister. 
No. 8, A brother is a boy. Two boys to be brothers .- · 
hav~ to be in the same family. 
No.lO. A brother is a boy. They are brothers if they 
only have one mother; if both have the same 
mother. 
Some of these definitions have emphasized the idea of the 
brothers having to be in the same family. This too is a 
criterion of correctness. 
The correct definition is therefore that 
which implies the idea that there must be at 
least two in the same family for there to be 
a brother or sister. The child often knows 
this without being able to express it straight 
away, in which case he must be helped to make 
his ideas explicit. There is a good propor-
tion of such correct definitio~s from the age 
. of 7 onwards (average of 6Q%,2J, 
1 ... 
J,R,, 104, 
2 J,R., 106, 
E~a.mples of incorrect definitions: 
No . 4, (An only child) A sister is a girl that lives 
with you. I have a cousin, but she lives in 
Texas. You can't be a sister, because you're 
a lady. (Can't ladies be sisters?) No, they 
have to be girls. (E~lanation) . 
No. 7, A brother is a boy, (Are all bo?s brothers?) 
Yes. (Wnat makes them brothers? Because girls 
wear dresses they are sisters •. T, hasn't any 
brothers. Is he a brother?) Yes, he's a bro-
ther, , 
No, 15. (This little girl has had one sister, who has 
died.) (Were you Helen's sister or brother?) 
Sister. (What is a sister?) I don't know. God 
makes them sisters. (Are .all girls sisters?) 
No • . (Why are some of them sisters?) Because, 
they died. 
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This child's ego-centrism is evidenced in her finalistic 
reply, "I don't know. God makes them ••• ", also in her not 
separating her definition of sister from her own individual 
case and also in her contradiction of her own previous state-
ment that she was a sister but "girls are sisters because 
they died." This example emphasizes the following points 
of Piaget 1 s about child thought and reasoning: finalism, a 
justification at any price, inability to separate thought 
from one's own viewpoint, and inability to retrace steps 




A sister is a ~irl. (Are all girls sisters?) 
Yes. (Has M. any brothers or sisters?) No, . 
(Is she a sister?) Yes, . 
A sister is a gi~l. (What makes. a girl a 
sister?) Because they look alike and have 
dresse~ alike, 
This common answer, "A sister is a girl" or "A brother 
is a boy," is "the most primitive definit1on."l In spite 
1 J ,R,, 104 
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of their having passed the tests except in the matter of 
definition, there are all types of definitions in this 
small group. This point is to be noticed; all accept the 
notion of a brother being a boy and a sister being a girl, 
but there is nothing in this very incomplete idea which 
incapacitates them for solving their brother-sister pro-
blems when confronted with them, those brothers and sisters 
being boys and girls, and their own home situations in-
volving brothers and sisters. The notion of relationship 
is only partly developed in some of them, that is, enough 
to handle actual situations presented but not enough to 
put all these points into verbal definition. There is a 
definite step between these two situations which Piaget 
emphasizes in other places but not in treating this pro-
blem, that is, the distinction between perceptive and ver-
bal intelligence • . 
The most difficult point in the right and left test 
for these children was that of the relative notion of right 
and left when considering it as opposite to one's own right 
and left. Only 3 of the 12 failed here, but it is a point 
to notice. Even though they could handle most of the 
relative situations of several articles to each other, 
they did it in relat1o nship of right and lef~ to them. 
The · test in which the experimenter's right and left was 
e~actly opposite theirs was a step more difficult for these 
three children. Nevertheless they failed in only one test 
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involving this point. 
The general difficulty with reciprocal relationships 
and relationships apart fro~ oneself is evidenced in a few 
of these children, showing the truth of Piaget 1 s state-
ments relating to child thought in general. 
There are two matters of interest in regard to No. 
8 1s answers which throw light on this individual child. 
His individuality and keenness of intellect are evidenced 
throughout the experiments and observations. When asked 
the first question, "How many brothers have you?" it is 
revealed that he is an only child. Immediately he says, 
"Let's suppose I have some." So he is asked to take the 
family of another boy in the group and answers all questions 
correctly· in relation to him. In the matter of the defini-
tion he brings out clearly that he has no notion that liv-
ing together makes boys brothers, a common idea among 
children, according to Piaget. This child's mother is a 
business woman, and he lives during the week in another 
family. Here is his statement about his deflnition: "If 
my mother keeps him he isn't my brother. If my mother 
has (evidently 'bears') him he's my brother. Two boys 
to be brothers have to be in the same family." Every-
where this child likes to figure things out, as he says, 
to demonstrate and to give reasons. He is the same child 
who, when giving s·entences with 1because 1 in them, volun-
teered the information that he was giving reasons. 
Such data along with the experiments give the inter-
esting side-lights on these children from the standpoint 
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of individuality. No. 2 also offers many interesting com-
ments showing his superior mind. These, with No. 1, form 
an extremely interesting trio. As a rule, the boys are more 
responsive to the experimental tests than the girls, who are 
more shy. Certain points, nevertheless, stand out in regard 
to the girls. No. 3 is meticulously painstaking: Nos. 5 and 
19, superficial and careless; No. 20 gives out the impress-
ion that she understands everything, but when it comes to 
the testing point is often superficial and apt to confuse 
her statements. 
In addition to these tests Piaget used syllogisms as 
dealing with ideas of relationship and obeying the laws o~ 
reason. The syllogisms used were: 1 
1) (Burt's ·test) Edith is fairer than Susanne; Edith 
is darker than Lili. Which is the darkest of the 
three, Editht Susanne, or Lili? _ 
2) If this anim.c;l has long ears, :1, t is either a mule 
or a donkey. If it has a thick tail, it is either 
a mule or a horse. Now it has both long ears and 
a thick tail. Which is it? 
3) Some of the inhabitants of .the town were English. 
All the English from that town were killed in the 
war. Are there any inhabitants left in the town? 
(Names changed, but same test.) 
These tests are to bring out the t endency in childish rea-
son not to think in terms of relationship, but in an abso-
lute sense, and the child's inability to understand before 
10-11 alternation, opposition, dis jun'ction, that is, 
1 - . ·' 
J,R,, 87, 161, 233. 
handling logical multiplication of the verbal . pl~e.1 
Thus the difficulty in handling the logical 
relations would seem to be a new consequence 
of childish ego-centrism; ego-centrism leads to 
naive realism, and this realism, which is by 
definition the ignorance of all relations, leads 
to logical difficulties every time there is ~ 
question of substituting the logic o~ relations 
for that of membership or inclusion. 
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Very few of the children show any ability to deal with 
these syllogisms, proving Piaget's statement for the child 
under 11-12 (except in rare instances). Some of the answers 
to these tests are offered to show the great variety in this 
smal l group. 
No. 1 answers all of them correctly, and his will be 
given in full. 
1) Susie. (Why do you think Susie is the darkest?) 
Lili hasn't very dark hair. Edith has a littl~ 
darker, Susie has a little darker than that. 
2) It is a mule because it has long ears and a thi ck 
tail. ·: : .AJ·horse has a thick tail, too, because I've 
been swished by •em. A horse has short ears. 
3) Yes, because all the inhabitants of the town weren't 
English. 
This child seems to have no difficulty with judgments of 
relationship. Neither has No. 2, although he has to be 
questioned to give his reasons. 
·1) Edith and Susie have the darkest hair. (Which one 
of them has the darkest?) Susie, because the other 
is lighter than Susie. , 
2) It • e a mul~ ,because mules have thick tails and big 
ears. 
3) The niggers and a lot of different people. All the 
rest were killed. (Who?) The English. 





l Edith; ehe 1s half dark and half light. 
~ Mule, because he has a big furry tail and long ears. 
Yes, the Chinese, Indians, and Japanese. (But he 
doesn't definitely eliminate the English.) 
No. 7 shows ability in this direction but fails in test 1 
and doesn't go far enough to generalize. 
1) Edith, because she is darker than Lili. (Is that 
all?) Yes. Faile to consider the relative degrees 
of fairness in the three girls.) 
2) A mule, fcause he has long ears and a thick tail. 
(Why ien 1 t it a donkey or a horse?) Because the . 
donkey isn't like a horse. A mul~ looks just like 
a horse if you wanted the horse to have lqng ears. 
3) Yes, because the Italian people were left~ (He 
himself is of Italian parenta~e.He fails to general-
ize, "Everybody but the English.•) 
No. 10 answers only teet 3 correctly. 
3) ·Might be any people left, American, Chinamen, any-
body except the English. 
These have been given to show the varying degree of develop-
ment of these children in reasoning and their advance in 
. this particular over the others, who gave such answers as 
follows: 
1) No. 3. Edith. (Why?) You said she was. 
No. 4. Edith, because she has dark and light hair 
and I don't see how she could change it, so I 111 
leave it dark. 
No. 5. Edith. I don 1 t know why. 
No. 6. Edith, because she has darker hair. 
No. 15. Lili. (Why?) 'Cause it is. 
No. 19. I think Susie is. (Why?) •cause you said 
Edith is darker than Susie. (Sh~ contradicts her-
self.) 
No. 20. Edith, because she was born that way. 
These children who do not correctly deal with this syllog-
ism generally give Edith as the darkest. They hear her 
called 'darker' last, and judge from that in an absolute 
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sense, with no idea of interrelationship of ~he three. No. 20 
merely gives a finalistic answer and makes no attempt to 
reason. No. 15 gives an arbitrary answer and justifies it 
at any price. 
2) Nos. 3,4,5, and 15. It's a donkey, 'cause it has 
long ears •. 
No. 6. A horse, 'cause it has a thick tail. 
No. 19. I guess it's a mule. I don't know. 
- No. 20. A horse, because horses do have a thick tail 
and big ears. 
3) No. 4. Yes, lots of people; girls, boys, ladies, and 
men. 
No. 6. Yes, soldiers and some of the other people. 
No. 15. No, because they got killed. 
No. 19. No, because they were killed in the war. 
No. 20. Three people, I think, because they watched it. 
We cannot enter into fuller details in the discussion 
of these tests but offer our conclusions that Piaget is right 
in his statements concerning the results of ego-centrism :in 
child logic, that its accompany~ng juxtaposition and syn-
cretism make it unconscious of reciprocal relationships or 
necessity of relations one with the other and cause it to 
build no b~archies of thought and to be Unable to give 
the reasons for its conclusions by retracing its steps. 
However, we do emphasize again the difference in individual 
children as brought out in this small group and.point out 
that everywhere it is the same chiidren who show the great-
est advancement from ego-centrism toward logical thinking 
and that many elements influence that development besides 
chronological age, as I.Q. plus mental ~ge, plus environ-
ment, and particular bent of the individual child's mind. 
It is true, also, that all the evidences of ego-centrism 
coincide with Piaget 1 s conclusions and seem to be tied up 
together, consequently the lessening of one in a child 
brings a lessening of the other. 
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The study of the child's idea of relationship is further 
carried out by asking for definitions of words involving 
the idea of relationship. 
1. Family. Piaget divides definitions of 'family 
into three stages; 1) Those emphasizing the fact of living 
together or defining by name; 2) those making use of the 
idea of blood relationship; 3) those generalized so as to 
include all blood relations.l 
Examples of Stage 1. 
No. 3. A family is a whole bunch of persons that have 
the same name. 
No. 6. A family is lots of people. It's the people 
who live in your house. My family is my brother 
and father and mother, the people that live at our 
house. 
Examples of Stage 2. 
During the second stage the idea of relation-
ship intervenes but does not yet supplant the 
fact of living together.2 
Many of these are stated in a general way and make no 
mention of living together, so muld be a step further, in 
our estimation. 
No. 2. A family is a man and a woman and a lot of 
children. (Arty man or woman?) A mother and daddy 
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No. 7. People are in every family. In mY family are 
father, mother, R., E., and I. 
No. 15. A family is people. (Who are in your family?) 
My grandpa and grandma and uncle and daddy and mothe~ 
and me. (They live together.) 
No. 19. A family is people, a mother and a father and 
maybe boys and girls. 
No. 20. A mother and father is a family, or a mother 
and father and children. (Notice the confusion between 
•husband and wife' and 'father and mother.') 
The next two emphasize other generations. 
No. 1. A family is when a man and a woman marry each 
other and have a child, I mean, children. My daddy 
was my grandpa's and grandma's child. In his family 
were grandpa and grandma and G. and F. 
No. 10. A family is a father and mother and children. 
My father had a family too. 
Example of Stage 3. 
No. a. (Explains rather than defines, but emphasizes 
successive generations.) My daddy married my mother • 
. People get born and they marry each other. You have 
to marry someone outside your family. That's the 
way I'm going to do. My daddy and mother made a new 
s. family, then there are one, two S. families, and 
when their boy marries there's another s. family; 
that's three. 
Piaget connects the development of these different 
stages with the lessening of childish reali-sm and places 
the age of 9 for the second and 11 for the third.1 He re-
lates this to the fact that on the average the correct 
definition of brother does not appear until 9. 2 
The writer's attention has been called to the fact 
that in America there is not the close connection between 




Cf. J.R,, 107 and 119. 
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the French, and therefore we should attach more importance 
to the division between emphasis on living together and 
emphasis on blood relationshi~ especially when that . relation-
ship is treated by the child in a general way apart from 
his own family, as "when a man marries a woman", etc. This 
more impersonal statement of the case marks the third stage 
of the American child when no reference is made to his 
immediate family or those living with him. 
II. Town and State. We offer a few notions of the 
relation of part and whole, which is the main idea of this 
definition. 
No. 1. A town is a great big place with lots of houses 
in it. (Which is larger, Stockton or California?) 
California. Stockton is in California. , 
No. 2. A town is a lot of stores and Christmas trees. 
(This was early in December.) (Are there other towns 
in our state, besides Stockton?) Yes, Oakley, Monter-
ey, Oakland, etc. (Which is larger, our town or our 
state?) The state is bigger than the town. 
No. 3~ A town is a lot of houses and a lot of people. 
{Which is bigger, Stockton or California?) California. 
(Are you in Stockton and California?) Yea. 
No. 4. I don't know what a town is • . ! ' know this town 
is Stockton. (How do you know you are in a town?) 
Because you see stores and houses. A state is like 
states of California and Texas. (Which is bigger, 
Stockton or California?) California is bigger than 
Stockton. , 
No. 7. A town is where people go to buy things and 
where they live; where they buy clothes for little 
boys and girls. (What's the name of our town?) 
Stockton. (What is California?) A state. (Which is 
bigger, etc.?) California. (Are there other towns 
in California?) Yes. 
No. 8. They build a lot of houses and make a town. 
A state is a whole bunch of towns. The United States 
is a whole bunch of states. (Which is larger, etc.?) 
California. It is a big state and Stockton is only . 
a town. Stockton's in California. (Names other towns 
in California.) 
·' 
No. 10. A state is like a law. It owns the town. A 
state is bigger than a city. 
No. 20. A town is a street and you go buy things in 
town. (Is Stockton a part of anything?) Sure, it's 
a part of California. (Which is bigger, eto.j) 
California is a bigger town. (We call it a s4ate. 
Has California more than one town in it?) Yes (she 
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names several). , 
No. 6. (Defines a town as) A big place and you haven't 
been there before. (She answers "I don't know" to the 
other questions.) 
The other three children make no attempt to define or 
to answer questions, but 66% of these children, though they 
give rather realistic definitions, show a thorough acquain-
tance with the fact that a town is a part of a state, the 
state being the larger and containing the smaller, and so 
show again a development in this <laS-e at-a notion of relati-
vity. 
III. Half and Part. 
No. 1. Cut anything right straight in two in the middle 
and one side would be half and the other would be the 
other half. \How many halves can anything have?) 
Two. A part is piece of anything. . 
No.2. Half is if you cut it in half. ··A part is a 
.piece of anything. (How many pieces would you have, 
if you cut it in half?) Two. If they weren't halves 
you could cut them in .five or six pieces maybe. 
No. 3. A half is a part. Cut it right in the middle. 
Right in two. A part is a piece of anything. 
No. 4. A half---if you cut a cake in the middle · in· two 
pieces. (How many halves in anything?) Two. A half 
has to be cut in the middle. If you out it in three 
or four pieces they would be parts. 
No. 10. A half is anything cut in the middle---two 
halves. A part---cut anything in the middle and it's 
two parts. You can have more than two parts. A half 
has to be two parts. 
No. 20. A half---you cut it right in the middle and 
the two pieces are halves. When anything is broken 
one of the pieces is a part. 
The other children make no distinction between 'half'and. •part' 
Half of the children have given cor rect defin·i tions and 
distinguished the difference between 1part and 'half'. In 
other words, half of the group have given their correct 
relationship to the whole. 
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IV. Friend and Enemy. Piaget does not give this test, 
but accepts the findines of Mme. Passello, a Geneva school-
mistress, "that at the age of 7 the notions of 'friend' and 
'enemy' axe still devoid of relativity."1 We have examples 
of definitions involving relativity. 
No. 1. An enemy is a person that hurts you and that 
you have to shoot. A friend is a person you know 
and that doesn't hurt you. You know him and he likes 
you. 
No. 3. A friend is somebody that people like and that 
the friends like the other people. 
No. 4. A friend is a boy, girl, lady, or man. (Wha·t 
makes them friends?) 'Cause they know each other and 
'cause they like yo.u and think you're nice. 
No. 7. (Repeats and emphasizes 'together') Friends are 
people that stay around together, a.nd go to shows 
together, and go to dances together, and go to picnics 
together. (That do things together?) Yes. 
No. 8. If you know somebody and he .lirkes you, that's 
your friend. 
No. 19. They are friends when you t alk to them and 
they know your nrune and like that. 
The followin~ is an interesting example of an e~planation 
involving relationship. This is given by the oldest member 
of the group, who, aside from this instance, does not stand 
out above the others. 
No. 10. An enemy is a spy. The Germans were enemies 
\ :f. R •. , 131. 
because they didn't like the Americans; the Amer-
icans were enemies of the Germans because they did-
n't like each other. 
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Some of these examples just quoted involve varying degrees 
of relationship, such as knowing and liking , hurting and 
shooting; others give an idea of a more reciprocal relation-
ship in such terms as 'if you like them and they like you' 
or by using the words 'together', •each other', etc., in their 
remarks. Others are one-sided, as~ 
No. 2. A friend is a boy or n girl you know. You know 
them and play with t i.1em. 
No. 5. A friend is a neighbor that you know. 
No. 6. A friend is a person that comes to stay with 
you sometimes. 
No. a. (See above) An enemy is not your friend; he 
doesn't like you. 
No. 10. (See above) A friend is a person you know. 
It is of interest to note that twelve years after the 
World War 75% of these children declare that they have 
never heard of an enemy and so do not know what one is. 
Another point of interest and one along the line of our 
study is the frequent use of 'because' by th~se children 
when talking about these experiments, giving reasons for 
their definitions or opinions, that is, using the logical 
1 because'. 
Through these experiments have been bfought out evi-
dences of ego-centrism which Piaget mentions, but also just 
as strong evidence of a developing sense of relativity. 
indicating a decline of ego-centrism in this group in vary-
ing degrees according to the individual, beyond their 
chronological age and far more in accordance with their 
mental age. 
CHAPTER IX 
How the Child Reasons 
If the definitions of 1 townf given by the children 
and mentioned in the last chapter are called to mind, child-
ish realism is apparent in many of them. For instance, 
11 a place where you buy things," 11 a big place and you have-
n't been there before," "a lot of stores and Christmas trees." 
These definitions are allied to definitions by usage, 
though not stated in the form 'it is for, etc.,' and come 
from the child's own particular viewpoint. Their defini-
tions of 1 friend, 1 'brother,' and 'family' were more gener-
ally stated and showed the further point of their develop-
ment. Being in the 1 in-between 1 stage of ego-centrism and 
socialized thought, evidences of both are apparent. 
With the decline of ego-centrism the child begins to 
be more conscious of his reasoning and forms his first 
logical definitions, but these are not exhaustive in the 
beginning, the child defining by particular rather than 
by specific features. Not until the age of 11-12, the 
age of formal reasoning do they become perfected. This 
is due to his unconsciousness of the meaning of the con-
cepts or words which he uses and this unconsciousness in-
volves him in incessant contradiction and makes it im-
possible for him to generalize. This unconsciousness of 
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his own reasoning is particularly true of such concepts 
as 'alive' or 1strong', Piaget affirms, although the child 
frequently uses these concepts in h~s own questions and 
explanations. 
Naturally, there is no question to asking 
the children: "What is life?" or even 11 What does 
'being alive' mean?" This would be to expect 
them to possess th~ power of making abstractions, 
and it would be absurd to conclude from the lack 
of such power to the ability to be conscious of 
meanings and to give definitions. The following 
method, on the contrary, raises no difficulty. You 
give the child a list of familiar objects, asking 
about each in turn 11 Is it alive?" and adding after 
the affirmative or negative reply, 11 Why is it 
(or is it not' alive?" The only thing to avoid is 
suggestion by persev~ration. In view of this, it 
is best to begin with objects that are obviously a 
alive or obviously inanimate, and then only after 
making sure whether there is or is not a definite 
systematization in the child's mind, can he be 
questioned about o-ojects which strike him as doubtful. 
The order to be observed is therefore roughly as 
follows: A dog, a fish, a fly, then a pebble, a 
table, a bench, then the sun, the moon, the clouds, 
the rivers, fire, wind, a marble, a bicycle, a 
train, a boat, etc.l 
Among our subjects, the idea of 'life' being because 
o£ movement or self-movement corresponds to : that of many 
of Piaget 1 s subjects. Also we find in the same child a 
heterogeneity of attributes of life, with no attempt to 
synthesize these into one general concept. But we did not 
ask these children for· :;a definition; we simply gathered 
their ideas about life, and only three children offered 
any general statement. The manner in which the questions 
1 . 





are answered show.sthat the same child attributes life in 
some instances to one cause and in others to another. Only 
two of the children who managed some or all of the syllo-. 
gisms show any signs here of logical snythesis or any gen-
eralization of ideas. 
In fact, in these tests we find the most evidence of 
finalism, precausality, juxtaposition and contradiction, 
lack of logical multiplication, etc., all of which Piaget 
points out to be the accompaniments or fruits of ego-cen-
trism. Here we witness the greatest evidence of the Iin-
between' stage in which these children are at present. 
Some of them have shown, as the tests and observations have 
proved, a noticeable advance in logical thinking, yet through 
these questions the evidence of how implicit their logic 1 
is in general comes to light. Synthesis and generalization 
of attributes to the degree of making abstractions is be-
.. 
yond the ken of most of them entirely. Here they thin~ 
t.ro~particular to narticular, without connecting these 
different attributes into one general concept. 
· To show how commonly movement or self-movement is 
thought of as a necessary attribute of life, we quote the 
following examples from different children: 
No. 1. (A dog, fish, fly) Yes, because it (res-
pectively) walks, swims, flies. (A table) No, 
because it doesn't move and jump unless people 
move it and carry it. (A bench, marble, bic¥cle, 
train) (The same idea in varied statements.) 




He makes no mistake about what is animate or inanimate, 
and offers the statement that being alive is moving, talk-
ing, and things like that. 
No. 2. (A boat) I don't know. I think so, 'cause it 
goes in the water. (A fish) If they're alive they 
swim over or under the water, 'cause a fish has got 
to breathe the water. (But he attributes life for 
one reason or another to sun, moon, fire, and rivers.) 
No. 3. (Fish) Because he swims he's alive. (Fly) 
Yes, because he flies. (She adds,) a paper flyins isn't 
alive, because it has no hands, feet, or legs. ('!'able 
and bench) No, because they can't move themselves. 
(She also calls clouds, rivers, fire, wind, a marble, 
bicycle1 train, and boat alive because they move.) No. 6. ~A dog) Yes, it runs and plays. (A pebble) No, 
(cause it doesn't move unless you pick it up. (Table 
and bench) No, it doesn't move b¥ itself. (Fire) No, 
because it doesn't move itself. {Talk to her about the 
flames dancing; she insists on her reason, which is a 
true one, of course, but incomplete) (She gives as 
a· reason that marbles, bicycles, trains, and boats 
are not alive the fact that someone has to shoot, 
pedal, or make them go. She attributes life also to 
the clouds, rivers, and wind because they move.) 
No. 7. (Attributes life to dogs, fish, and flies 
because they walk or swim or fly, and denies life to 
pebbles, tables, benches, sun, moon, marbles, bicycles, 
trains and boats, because they either do not move or 
move of themselves.) (Clouds) aren't alive because 
they dan't walk; they haven't any feet. (A river) 
because it's just water moving around. That makes it 
move around. (Wind) No, because it just moves around 
the air and blows. (He is groping for some hidden 
factor besides mere movement, but doesn't frame it 
in clear terms.) 
No. a. (Gives self-movement as a reason for life in 
different cases and generalizes in regard to his idea 
of life and movement when he says of pebbles,) No, 
they lay on the ground. If things move around, I 
know the~ are alive. 
No.;. 10. Lays emphasis on "If they keep moving.") 
(The sun is alive if it keeps moving. (The wind) is 
alive sometimes because it blows. (A marble) Yes, 
if you keep throwing it around. (A bicycle) If 
somebody keeps riding it all the time. (A train) 
If it's always moving. (A boat) If it keeps moving; 
if it stands stil, it's dead. (I asked him if he 
.. 
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was alive when he stood still, and he said,) Yes, 
'cause I eat good stuff. (The reader will. remember 
that this is the oldest child in the group. He does 
not show the furthest advance in logical thinking.) 
No. 15. (Calls several things alive 11 if they wiggle.") 
No. 20. (Attributes life to a boat "when it goes.") 
Thus the predominance of movement and self-movement as 
attributes of life is evident. Only two children fail to 
name it, and yet No. 1 : and No. 8 are the only ones to make 
any sort of a general statement about it. (No. 1: "Being 
alive is moving, or talking, and things like that." No. 
8: "If things move around:j I know they are alive.") No. 
1,7, and 8 are the only ones who answer about each object 
correctly; but they give precausal explanations for some 
objects. In spite of the two attempts at general state-
mente, there is evident lack in each child of putting "two 
and two together• and making a general statement which fits 
all cases. They reason from particular to particular here, 
and though they emphasize movement and self-~ovement, they 
i-
also bring in heterogeneous reasons and fail to relate 
them all in any way. No. 1 comes nearest to doing so• 
The same child who emphasizes movement or self-move-
ment may bring in other criteria of life, such as talking, 
the possession of hands and feet, the fact that "things 
that shine aren't alive," and "God makes" a certain thing 
alive. In some cases a child answers many of the questions 
and then says, "It just is (or isn't). I don't know why. 







· No.4 offers an interesting example of heterogeneity 
of reasons for anything being alive or not alive. 
(Dog) Yes, because he can walk. I never saw a man kill 
a dog. 
(Fish) Yes, when it's in the water, because there's no 
hook going down there to kill. (How do you know it's 
alive?) If he swims, he's alive. 
(Fly) Yes, because they don't kill it yet. If a lady 
kills them they're not alive. If a lady doesn't kill 
them, they're not dead. 
(Pebble) No, it can't walk or see or roll, not unless 
a lady makes it roll. 
(Table) No, because it has legs out it can't walk. 
It can't see. 
!Bench) No, because it can't walk. Sun) Yes, because it can make the day bright. Moon) Yes, because it makes it bright like the sun. 
Not as bright as the sun, though. tHere she brings 
in utility as a reason for being alive.) 
(Clouds) Sometimes they are alive, sometimes they 
aren't. At n.ight they're alive. Some days they are-
n't. (Eviden.tly when they are not visible she con-
siders them not alive.) 
(River) Yes, 'cause it floats around. 
(Fire) Yes·, 'cause it burns. If it burns something, 
paper, logs, sticks, it's alive. (Effectiveness or 
power the criterion.) . 
(Wind) Yes, 'cause it blows. Because it makes the 
night cool when it blows. (Utility again.) 
(Bicycle) No, because it doesn't go unless a boy or 
girl rides it. · 
(Marble) No., it can't roll unless a boy or girl rolls 
it. 
(Train) Yes, unless a man turned the engine off. It is 
then, 'cause when he turned the engine on it goes like 
that {motions). · 
.(Boat) Yes, if a man and lady started it it would go 
on the water. 
She shows a confusion of ideas all juxtaposed with no thought 
of synthesis. Most often movement or self-movement is the 
criterion, but i n the case of the clouds, for instance, she 
does not take movement into account at all. Although these 
questions were all asked in succession, she does not connect 
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her ideas or attempt to generalize. She does, however, 
offer this general thought, 11 Vlhen you die, you aren't alive. 
· When you don't die, you are alive." But this has nothing 
to do with what being alive involves in many of her state-
ments. She deals with each particular case by itself; 
hence, the disregard of any relationship between the sev-
eral notions and the unconsciousness of any contradiction 
in her statements. 
The various answers of each child offer an interesting 
study of these points but enough examples from each one 
and the answers of this one child in the entire~y bring out 
sufficiently the points we a.re discussing. 
The same holds true of their answers about 'strength', 
though there is more consistency here than in their answers 
about 'life' 1 and greater similarity between the answers 
of the different children. But there is no attempt whatever 
to gather the attributes into a general idea. We followed 
Piaget's suggestion of not asking outright for a definition 
and no child spontaneously gave one. 
In general, the children considered the wind and rivers 
strong because of the rapidity of self-movement or because 
of their power to move or to break other things, and tables 
and benches strong because they hold things and people up. 
No.1. (Emphasizes 'resistance' in saying of a bench.) 
Yes, it's lots stronger than a table, because people 
sit in it and bear down. 
14'9 
No. a. (Shows his practical nature in his comment,) 
You and I wouldn't be sitting here if it (the Bench) 
wasn't strong. 
Some of the children attribute 'strength' to tables and 
benches because of the material of which they are made, 
and going back of that, "if the wood is rotten, they're 
apt to break." Some attribute 'strength' to the ocean and 
river because they hold boats up, but No. 2, who was one 
of these 1 does not carry t his t ~iought over into his ideas 
about tables and benches. He attributes their strength to 
the strength of the tree from whose wood they are made. 
No. 20. (Says of the wind, as do several others.) 
When it blows, it's strong; when it doesn't, it 
hasn!t any strength in it. 
Only two children try to carry the same idea of 'strength' 
lying in power to move over to a table and bench. 
No. 7. (Denied at first t hat a t able was strong.) No, 
there's nothing to make it go fast. (What about those 
things on the table?) The table has to be strong to 
hold them. . 
No. 15. (The wind) Yes, 'cause it makes you go always. 
(Table) No, it doesn't move. (Bench) No, it doesn't 
move. (Quickly changipg her mind) Oh, yes, it won't 
break, 'cause it's a lot of wood. 
We find nevertheless, little contradiction in the srune child's 
answers about any certain thing, as Piaget did.
1 
If, as 
in the instances we quoted, the child changes from motion 
to resistance as a necessary attribute of the particular 
thing, he corrects his own idea about it and does not 
1 
Of. J .R. I 156. 
deny life for the lack of the former attribut·e. Never 
does he accept both views at once, as of course he should 
be able to do in the case of the river, but always gives 
either one or the other attribute as a criterion. Again, 
these children are always reasoning from a particular 
viewpoint. 
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We can agree with Piaget in his conclusions that two 
particular points stand out from t his experiment, uncon-
sciousness of thought processes resulting in contradiction 
and lack of arrangement into a logical hierarchy of the 
notions or ideas about a concept. Concerning the contrast 
in this matter between children and adults, we quote: 
1 
For most' ·of our ideas, too, are determined by 
several heterogeneous factors and even by fac-
tors which are the same as those used by children. 
Thus we, like children, define life as self-
movement, as the fact of having blood (or sap, or 
any kind of circulation), etc. We also define 
force as activity and as resistance. Where we 
differ from the cb~ldren we have been.·discussing 
1s that we always have the component parts of 
the concept si~ultaneously in mind. Thus we say 
that a river has force because it flows fast, 
but we do not deny that a bench has resisting 
force even though it makes no movement. The 
child, on the contrary, thinks, not simultaneously, 
but alternately of the two determining factors. 
When he is thinking of resistance he denies force 
to rivers because a pebble sinks to the bottom · 
of the :~ater, and when he is thinking of motor 
force he denies force to a bench because it moves 
neither itself nor any.thing else.l 
J ·,R,, 156 f. 
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Our ·eubj ects do not exhibit the same degree of contra-
diction that Piaget refers to. When they attribute strength 
to motion or to driving force they do not deny it to things 
standing still, as he avers some of his cases do. In the 
two instances only when children do -this, they immediately 
see their mistake ana correct it, one without any question 
Asked. In their ideas about life, we find more contradic-
tion, as we have stated, life be ing attributed to motion 
in some cases and the fact of motion being left out of 
consideration entirely in other cases. Also, in regard to 
str~ngth, in a few instances, they say a table or a bench 
is strong if it has something on it to hold and not if it 
does. not. They are considering the outward evidences of 
strength, not the constant elements of inherent force or 
resistance. These are questions too deep for the child's 
mind to grasp. But the point we are emphasizing is that 
these children again are not as contradictory in their 
statements as a greater degree of ego-centrism would en-
tail. These facts do not nullify Piaget's statements, only 
emphasize again the simu~taneousness of a decline in ego-
centrism and a decline in its accompaniments. It is 
certainly true that 
they (the children) think of them (the 
factors or classes) alternately, without 
bringing · them together, and fhat is why 
they cannot define the word, 
'· 
1 . 
J .R., 160. 
and that 
the reason why adult concepts a r e in a state 
of equilibrium is that they are the products 
of logical addition or multiplication.l · 
Piaget goes on to shov1 how this lack of synthesis 
is due to an over-determination of certain ideas and to 
show the connection of all the features we have discussed 
in our various chapters, ju~taposition and syncretism, 
the child 1 s inability to use the relations of discordance, 
his thinking from particular to particular, or by trans-
duction, his overdetermination of certain ideas, his lack 
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of recognition of reciprocal relationships, his lack of 
synthesis, and his irreversibility of thought, all these 
either bound up with or growing out of ego-centrism, and 
declining as it declines. He discusses contradiction by 
amnesia and by condensation, and t he part -played in child-
ish reasoning by such factors connected with contradiction 
as imitation and' assimilation of reality~ We cannot take 
up all these points in detail but would refer the reader 
to the two closing chapters in his second book on the logi c 
of childhood. 2 In these are gathered up all the points 
which we have emphasized throughout this study and to which 




J.R3 , Chap~ers IV and v. 
his two books. 
l 
What appli es to the child is also true of 
science. So long as Physics took absolute 
space and time as its demain it reached a 
certain degree of development but came short 
of any fundamental solution. But from the 
moment that it was realized that the measurer 
was relative to what he measured, the result-
ing relativity enabled physics, thanks to the 
conditions of invariability and co-variability, 
to attain objectivity. In the same way, so 
long as t he child thinks he can reason directly 
about things without taking himself into account, 
he will succeed neither in handling relations 
nor in reaching logical necessity. As soon as he 
brings in his own ego as an element in these 
relations, the child attains to the reciprocity 
of relations and to logical strictness ••• As soon 
••• as rel a tions become completely reciprocal, the 
fertility of relational multiplication knows no 
bounds, and generalization becomes possible. Nay, 
more, this reciprocity is what explains the re-
versibility of all deductions and consequently 
the character of strictness and necessity that 
is peculiar to the reasoning process.l 




Because of the nature of these observations and the 
constant comparison of them to Piaget's standards, we have 
necessarily drawn conclusions in regard to each phase of 
the development of our thesis. There remain, then, only 
a few general conclusions. 
In the first place, we cannot emphasize too strongly 
the great contribution made by Piaget to the study of child 
reasoning. As a thorough analysis of the trend of develop-
ment and its different stages it forms a most enli gh t ening 
basis for child study. It has been more and more evident, 
however, in the course of these observations and experiments 
that he fails to emphasize the followin~ points: 1) The 
importance of mental rather than chronological age in de-
fining these stages of development: 2) The individual ap-
titudes or differ~nces in rapidity in development: 3) The 
effect of t he style of language used in the child's home 
on his own language development: 4) the socialising influ-
ence of that home or of his environment: 5) the necessit y 
of adapting meticulous points of language to the particular 
language which is native to the child's country: 6) The 
natural responsiveness or adaptability of the child to the 
experiments tried. But as a working basis for successive 
stages of development, it is invaluable. 
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It has been evident throughout that the smaller, 
superior group was not to be compared to Piaget 1 s standards 
for six-year-olds, but to the stage more nearly approxi-
mating their mental age, and the.t within that small group 
of twelve mental age was but one, although a very important 
item, in the child's individual development in the social-
ization of thought. 
It was emphasized in the study of the individual child 
how much greater a degree of socialization of thought and 
language he exhibited when checking his ideas by those of 
the family group and how in a lesser degree he used more 
socialized language with one adult than with one or more 
children. These facts lead us to the importance of envii·-
onment in the development of child language and thought and 
consequently in his reasoning. 
One little girl, during the last experiments discuss ed, 
asked me, "Can D. talk at the table?" ".Yes 11 • "I c~ 1 t,only 
just to ask for things. My daddy 1 d give me a whipp ing i f 
I talked at the table just to tell him things." If the 
table conversation among the family is the most socializ-
ing factor in one child's life in the matter of language 
and thought development, the other child is missing that 
influence entirely. This illustration is offered merely 
to bring out the point of the varying environmental in-
fluences in this small group entering in to determine the 
degree of socialized thought of its membe~s. 
We agree thoroughly with Piaget in his suggestion 
that such studies as his and those based on hismay prove 
of great value to parents and educators. Considering 
such findin gs, how essential it is to adapt our training 
to the child 1 s level of reasoning and to be sure that he 
understands us. How often his proneness to syncretism may 
lead him to select some unessential point and build his 
schema about that, leaving him utterly and innocently un-
aware of wha.t we had in mind as important. How many child-
ren in the past have been unfairly held responsible for 
aspects of situations of which in their ego-centric outlook 
they were utterly unaware? 
. . 
In the educational field how essential it is to take 
these findin gs into consideration as to subjects taught and 
methods of teaching these subjects, recognizing tha t the 
child thinks first in confused wholes, and fails to ana-
lyze or to recognize relations. The modern unit system 
of reading is in harmony with Piaget 1 s findings, beginning 
with whole sentences, then gradully through familiarity 
recognizing word units, and late-r analyzing these into 
their individual letters, the.se letters finally in new 
relationships to be built into synthetic wholes. The 
project system, also, beginning with the intellectual 







and when he is old enough to do so, abstractions based on 
these projects may be made. With Piaget's diagnosis of the 
development of child thought and reasoning as a guide, all 
subjedt-matter can consciously be fitted to the child's 
stage of development. 
Many times Piaget hints at the remants of ego-centrism 
existing in adults, but that through social inter-action 
we are made conscious of our shortcomings and are engaged 
in a perpetual struggle toward maturity. An understanding, 
made possible by his explanation, of the stages by which 
our own thought has developed and the consequent self-ana-
lysis marks a further step in our own development away from 
the effects of ego-centrism. 
There ma.y be room for criticism of Piaget in the em-
phasis which he puts everywhere on the ability to reason 
formally as the acme of development and in his consequent 
fine distinctions drawn between implicit' and pure logical 
reasoning. Everywhere this nicety of distinction has been 
evident in the tests which he applied. It should be re-
membered, however, that even though formal logic and the 
syllogism are but the shell or corpse of reasoning, they 
are the evidence of the ability to separate oneself from 
one's own point of view and to consider matters in a 
relative light, which ability even in a practical way is 
indispensable to maturity of thought. 
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In our observations and experiments w~ have not been 
able to follow up clues exhaustively. Vistas of further 
investigation with the individual children have ·opened :up 
but time and opportunity forbade following them up. This 
thesis is offered not as a conclusive treatise, but as an 
interesting study made in the light of Piaget 1 s theories 
and findings. 
A:ppendix 
Since the completion of this thesis the wri.ter 1 s 
attention has been called to the recent book, Child Psy-
chology, by Margaret Wooster Curti, Assistant professor 
of psychology at Smith College. She devotes considerable 
space to a discussion of Piaget's theories concerning child 
thought and reasoni::1 g and makes the following comr:1ents. 
It is only recently that we have had systematic 
investi gations of children's t ho ught which have . 
succeeded, as it were, in getting beneath the 
surface. 
The great advance in this respect has been 
made in Switzerland by Jean Piaget.l 
Ego-centrism is inevitable in early child-
hood but in thus calling our attention to its 
importance in thinking Piaget has made a fruit-
ful contribution, especially as he shows that the 
other chief features of child thought are intrin-
sically related to this ego-centrism.2 
No one has studied so thoroughly the actual 
processes of empirical thinking in children as has 
Piaget, or traced in such a penetrating way, by 
means of systematic investigation, 'the progress 
3 made by the child in powers of lo gical analysis. 
In various places, howeve·r, Mrs. Curti calls attention 
to the fact that Piaget narrows the concept of reasoning 
down to formal reasoning only, and she remarks that if we 
thus restrict reasoning we will find it rare among adults. 
1 




Ibid. , 260. 
·' 
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Compare the following statements to the conclusions 
of this thesis: 
1 
2 
The word method of teaching reading, pre-
valent now for years, is based on the realization 
that it is natural for the child to react to whole 
words first, and only later to read by ~utting to-
gether of previously perceived letters.~ 
One reason which might well be advanced for 
adhering to this (Piaget 1s) conception (of reasoning) 
is that it might have a good effect on practical 
dealing with children. Perhaps too much time is 
spent trying to instruct through formal reason 
young children who are really incapable of pro-
fiting by such methods.2 · 
But according to our conception successful 
integration of the whole personality cannot begin 
until the child has acquired some conception of 
himself as an individual in relation to other 
people and some general idea or plan of what he 
wants to make himself. Such an objective con-
ception of himself the average child does not 
acquire until the age of twelve or so, if we acc-
ept Piaget's analysis. Some for lack of know-
ledge or of sufficient innate intelligence, never 
acquire it, and hence can never have well-inte-
grated personalities. They may as adults have 
desirable personality traits and distinct indi-
vidualities but their outlook in life remains 
essentially childlike and naive. 3 : 
Not only the rate at which children pass 
through the first primitive stages of thought but 
the degree to which their ~atute conceptions of 
the world and human life become rational are sus-
ceptible of control by adults, a point on which 
Piaget does not dwell. There are differences of 
opinion on the extent to which rational thought 
should ·be applied, but it would be generally agreed, 
probably, that the abi l ity to see the world in 






the attainment of what we might call "inner 
harmony". The child must learn sometim·e, if 
he is to lead an effectively integrated life, 
to look upon himself as merely one individual 
among an inconceivably large number of others 
of past and future as well as of the present, 
living in a vast world which is not organized 
with reference to their wishes. And so, by 
whatever means they may, those who bring up 
children will wish to help them outgrow their 
first crude ways of thinking and achieve ra-
tional standards of conduct, to the end that 
sometime they ma.y learn, as independent and 
mature personalities, thoughtfully to direct 
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